The following is an interesting letter that I received from one of my many astute subscribers. He brings up the valid point that once management is allowed to exercise imprudently wide discretion in terms of disclosure (and by extension, opinion on valuations), then investing in the US public equity markets becomes essentially a widespread, electronic form of Vegas slot machines. Keep this in mind as I prepare to release my findings on JP Morgan (see the questions I raised about their derivative exposure here: (Why Doesn't the Media Take a Truly Independent, Unbiased Look at the Big Banks in the US?) to subscribers, with a few freebies and tidbits to the general public as well.

Letter from a concerned reader (I haven't' disclosed his name, but he is free to reveal himself in the comments if he wants to):


Based on some recent research, it is clear that a small loan for $225 million from Goldman Sachs was the proximate cause of GGP's bankruptcy.

Here it is. Goldman made the loan on 10-8-2008 with GGP pledging various Columbia, MD properties as collateral. The collateral was released on May 15, 2009. I pieced this puzzle together from the Q 4 10-K referencing the $225 m Goldman loan ( GGP Q4_10k 08/09/2009,14:10 65.99 Kb), a 2-4-2009 WSJ article discussing the loan (Loan Deadline Passes for General Growth -, the Q2 2009 10-k cash flow statment ( GGP_Q2_10k_cashflow 08/09/2009,14:09 480.58 Kb) showing the funding of the DIP loan and the takeout of the Goldman loan evidenced by the deeds of trusts (GGP Goldman Deed of Trust 2009-09-08 14:03:23 2.08 Mb) and releases of the collateral ( Goldman GGP Release 2009-09-08 14:06:07 63.08 Kb). In addition, the forbearance agreement reached in April 2009 required GGP to disclose the terms of Goldman loan agreement. 

Reggie, the inescapable conclusion is that this loan was the time bomb that blew up GGP. How else can one explain their takeout with the DIP facility. This loan has never been disclosed.

event. In this case, management deemed that a $225 million loan was "immaterial" and elected not to disclose the terms of the deal. 

Six months later, the loan comes due with the lender apparently threatening Armageddon, successfully I might add, with the loan getting taken out in May with funds from the DIP line.

Also, attached, please find a copy of a letter from the SEC regarding the Bucksbaum Trust loans to the officers to cover margin calls (SEC_letter_re:_o d_loans 08/09/2009,14:20 19.74 Kb). So far, I have not located their reply. For those that haven't been following the blog for long, we found evidence of these issues over a year and a half ago, and plainly stated our concerns years before the lawuits were even considered. See "We did find some surprises, and my blog readers chimed in with their expertise and opinions..."

This failure to disclose is a real issue. How can anyone make informed investment decisions when management is withholding critical agreements that impact directly on the solvency of the Company.

I would like everyone to keep that last thought in mind as we parse through JP Morgan's (the so-called "most respected commercial bank on the street") deep dive next week. GGP analyses

  • Will the commercial real estate market fall? Of course it will.
  • Do you remember when I said Commercial Real Estate was sure to fall?
  • The Commercial Real Estate Crash Cometh, and I know who is leading the way!
  • Generally Negative Growth in General Growth Properties - GGP Part II
  • General Growth Properties & the Commercial Real Estate Crash, pt III - The Story Gets Worse
  • More on GGP: A Granular View of Insider Selling and Lease Rate Growth
  • GGP part 5 - The Comprehensive Analysis is finally here
  • My Response to the GGP Press Release, which seems to respond to blogs...
  • For those who were wondering what sparked that silly press release from GGP...
  • GGP: Foreclosure vs Asset Sale
  • GGP Refinancing Sensitvity Analysis
  • GGP part 7 - Share value under the foreclosure analysis
  • GGP part 8 - The Final Anaysis: fire sale of prime properties
  • Analysis of GGP's recent Q1 results
  • GGP Conference Call
  • Reader's legal observation on GGP
  • GGP Can't Afford its Dividend
  • Press release announcing new equity financing - something that I didn't explicitly model in my own
  • analysis, but after reviewing information without the benefit of official documentation, there were no surprise nonetheless...
  • We did find some surprises, and my blog readers chimed in with their expertise and opinions...

Free research and opinion 

  • Reggie Middleton on Goldman Sachs' fourth quarter, 2008 results
  • Goldman and Morgan losses in the news, about 11 months late
  • Blog vs. Broker, whom do you trust!
  • Monkey business on Goldman Superheroes
  • Reggie Middleton asks, "Do you guys know who you're messin' with?"
  • Reggie Middleton on Risk, Reward and Reputations on the Street: the Goldman Sachs Forensic Analysis
  • Reggie Middleton on Goldman Sachs Q3 2008

§ As Reality hits, the Masters of the Universe are starting to look like regular bank employees

I am still in the process of preparing the Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) stress tests for publication, but just came across this headline in Bloomberg: General Growth Files for Protection in Biggest U.S. Real Estate Bankruptcy.

 This prompted me to excerpt a portion of the Pro level Stress Test Analysis. Remember that Goldman has some of the highest VaR numbers of the bulge bracket save the collapsed Lehman Brothers (LEH), which collapsed in large part due to its commercial real estate exposure (much as Bear Stearns).

I also want to reiterate the investment horizon that I use when implementing my research. With the recent bear market rally forcing shorts into drawdown, keep in mind that my research looks 3 months to 1 year out. I personally bought puts on GGP at $60 and suffered through many a drawdown before that position reached fruition.

This means that if I say XYZ company has poor prospects and that company doubles in price within 3 months, it really has no bearing on whether said analysis was right or wrong. I have absolutely no control or special insights into the markets. I can tell you if a company is in trouble though. The issue is, this trouble takes time to manifest, and this time period is often more than just a few months. Be prepared to hold on to your positions for a year or more. Trust me, it is worth it and I am right more often than not.

Shorting a company from $60 to $1 yields a very strong IRR of return on an annual basis. Patience is both justified and highly rewarded. A lack of patience and weak hands easily turns a big profit into a big loss.

Goldman Sach's CMBS Pressure Points and Other Risk Factors Not Reflect in VaR 

I have been banging on the table since September of 2007 about the unappreciated risk the commercial real estate market poses - way before the crowd of investors, pundits, analysts and media. See: 

Well, the nation's second largest property owner and REIT has just filed chapter 11, after I warned readers over a year and a half ago of this very distinct possibility. See General Growth Files for Protection in Biggest U.S. Real Estate Bankruptcy then go on to read the 80 or so pages of research that I have generated to support riding the share price down from $60 to near zero: GGP and the type of investigative analysis you will not get from your brokerage house.

  This underappreciated risk will reverberate through investment banks, insurers, money center and regional banks alike for these are the source of the large nonrecourse loans and CMBS that funded these vehicles. In addition, the retail mall REITs will see significant hits to asset prices and consequently rents (more so than they have already seen, which has been significant already) which will put additional stress on debt service.

 Keep in mind that the General Growth Properties (GGP) issue is not confined to GGP. Debt that had financed assets during a property bubble cannot be rolled over due to a dearth in financing - causing bankruptcy. Chances are that this will be seen several more times in the next 8 quarters or so. Long story short - expect valuations, rents, credit quality and cashflows to drop as vacancies and delinquencies rise. 

GGP 01 4db2b

Break up of mortgage backed securities


Q4 07

Q1 08

Q2 08

Total mortgage backed securities




Commercial real estate
















Sub prime




Loan portfolio




As the CRE market starts to deteriorate and the CMBS market collapses, the entities that are holding these securities through high leverage (Goldman currently has a roughly 22x leverage ratio) will be very sensitive to any changes in valuation. Goldman holds nearly $17 billion in CMBS, and at 22x leverage, it will be hurt if the GGPs of the world force realistic marks to be made through real world transaction, ex. Bankruptcy.

As a percentage of total mortgage backed securities


Q4 07

Q1 08

Q2 08

Commercial real estate
















Sub prime




Loan portfolio





The commercial real estate risk that Goldman Sachs is woefully underappreciated by the market and apparently unknown to the sell side analytical community. Take it from the guy that clearly anticipated the fall of Bear Stearns (Is this the Breaking of the Bear? [Sunday, 27 January 2008]) and (with the help of his readers) pointed out the Lehman Brothers CRE implosion connection (Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise? [Thursday, 21 February 2008]), as well as the GGP debacle in full detail (GGP and the type of investigative analysis you will not get from your brokerage house). Goldman has risk here, among other places that aren't even visible in its rapidly increasing VaR numbers...

GGP02 bec09


Other risk exposure not included in VaR


Q1 07

Q2 07

Q3 07

Q4 07

Q1 08

Q2 08

Trading Risk
















Non-trading Risk
















Other Equity














Real Estate















See also: The Official Reggie Middleton Bank Stress Tests 

Disclamer and explanation as to what I do for a living: I am a pure investor, plain and simple. I am not a journalist, analyst or professional pundit. As such, I am short GS since June of 2008, and was heavily short GGP from 11/07 to the latter part of 2008. So there is no confusion, I am nearly always short a company that I am bearish enough on to generate and publish bearish research - just as I will always be long a company that I take the time to publish bullish research on. This is a constant, and I don't have the time and bandwidth to do otherwise, unless otherwise stated - which is quite rare.

Required reading for this article: The very first paragraph of the very first post I made on this blog and "the Great Global Macro Experiment".

Of course commercial real estate is going to fall. Why? For the exact same reason residential real estate is falling. But, there hasn't been an oversupply of commercial real estate, you say. Well, the oversupply is not the core reason why residential is falling right now. Residential RE's problem is that easy, cheap money brought upon wreckless, imprudent speculation from players who were not well versed in the real estate game - and even those who should have known better. The current oversupply is a byproduct of that liquidity induced speculation. Why split hairs? Because the devil is in the details. The downfall of CRE is the rampant speculation that caused many to significantly overpay for assets that are quite illiquid and take significant expertise and time to improve (or even sell), even incrementally. Not only did they overpay, but they applied significant leverage as well, much more than the industry norm.

A Quick Commercial Real Estate Primer: Pricing Commercial Real Estate

There are several ways to price and value CRE, but the simplest and most straight forward is the capitalization rate (cap rate).

The cap rate is simply net operating income/price. The result is a yield that you can use to compare to other investments in order gauge relative price/return - such as the 10 yr. note yielding 4.114%. For instance, I buy a building for $100,000 and it throws off $10,000 after all operating expenses. $10,000/$100,000 = .10 or 10% = the cap rate. Thus this building is priced at a 10% cap rate, or priced by the seller to give the buyer a 10% return, unleveraged. This 10% return priced into the building allows a 589 basis point risk premia over the 10 yr treasury. Why, you ask? Because the office building is much riskier, being very illiquid, taking many months or years to close on and sell. The office building inherently has risk of litigation, operational risk, and market risk. It also requires a modicum of operational expertise, and in addition there is credit risk (through your lessees(?) So, as you can see, the risk premia is well deserved.

Now, many (in order to juice the return a bit) apply leverage through mortgages, bank loans, etc. to spice up the return, albeit at the risk of higher volatility of cash flows and the possibility of running negative cash flow in tight years. Assume, I used 30% of my own monies ($30,000) to buy this building and borrowed $70,000 for the rest. I now get that same $10,000 net operating income off of a $30,000 cash outlay, vs a $10,000 cash outlay. So now I yield 33% return instead of a 10% return due to leverage. Of course my astute readers realize that the cost of this leverage was not factored in. Let's assume the debt service for this loan is $4,900 per year. I must deduct that interest and principal repayment from my operating profit. This is reality. Thus, my leveraged yield is really something akin to 17%. Still not bad, and still better than 10%.

The realities of the liquidity boom generated leverage, the absence of risk premia & how the combination of the two will bring down commercial real estate

There are additional caveats to the use of leverage. For one, it greatly reduces operating flexibility. If you paid all cash in the deal above, and two out four of tenants move out or go bankrupt, your (variable) cashflows are not as hindered by your debt service (fixed) which offers you the flexibility to pay more bills until you replace your income. If you took on debt, you have less room to maneuver since the debt service is a fixed cost. Of course, the more debt you take on, the less room you have.

Now, over the last year or two, I have witnessed market participants purchase apartment and office buildings at cap rates of,,,, hold your breath now,,,,, 1.5% -4.5%. That's right. These are supposed professionals, acquiring multi-million or even multi-billion dollar risky assets yield less than a 10 yr treasury or your local money market fund - much less. There are only way two ways to justify paying a low cap rate:

  1. A clear path towards increasing net operating income, such as doubling rents (this ain't gonna in this economic downturn with corporate earnings disappointing and the residential housing stock at all time highs), or reducing expenses, or -
  2. selling to an even greater fool at an even lower cap rate. With the easy money drying up and CMBS market looking rather scary, fools that are easily departed with thier money are increasinly hard to come by. Now, we can find fools, still - but the money part is the kicker these days - And even if you find a fool who still has some of his money, how do you convince even him to pay between 0% to 1% return on his money for your risky asset when treasuries are currently yielding ove 4%. This is not even taking into consideration leverage - which would assuredely drive this asset into negative cash flow, with NO MARGIN for ERROR in operating. Trust me, you will need a margin for error. Everyone makes mistakes, even me. I made one back in the early '90s... :-)

Sam Zell, one of the most successful real estate investors of our time, sold his Equity Office Properties Trust of Class A and B buildings to Blackrock for what I assuredely thought was a fools price. When I saw the numbers, I said easy money or not, there is an ass for every seat. Well, little do I know. Blackrock found someone to pass the cherry on to, and in near real time at that - and they paid even lower cap rates than Blackrock did. Hats off to the Blackrock folk. You found the guys at the very tip top of the market to drop those cap rates off on.

Now, the problem for the last guys to buy these properties (as Sam Zell sits there smiling on his $21 billion pile of cash) is that it is going to be nigh impossilbe to find someone who will pay a ZERO cap rate, and try as you might it will be damn hard to raise lease rates amongst an economic hard landing and negative trending earnings... And thus, this is the fate of commercial real estate. The many guys who overpaid, will get burnt as values tumble from their peak bubble highs. Old school real estate guys email me and say they never even heard of 5, 6 and 7 percent cap rates until recently (after 30 years in the biz). Well, some of these guys are pushing zero (literally 1.5% to 3 and 4%).

So I told my team to find the low cap rate buyers so we can short 'em. We, of course, started looking at the profile of those who bought from Blackrock (I mean, who wouldn't?) and then moved on when we saw that their were some entities that were in some real (and I mean real) trouble. Here are a couple of companies that we passed on because they weren't bad enough off:

Vornado - implied cap rate of 4.2% (currently about that of a risk free note, but fraught with risk), and debt to equity of 163%. This means $1.63 of debt to every dollar of equity or in terms of residential real estate.

Equity Residental - implied cap rate of 5% (currently about that of a risk free note, but fraught with risk), and debt to equity of 193%. This means $1.93 of debt to every dollar of equity. Inserted comment: Error correction, hat tip to Kiku below. It has been pointed out in the comments that published equity numbers are misleading for REITS, which is why we measure portfolio value independently, as we did with the mononline insurers and the homebuilders. Could you imagine going to a bank (like Countrywide, with mortgage backed structured products insured by Ambac) and saying, "Hey, I'd like to borrow twice what my house equity is appraising for, and I want to do it now, Dammit!" :-) Alas, this is what "The Great Global Macro Experiment" has wrought.

If you think these numbers might look just a little hairy, just wait and see the numbers of the companies that I am actually shorting. The one's above were actually cut off of the short's short list, so to say. Once you see, you will be a believer just like me - commercial real estate is on its way down. See comments below for more on the accuracy of the book calculations I use in my analysis vs. used in this story.

Details of transactions for sale of properties by Blackstone Group 


Particulars of transaction



12th June, 2007

Sold Extended Stay Hotels

The Lightstone Group LLC

$8 billion

9th August, 2007

Sold 38 assets comprised of 106 office buildings and 5.9 million square feet in San Diego, Orange County, San Francisco, Seattle, Portland and Salt Lake City. The properties are from the CarrAmerica West Coast Collection that Blackstone Group purchased last year as part of a national portfolio.

GE Real Estate-owned Arden Realty


17th July, 2007

Merlin Entertainments Group, the leisure park operator owned by Blackstone, sold its property assets to


property firm Prestbury Group plc owned by real estate investor Nick Leslau.

Prestbury Group plc

$1.27 billion

27th August, 2007

Sold 9 suburban Chicago office complexes to GE Real Estate. Blackstone acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties Trust.

GE Real Estate

$1.05 billion

27th August, 2007

Sold a portfolio of downtown Chicago properties to Tishman Speyer. Blackstone acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties Trust

Tishman Speyer

$1.72 billion

9th February, 2007

Sold 6.5 million square feet of Manhattan office space Macklowe Properties. Blackstone acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties Trust.

Macklowe Properties

$7 billion

A couple of weeks ago I informed readers that I was working on a big project concerning commercial real estate short candidates. I stated last year that I was sure CRE was headed down, hard. Well, I am now ready to start releasing the results of my research over the next week or so. Unfortunately, the market has moved against the subject of my research fiercely as I was completing it, but it appears to be far from over. Who is the subject of that research, you ask? General Growth Properties (GGP). I have actually seen this company pop up in the media and a few discussion groups from time to time, but they have no idea what the management of this company has been up to. First, a little background on how I got here. Those who are not versed in commercial real estate valuation are urged to read my quick and dirty primer on CRE valuation .

I told members of my analytical team to screen the commercial real estate trust, service, and development sector for the usual suspects, starting with the the guys that purchased Sam Zell's flipped properties from Blackstone. I made some of the companies available via blog post and download: Commercial Real Estate Cos. (43 kB). Forest City Enterprise Peer Comparison (198.98 kB), Vonardo Realty Trust (146.49 kB). After and exhaustive screen and resultant short list, we chose GGP. I then instructed the team to canvass local and national brokers (4), databases (5) and data aggregators (several) to get the most precise localized rental and expenses figures possible. This data, as well as purchase dates, prices, management actions, capital improvements, etc. were used to plug into models such as this 33 page illustrative example, GGPs Woodlands Village (612.34 kB), to ascertain the true value of GGP's portfolio. We also measured and valued their development operations, joint ventures, CMBS financing, off balance sheet vehicles and master planned communities. Sum total, I now have roughly 2 gigabytes of "REAL" valuation data on my servers covering 260 properties owned or partly owned by GGP. A this point, I may know more about their operations than they do.

What is more telling is the window of understanding this opens into the commercial real estate space in the US. It is my opinion that most are extremely over-optimistic regarding the prospects for this space.

An Overview of What I Found

  1. Valuing the company - After including the proportionate valuation of the properties in which GGP has minority stakes, we got a total portfolio valuation of around $30 bn based on the NOI stream. Adjusted for the current o/s debt of $24 bn. The net valuation comes to $6.5 bn. Note this is nearly the same as the $6.6 bn. valuation based on CFAT (after debt service) stream as per the aggregation of the 260 individual valuation models, which lends signifcant credence to the numbers. Finally, including an estimated $2.8 bn for the PV of the stream of other income, the total valuation of GGP stands at $8.8 bn which is a 5% downside from the current market cap.
  2. Our present rental growth assumptions are based on reasonable estimates of GDP growth, population growth and household income growth in the company's operating locations. We believe these assumptions represent a best case scenario. We have yet to build the impact of the slowdown over the last few months as reflected in falling retail sales and consumer spending. Incorporating these factors, valuation may decrease 10-15%. The worst case scenario assumptions considering expected recession conditions will drive valuations down to around 20%. This is probably mislabeled as "worst case scenario", since I strongly believe we are already in a recession - one that looks to be rather severe. We would incorporate the different scenarios and work out the precise numbers later on in the week. Keep in mind that I am being conservative here. My gut feeling puts these numbers much lower.
  3. Referring to the Leverage portion of our models, we identified the properties with leverage higher than 80%. It can be observed that around 73% of such properties have negative PV based on CFAT (including debt service), validating the fact that highly leveraged properties are already running into negative values - and this is at the onset of recession - much worse is to come.
  4. The Cap Rate Analysis in the same file shows that the properties purchased over the last 3-4 years are earning lower cap rates (3-4%) than those purchased in late 1990s and early 2000s owing to higher relative purchase prices in the last couple of years. Since a large lot of GGP's portfolio has been added in the last 3-4 years, the overall cap rate of the company is being negatively impacted by the lower cap rates for such properties. Further, with macro-economic conditions turning adverse, such properties may already stand overvalued in GGP's books and may soon turn into losses. Up until this point and as I did with the homebuilders, stated book was pretty much ignored and I went about constructing book value independently. I am now having the mod squad delve into the reported numbers for comparison's sake.
  5. Another important observation is that around 100 properties (38% to 43% depending on how one includes ownership under JVs) have negative equity. Around 70% of those were acquired in the last couple of years (when credit availability was easy and cost of debt low), reiterating the finding that a large amount of these properties may be significantly overvalued in GGP's books.
  6. We have also looked for the historical NAV trend for GGP. However, since NAVs are not publicly available (GGP does not report NAV for its portfolio), we haven't had much luck thus far. Specifically, the REIT NAVs computed by Green Trust Advisors, one of the most popular REIT investment advisory concerns, are also not publicly available for the recent periods. The latest NAVs we could find from this source were for early 2007 when GGP stock was trading at around 10% discount to NAV. However, we believe that due to the subsequent difficulties in the credit market, the situation may have reversed of late. I have the Mod Squad continuing to explore this area and will post the findings on the blog.

Other issues of note

  1. Rise in Insider Transactions: There has been more than a couple of insider transactions for sale of company shares by senior executives in last 1-2 months. This may indicate GGP management's indirect response to overvaluation of company's share price at current levels of $39.36.
  2. Huge Mortgage Obligations: The company has huge mortgage obligations (approx $24 bn as of Sep 30, 2007), due for payment in next couple of years. In view of the credit crunch in the global financial markets, the company would be mandated to refinance its financial liabilities at a considerably higher interest rate, thereby adversely impacting its cash flow.
  3. Overvalued Stock: Based on our initial work on valuation of GGP, the company's stock seems overvalued by approx 15% at current level of around $40, indicating a minimum potential downside risk of $6 per share. Again, this is an optimistic scenario, excluding the possibility of recession. GGP is highly reliant on 2nd tier retail shopping centers and to a lesser extent Master Planned Communities. I expect both of these segments to take a bath in the upcoming years.
  4. Property Overvaluation: Our working on individual property valuation indicates a number of instances where the Company's properties seem to be overvalued. These properties have mostly been purchased in late 2006 and 2007. There are also quite a number of such properties which were purchased in 2001 and 2002. This is paradoxical, since the commercial real estate was quite soft during this period. I consider it management's error to overpay for properties during an era when it should have been relatively easy to get the properties at decent prices. This could also be a result of mismanaging the properties as well.
  5. Lower than expected 4Q2007 retail sales: Many US retailers have witnessed lower-than-expected sales in 4Q2007 owing to slow-down in US consumer spending. This may (most likely will) dampen demand for commercial rental space in the US, thereby creating downward pressure on commercial real estate rentals.
  6. Stock Trading at 52 Week Low: The company stock is trading at 52 week low price of $39.36. Despite this, there is still noticeable insider selling.

The above observations are based on initial assessment and valuation of GGP properties in different geographies in the US, and we shall come out with some more and refined observations as we advance our research on the company.

Cap Rate Analysis

Year of
Cap rate No of
Unlevered risk
premia received
Mgt performance
2007 3.8% 107 0.2% Awful
2004 2.7% 39 -1.0% Class action suit?
2003 4.3% 17 0.6% More awful
2002 13.8% 47 10.2% Mo' better
1999 3.8% 3 0.1% Mo' awful
1998 7.5% 13 3.8% Dull average
1997 5.4% 9 1.7% Bad


Equity Summary

Year of
No of
Properties with
negative equity
% of Properties
with negative equity
2007 107 37 45%

39 21 26%
2003 17 11 13%
2002 47 4 5%
1999 3 2 2%
1998 13 4 5%
1997 9 3 4%
Total 235 82 100%


Leverage Summary

Properties with negative equity and leverage >80% 32
Properties with leverage >80% 44
% of properties with negative equity (based on CFAT after debt service) 72.7%


Summary of GGP Valuation

GGP valuation on NOI basis $
Consolidated valuation as per Portfolio Valuation sheet (NOI based) 30,553,483,142
less: Debt outstanding 24,073,812,000
Estimated portfolio PV 6,479,671,142
Add: PV of the other net income 2,383,540,286
Estimated valuation of GGP 8,863,211,429
No of shares 243,810,000
Estimated share price 36.35
Current share price 38.4
Upward (Downward) -5.3%
GGP valuation on CFAT (after debt service) basis  
Consolidated valuation based on CFAT (after debt service) 6,605,261,299
Add: PV of the other net income 2,383,540,286
GGP's estimated market cap (CFAT basis) 8,988,801,585
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