Displaying items by tag: Investment Banks

Here's my latest with Max Keiser along the requisite related background opinion. Please scroll 13 minutes into this clip for my latest interview with Max Keiser discussing Goldman Sachs (remember, I was the first and original public Goldman Bear), the race to the bottom three (or the Triumvirate of super states looking to crash the other two), the banks as the "new tobacco companies" and the accuracy of my call that banks are choking on Bernanke's ZIRP flavored medicine...

You just don't hear this stuff in the mainstream, do 'ya?

Published in BoomBustBlog

Check out the screen shots below from Bloomberg.com yesterday. Whoa!!! What happened? How did we get here? Let's just keep in mind that what may look like analytical/intellectual superiority on my part in comparison with to the literal army of Wall Street analysts and pundits may actually simple end up being intellectual honesty and a dearth of truth destroying conflicts of interests. Then again, it does make me feel good to say that I may be smart, doesn't it?

Published in BoomBustBlog

This is my response to an inciteful insightful comment posted by GJK313. It is in reference to an article which readers can find here, titled "FASB Surrenders - America Win". I suggest readers read the aforelinked document in its entirety before moving on. Notice how this is written by economists and analysts, not real world investors that are investing THEIR OWN CAPITAL! When I state "own capital" I mean their money, and not that of their clients. I cannot fathom how anyone who had their own money at stake would ever want more ambiguity in pricing assets, in lieu of less.. Let me pick this apart...

"Somehow it believes that marking everything to market (even when that market is illiquid) will somehow make the world a better and safer place"
Well, when the market is illiquid, the assets in said market have a lower market value. It really is that simple.
"Somehow it believes that marking everything to market (even when that market is illiquid) will somehow make the world a better and safer place"
Yes, because if said banks had to liquidate their loans the only place to liquidate them would be said "illiquid" market. This goes to show you how the value of the loans are probably highly overstated by those such as the authors of this article. Guarantee me that no bank will ever go bust again - guarantee me that no bank will never, ever need to sell assets, and I will soften my stance some on mark to market accounting. Until then...
"banks will be allowed to carry loans on their books at amortized cost, reflecting cash flow (payments), as well as reasonable estimates of likely loan losses."
This should now mean that the price of all unsecured loans should drop immediately and dramatically for all consumers, for FASB and these authors are not differentiating between loans backed by collateral and loans not backed by collateral. Many formerly overcollateralized real estate loans are now partially or fully unsecured due to the collapse of real estate "Values" and "Prices" (yes, there is a difference). They are also not taking into consideration the financial and strategic advantages of defaulting on a loan against an asset with negative equity. So, if the banks can now benefit from pricing loans at will (as the authors stated, "reasonable estimates of likely loan losses" - who will make these estimates?), regardless of collateral, why shouldn't that benefit be passed onto the consumer and allow them to enjoy said valuation/pricing perks. Picture me going to a bank and saying, "Just loan me $4 million with nothing hard to back it for no more than you charge that guy with a 40% overcollateralized loan. You can't charge me more since I will keep my payments current and you will be able to make a "reasonable estimate" of the losses, of which of course there will be none because.... Well, just because!"
Does this scenario make any sense to you?
Published in BoomBustBlog
Friday, 04 February 2011 17:59

Is Another Banking Crisis Inevitable?

Today, Bloomberg reports that Goldman Sachs Turns Bullish on Europe Banks as Debt Risk Eases.The report goes on to state:

The U.S. bank that makes the most revenue from trading advised investors to take an “overweight” position on banks, raising its previous “neutral” recommendation, according to a group of equity strategists led Peter Oppenheimer. Investors should pay for the trade by lowering holdings of consumer shares, he wrote.

“For financials the narrowing of sovereign spreads in peripheral eurozone, which our economists expect to continue, is a clear positive,” London-based Oppenheimer wrote in the report dated Feb. 3. “Banks are one of the least expensive sectors in the market and the trade-off between their growth prospects and earnings in the next few years looks especially attractive.”

Unfortunately, the risks of this particular trade were not articulated, and I feel that the risks are material. Far be it for me to disagree with the "U.S. bank that makes the most revenue from trading", but they have been wrong before - many times before. Reference Is It Now Common Knowledge That Goldman’s Investment Advice Sucks??? or Did Reggie Middleton, a Blogger at BoomBustBlog, Best Wall Streets Best of the Best? for more on this topic.

Attention subscribers: A new subscription document is ready for download File Icon The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis

So where is the risk?

The impact of the Asset Securitization cum Sovereign Debt Crisis to bank balance sheets should become the market and media focus. The full cost of cleaning up the balance sheets of financial institutions particularly against the backdrop of adverse macro shocks emulating from sovereign defaults is not fully known. Structural weaknesses in sovereign balance sheets could easily spill over to the financial system due to the fact that most banks are stuffed to the gills with sovereign debt – highly leveraged, and marked as risk free assets at par. This can have broad, adverse consequences for growth in the medium term.

Published in BoomBustBlog

Another stint on Max Keiser discussing topics such as Goldman's Facebook offering that never was, what happens when its the banks that walk away from a home, phantom banking profits that never were, and more shenanigans that are the tour de force that is today's banking system and economy. To skip directly to the Reggie Middleton interview, move to 11:55 in the video.

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Published in BoomBustBlog

It's official, the mainstream media has turned on those "doing God's work" and come to the side of BoomBustBlog.

I must admit, I was shocked when I first read this headline and saw the accompanying cover. After all, Bloomberg was the organization that published a story lavishing adulation upon a young Goldman analyst that had a 38% win rate throughout the credit crisis and (faux) recovery. I see those results as mediocre at best, and downright horrible from a realistic perspective. To make matters even worse, I believe I ran circles not only around that analyst, but the entire firm, see Did Reggie Middleton, a Blogger at BoomBustBlog, Best Wall Streets Best of the Best? The next thing you know, this heavy nugget of truth is dropped, and all I can say is.... Damn. Let's excerpt some juicy tidbits from Blankfein Flunks Asset Management as Jim Clark Vows No More Goldman Sachs:

On Jan. 2, Jim Clark, a founder of such technology icons as Netscape Communications Corp. and Silicon Graphics Inc., was at home in Palm Beach, Florida, when he got an e-mail from an executive at Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s private wealth management division. Goldman was offering Clark a chance to invest in the closely held social-networking company FacebookInc. The deal -- through a fund overseen by Goldman Sachs Asset Management -- was being offered to other Goldman investors at the same time, Bloomberg Markets magazine reports in its March issue.

The firm would levy a 4 percent placement fee on clients, plus a half percent “expense reserve” fee. It would also require investors to surrender 5 percent of any profits, known as “carried interest,” according to a Goldman Sachs document.

Clark turned Goldman down. In June, 2009, he had yanked most of the roughly $400 million he had invested with the firm due to what he considered bad advice and poor performance, including a big hit from GSAM’s Global Alpha hedge fund. This offer, he says, just irked him further. A few months earlier, he had purchased a stake in Facebook through another firm for a lower price, he says, and without the onerous carried interest.

“I don’t think it’s reasonable,” Clark says. “It’s just another way for them to make money from their clients.”

Jim Clark is a smart man, and I don't think he needs me to assure him of that. For those who may not be as hip to fees and valuations, I published The Anatomy Of The Record Bonus Pool As The Foregone Conclusion: We Plug The Numbers From Goldman’s Facebook Fund Marketing Brochure Into Our Models which clearly demonstrated that this offering was primarily for Goldman's bonus pool integrity and basically a ripoff for clients. In the following post, I declared "Here’s A Look At What The Goldman FaceBook Fund Will Look Like As It Ignores The SEC & Peddles Private Shares To The Public Without Full Disclosure". As excerpted:

Published in BoomBustBlog

Goldman Sachs posted a 53 percent decline in quarterly profit, due in large part to the reversion to mean of their outsized trading profits over the last several quarters - as duly warned in the BoomBustBlog research reports. As per CNBC:

Fourth-quarter net income after payment of preferred stock dividends totaled $2.23 billion, or $3.79 per share, compared with $4.79 billion, or $8.20, a year earlier. Net revenue fell 10 percent to $8.64 billion.

Analysts on average expected profit of $3.76 per share on revenue of $9 billion, according to Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S.

Net revenue dropped sharply, as we anticipated as well.

Net revenue in fixed income, currency and commodities slid 39 percent from the third quarter to $1.64 billion, reflecting what Goldman called "generally low client activity levels."

The Goldman, et. al. story is not over yet. There is still a material amount of legacy assets (losses) to be recognized at market value. The market is not returning to the point of inception of this stuff, and the true extent of the losses have yet to be taken. I have been uber bearish from this perspective, yet market prices appeared to disagree. The problem was simply a matter of gross, coordinated misrepresentation (a fancy way of saying "lying, on  a large scale - and with the cooperation of regulators"). I was absolutely correct, and now that the truth has come out, will there be any rule of law? Let's reminisce through referencing several posts from 2008 wherein I made clear that Goldman Sachs was much riskier than practically ANYBODY on the street and in the media recognized...

Published in BoomBustBlog

After hearing of Goldman's plans to allow investors to skirt SEC guidelines and issue private shares of Facebook to the public, I had a plethora of warnings and admonitions. Once I (and my best analyst) took the time to parse the numbers and the logic behind the deal, I concluded that Facebook Registers The WHOLE WORLD! Or At Least They Would Have To In Order To Justify Goldman’s Pricing: Here’s What $2 Billion Or So Worth Of Goldman HNW Clients Probably Wish They Read This Time Last Week!

In a nutshell, not only is the offering unlawful on its face (although probably lawful due to the financial engineering cum law splicing from the wizards at Goldman), the valuations were simply stuff of fairy tails and dot.com implosions.

Published in BoomBustBlog

I read this headline from the Financial Times and said to myself, "Okay Reg, Don't say 'I told you so'". Thus, you won't hear it from me, at least not this time. As reported today in the Financial Times: Goldman reveals fresh crisis losses and Goldman’s republished results present a new picture

Goldman Sachs has revealed details of about $5bn in investment losses suffered during the crisis for the first time this week, in a move that will deepen the debate over companies’ financial disclosures. The figures, issued as part of internal reforms aimed at silencing Goldman’s critics, show that the bank suffered $13.5bn in losses from “investing and lending” with its own funds in 2008. But Goldman’s regulatory filings and its executives’ comments to investors at the time pointed to about $8.5bn of losses arising from its investments in debt and equity, as markets were rocked by the turmoil.

Hmmmm! I walked through this in explicit detail in “When the Patina Fades… The Rise and Fall of Goldman Sachs??? and I did it without being privvy to Goldman's financial innards. It was more or less common damn sense. Goldman and its employees do not walk on water, they do not shit gold, and they cannot perform miracles. If one takes an objective approach to their equity analysis, and simple plug the numbers into a spreadsheet (objectively) you would have come up with the exact same conclusions that I gave my subscribers all of these years. Let's reminisce, shall we?

So, what is GS if you strip it of its government protected, name branded hedge fund status. Well, my subscribers already know. Let’ take a peak into one of their subscription documents (Goldman Sachs Stress Test<br /> 	Professional Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional 2009-04-20 10:06:45 4.04 Mb - 131 pages). I believe many with short term memory actually forgot what got this bank into trouble in the first place, and exactly how it created the perception that it got out of trouble. The (Off) Balance Sheet!!!

image001.png

Contrary to popular belief, it does not appear that Goldman is a superior risk manager as compared to the rest of the Street. They may
the same mistakes and had to accept the same bailouts. They are apparently well connected though, because they have one of the riskiest
balance sheet compositions around yet managed to get themselves insured and protected by the FDIC like a real bank. This bank’s portfolio looked quite scary at the height of the bubble.

And back to the FT article...

Published in BoomBustBlog

This is the Facebook valuation exercise that I promised to release to the professional (HNW) blog subscribers (File Icon FB note final). As is customary, I am including a material amount for the public blog to chew on. I think most will find it quite the engaging read, at the very least. If you haven't read my first three pieces on this topic, please do so for you will easily be able to glean my overarching opinion on this most recent Facebook "investment":

  1. Facebook Becomes One Of The Most Highly Valued Media Companies In The World Thanks To Goldman, & Its Still Private!
  2. Here’s A Look At What The Goldman FaceBook Fund Will Look Like As It Ignores The SEC & Peddles Private Shares To The Public Without Full Disclosure
  3. The Anatomy Of The Record Bonus Pool As The Foregone Conclusion: We Plug The Numbers From Goldman’s Facebook Fund Marketing Brochure Into Our Models

As reported by Bloomberg, the Facebook stock sale throws new light on the Goldman Sachs potential conflicts of interest – conflicts which we have illustrated in full detail in the past. By offering shares to its most favored clients and forcing them to commit or decline in less than a week, Goldman not only made investing in Facebook seem like a precious privilege from a marketing perspective, but made due diligence nearly impossible for those who did not have a dedicated staff with the free resources to throw at the problem in near real time. We, at BoomBustBlog would like to remedy such an issue as what I see is the new face of  investigative reporting and analysis on the web, and will offer consulting services to HNW and UHNW clients who find themselves in similar binds in the future. Simply drop us an email.

Goldman warns, 'We’re probably going to dump this load, but we may also need you to remain behind to hold the bag!'

In its offer for the $1.5bn stock sale of privately held social-networking company Facebook, Goldman Sachs disclosed that it might sell or hedge its own $375m investment without warning clients. Under the deal, private wealth-management clients would be subject to “significant restrictions” limiting their ability to sell stakes while Goldman Sachs own holding can be sold or hedged at any time, and without warning. One would hope that astute clients and investors would be put on guard by such conflicting and restrictive liquidity measures! In addition, it appears as if Goldman Sachs failed to disclose its clients that it had offered Facebook shares to its internal investment group, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, headed by one of its star fund managers, Richard A. Friedman.

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