Government manipulation in the free markets will lead to more volatility, not less

The market has predictably rallied as a result of a massive, US government induced short squeeze. We all saw this coming. We all know this is government manipulation, and not a fundamental occurrence. Yes, that's right! Pure, unadulterated government manipulation. The government gave special relief to a very small segment of the market, the very same segment from which many of those same officials hail from (Wall Street), in an attempt to prevent the price of their shares from reaching equilibrium with their value. This is nothing but interference in the free market system. Let's not even broach the discussion of the ethics or legality of naked short selling. The government failed to ban the practice for the homebuilders whom I shorted into single digits, they failed to do it for the monolines whom I shorted into the single digits, they failed to do it for the regional banks whom I am on way to riding to the single digits, they failed to do it for the retain industry, the automotive industry. So what makes them do it for Wall Street? Let me help you ponder that query... The table below is derived from , and is a compilation of Washington lobbyist money by sector. If you had to guess who donated the most money to Washington over the past 10 years, who do you think it would be? Okay, I know that's a hard question, so I'll give you a hint. What sector just got preferential treatment in an attempt to prevent entities such as mine from shorting certain companies' share to the point where their share price matches their companies' intrinsic value (ex. Goldman Sachs is worth a tad bit less than $130 per share, yet it is trading over $180, an ideal opportunity for me)? Still can't guess. Okay, here is another hint. What industry (or even company whose shares are currently overvalued) spawned the last few treasury secretaries? Need more hints???

So the SEC participates in this cronyism cum capitalism for sale game (and I really mean that) and the shares of the financial stocks (whose macro situations, micro situations, and balance sheets are very bad and getting worse) sky rocket upwards. The CEOs of these companies such as Dimon (who just bought a $20 billion company for less than 5% of that and still had bad numbers), says outright, things are bad and they are getting worse - yet his shares jump, and jump hard (more on this later). Well, if you think that there was a lot of volatility when they fell the first time, what do you think will happen to the volatility number after they knee jerk upward with valuations still falling down. Eventually, price = valuation, then free fall. Granted, somebody may have had an opportunity to dump some stock while the prices were artificially elevated above their intrinsic value, but so be it.

So, now you all know what I think will happen when the market eventually comes to the same valuation conclusions that I do? The government (actually, the SEC) has exercised its rendition of the Bernanke put, and I have been assigned. No problem, I have plenty of cushion from reading the overvaluations in the market correctly up till this point. Thus, I will accept my assignment and move on with my synthetic short position ala the SEC, for I am confident equilibrium will be reached. So, what happens if I am right?

At the end of the day, the fundamentals will always rule. After all, we all eventually have to pay our bills

I've been offline for a day or two, come back and see many have lost faith in the fundamentals due to a government induced bear market rally! My, hence this blog's focus and forte, is extreme fundamental and forensic analysis. My strength is cutting through the bullsh1t. You know how some guys are good at basketball, some are natural poker players, well my nose is acutely attuned to bullsh1t. Do not, and I repeat, do not take the PR and marketing pitch's in press releases, financial media news blips, and people who generally either have no idea what they are talking about or have an extreme incentive to bend the facts as a proxy for actual

performance. Look at the actual performance numbers, not the press releases, and not the "analyst's "so-called" expectations which fluctuate like the wind and are easily manipulated by management. An example of what I am referring to is when analysts expect a company to report $1 profit. The company comes out with guidance, 60 cents lower, and the sell side community drops there expectations accordingly to 40 cents (I look at its as this company is #$@#$ up). Well, when the company reports a 50% drop in profit, the "Street" applauds and the stock skyrockets because the company beat expectations by 25%. Whaaaaat!!!!??? Think about it. The company earnings stream, based on this period's earnings, is half as valuable as it was last period, yet the stock pops as if there was some good news to be had. This is a shell game, plain and simple. I understand why the Street plays it, but the readers of this blog know better. Just imagine if you received a 50% pay cut, then your boss wants to celebrate your "promotion" with a party. I already see many with that bewildered look on their face as I type this. Well, welcome to the earnings expectations vs. reality game.

Now, I will briefly go over the results that accompanied the Cox version of the Bernanke put:

JP Morgan: CEO has dire outlook for the present and even worse for the future, credit reserves increase across the board, gets a $20 billion plus company (along with a $3 billion Park Avenue office building), a fat government subsidy and plethora of guarantees, for almost less risk adjusted economic outlay than the Yankees paid for A Rod, and still reports 51% drop in net (I didn't even check to see if BSC's profit and revenue were added in to JPM's numbers). Where is the good news in this???

PNC: As I forecasted in my analysis, charge-offs skyrocket, capitalization remains thin.

MTB: More of the same

Wells Fargo: Smoke and mirrors at its best. They move the goal posts closer then say they kicked a field goal. Note the HELOC charge off modification. Note no explanation on how they profited from MBS sales when the rest of the WHOLE WORLD failed to do so. They raise their dividend during a time of global bank capital constraints. Why do such an imprudent thing, you ask? Smoke and mirrors, my friend. Smoke and mirrors.

I will go a little more in depth into PNC and WFC if I get the time later on today.

As a backdrop, for those who haven't read my background research on the banking system, please do. After reading it, I don't see how anybody can be very positive on the US banking system - at all.

A few people have had trouble finding this post, so I dug it up myself. There are approximately 465 archived posts dating back to Sept 1 2007. I strongly suggest those who have either the time or the economic interest browse throgh my Archives (click here to access them). There is the equivalent of hunreds of thousands of dollars of quality research buried in there. A shame to let it go to waste. Remember, if the link leads to this message, : Cannot find the entry.The user has either change the permanent link or the content has not been published." it means that the article has already been archived, and you will need to access it through this link in the main menu - "Archives".

The orginal Doo Doo 32 post:

A sampling of the Asset Securitization series:

1. Intro: The great housing bull run - creation of asset bubble, Declining lending standards, lax underwriting activities increased the bubble - A comparison with the same during the S&L crisis

2. Securitization - dissimilarity between the S&L and the Subprime Mortgage crises, The bursting of housing bubble - declining home prices and rising foreclosure

3. Counterparty risk analyses - counter-party failure will open up another Pandora's box (must read for anyone who is not a CDS specialist)

4. The consumer finance sector risk is woefully unrecognized, and the US Federal reserve to the rescue

5. Municipal bond market and the securitization crisis - part I

6. Municipal bond market and the securitization crisis - part 2 (should be read by whoever is not a muni expert - this newsbyte may be worth reading as well)

7. An overview of my personal Regional Bank short prospects Part I: PNC Bank - risky loans skating on razor thin capital, PNC addendum Posts One and Two

8. Reggie Middleton says don't believe Paulson: S&L crisis 2.0, bank failure redux

9. More on the banking backdrop, we've never had so many loans!

10. As I see it, these 32 banks and thrifts are in deep doo-doo!

11. A little more on HELOCs, 2nd lien loans and rose colored glasses

12. Will Countywide cause the next shoe to drop?

13. Capital, Leverage and Loss in the Banking System

14. Doo-Doo bank drill down, part 1 - Wells Fargo

15. Doo-Doo Bank 32 drill down: Part 2 - Popular

16. Doo-Doo Bank 32 drill down: Part 3 - SunTrust Bank

17. The Anatomy of a Sick Bank!

18. Doo Doo 32 Bank Drill Down 1.5: The Forensic Analysis of Wells Fargo

See: Insolvency of the Fannie and Freddie Predicted Here Two Years Ago. What Happens Next? Or How to Avoid the “Mother of All Bailouts”

The following is a heavy excerpt (pardon me Dr., but you were so accurate in expressing my thoughts and feelings on the topic that I just had to spread the word) from the afore-linked post in Nouriel Roubini's blog:

First notice that, as discussed previously in this column, the farce that Fannie and Freddie were “private sector" firms was obviously a farce as investors always expected that the liabilities of the two GSEs would be eventually backed by the U.S. government. And in spite of the decade long rhetoric by Fed, Treasury, the Bush administration, conservative government-bashing hawks and a slew of other regulators that Fannie and Freddie were private firms, that investors should not assume that they would be bailed out if these firms turn out to be insolvent and that the moral hazard deriving from perceptions of an implicit guarantee should be stomped as hard as possible, the reality was different: these were effectively public institutions – not private ones - used by the government (especially this administration) to pursue public policy goals. The hawkish rhetoric about the “moral hazard” the from implicit guarantees that Greenspan, Bernanke, Paulson, Bush and the administration peddled for eight years was thrown out of the window the moment the housing and mortgage bust started. Instead, for the last few months the GSEs – that were already bleeding and becoming insolvent on their own portfolio – have been used by the government to back stop the mortgage markets: their portfolio limits were raised, their regulatory capital was reduced and the limits to what conforming mortgages (that the GSE can repackage/insure) are were raised from $420k to over $720k. So much for barking in public about “moral hazard” and then going ahead and using already distressed GSEs to bail out the mortgage market and make them even more insolvent. Now this “the emperor has no clothes” farce has been revealed to be what it always was: a high-flatulin “moral hazard” farcical rhetoric with zero substance and credibility.

To minimize the financial cost of this farce the administration should stop pretending that these are private institutions and go ahead and take them over and nationalize them since they are going to bail them out anyhow. The financial costs of this farce include the $50 billion of subsidy that the GSEs bondholders/creditors are receiving every year as the spread of the agency debt over Treasury is now close to 100bps (100bps on $5 trillion of liabilities is equal to $50 billion). Today the market prices the debt of the GSEs as if there is a meaningful probability that – once bankrupt – these firms will be treated as private firms and their bondholders will take a loss. But if the government is going to bail them out - because the consequences of a capital levy on their bondholder will destroy the mortgage and housing markets - the government should at least make this implicit liability (the guarantee of the $5 trillion debt of the GSEs) explicit and thus save the U.S. taxpayer that $50 billion subsidy that is given every year to the creditors/bondholder of Fannie and Freddie. An implicit liability that is not made explicit is the worst of all worlds as fat cats on Wall Street and around the world get a 100bps spread relative to safe Treasuries ($50 billion subsidy) on their holdings of agency debt and they know they will be anyhow bailed out if Fannie and Freddie go bust. Saving those $50 billion will not make Fannie and Freddie solvent as their insolvency hole is too big to be filled but it would at least reduce the fiscal bailout bill – that could be as high as $200-300 billion – that their insolvency and government takeover will imply.

I've had knowledge of the Indy Mac Bank takeover for about a week, and failed to post it. It was timely, but I've been overwhelmed by this blog, starting a new business, winding down the old business, investing in this "new depression era", three kids, a wife, 2 dogs, a bird, a ferret and 2 snakes (plus fish, parents and in laws). Burnout ensues. I only get to post about 40% of what comes across my (virtual) desk.

So, to make up for not passing the gossip, I will pass along some empirical innuendo. C. Peterson's blog has an interesting post surmising the extent of the implied haircut the FDIC is taking on IMB assets. It appears significant from Mr. Peterson's perspective. Remember, the FDIC is undercapitalized for the event that is coming. Taking over IMB is a big chunk for them to swallow (the 2nd largest bank failure to date, but I think that record will be broken soon), and they have four 12 course meals coming down the pike. Remember my post, The worst is behind us, unless massive bank failure is a bad thing. According to the WSJ: The collapse is expected to cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. between $4 billion and $8 billion, potentially wiping out more than 10% of the FDIC's $53 billion deposit-insurance fund.

Well there are a few more banks coming. The regulators are saying that my local Senator, Chuck Schumer, is responsible for the collapse of IMB, by instigating a run on the bank. Well, that's debatable, but I'm going to give him a call anyway for I can see the logic in the statement. If he'll have me in such a manner, I'll go over the entire Asset Securitization Crisis Analysis, page by bage - and hopefully make him the most knowledgeable and educated politician on the subject, or maybe not.

Below, you will see where Huntington Bancshares and WaMu are most likely on the FDIC list. These companies score very poorly in the Eyles test as well (different spreadsheet).

image003.png

Countrwide has just been rescued (a temporary thing, I'm sure), which leaves Huntington Bancshares lonely at the top of the pile in regards growth in Texas ratio. For those who need a quick primer, from Wikipedia:

The Texas ratio is a measure of a bank's credit troubles, developed by Gerard Cassidy and others at RBC Capital Markets. It is calculated by dividing the value of the lender's non-performing loans by the sum of its tangible equity capital and loan loss reserves.

In analyzing Texas banks during the early 1980s recession, Cassidy noted that banks tended to fail when this ratio reached 1:1, or 100%. He noted a similar pattern among New England banks during the recession of the early 1990s.

image005.png

According to these growth measures and the historical validity of the Texas Ratio, as long as ratio growth measures remain constant these two banks may fail sometime in the fourth quarter.

This is just my unconfirmed opinion, but if the FDIC has to take over WaMu, it will put a severe financial strain on them that will hamper their ability to handle the other smaller banks that are bound to fail as the future unfolds. Without additional funding, the FDIC itself may fall victim to insolvency. I have not explicitly ran the numbers, so don't consider this set in stone, but one would be very unwise to flirt with FDIC insured limits and maybe even brave to think that the FDIC (in its cuurent funded capacity) has the upcoming situation under complete control. For those that haven't read my lengthy Asset Securitization Crisis Analysis - it is now required reading to be on this blog.

I expect this list to grow very quickly:






Failed
Bank List

I have decided to share a portion of my interest in the consumer finance sector with the blog. I put a team together to focus on this sector before moving on to develop the next leg of my investment thesis. We have shortlisted 8 companies in the US consumer lending sector for further fundamental analysis. We will be looking more closely at these companies and reviewing their financial statements and foot notes. I'll share the procedure and two of the finalists (sounds like a beauty pageant, doesn't it?) as well as one that was booted from the list.

We selected these companies based on the following procedure:

From our initial list of 825 companies globally, we selected 525 companies by excluding 290 companies for which price information was not available and were having market cap of less than 2.5 mn. Of the remaining 525 companies, we selected 146 companies based on relevance of business in the following line of business - Credit cards consumer installment, credits loan guarantees, secured/unsecured consumer lending, real estate lending, consumer lending and financing, capital funding service, outsourced receivables management, pawn brokering services, financial guarantee insurance.

Of the remaining 146 companies we excluded 26 companies which had witnessed price decline of more than 65% over the past one year. We obtained 34 US companies (in the remaining list of 120 companies), of which 6 were excluded with market cap of less than $10 mn.

The following are 3 out of the 8 companies that were shortlisted from the list of 28 US companies for further scrutiny:

American express (AXP) :

· AXP with adjusted P/B of 6.47x trades higher than most of its peers.

· The company’s net charge-off’s to loans in 2007 was 4.0% while its total allowances to loans was 3.4% suggesting that the company might have inadequate provisioning

· AXP’s total debt to common stood at 662.3% at the end of 2007 while its leverage at 13.6x is considerably high when compared to its peer group.

Capital One (COF) :

· COF’s five year EPS growth (geometric) is at a negative of 0.3% reflecting the company’s dismal performance.

· COF’s return on equity and return on assets at 6.3% and 1.0% , respectively for 2007 is significantly lower than its peer group.

· 30 day+ delinquency rates for credit card segment increased to 4% in 1Q2008 from 3% in 1Q2007 while charge-offs for US credit card segment had increased to 5.85% from 3.72% in the comparable period.

SLM Corporation (SLM) :

· SLM’s 5 year geometric EPS and NIM growth of -6.1% and 2.2% is quite low when compared to its peer group.

· SLM has very thin NIM margin of 1.3%.

· The company is highly leveraged with leverage ratio of 29.7x and total debt to capital at 4,019% (sourced from Bloomberg)

· SLM’s total reserves at 0.8% of total loans could be inadequate to cover for future charge-offs.

· Although the stock has declined nearly 63% over the past one year its still trading at $19.4 . A further probe revealed that there was not enough meat left on the bone for significant downside potential from the current levels.

The next step was to whittle down the 8 companies chosen to a manageable chunk...

Among the 8 companies shortlisted for further scrutiny, we have looked at the first 7 and have shortlisted 3 companies based on the following observations (I'm only publsihing two for now).

Capital One:

· Note: Capital One was on my radar last year and earlier this year as having the highest default rate among its peers, but I decided to move on to other targets on both occasions. Despite the price drop and a more stringent screening process, it shows up in the scan once again. Capital One’s loan portfolio comprising credit card business, auto finance business and international business is facing problems as reflected by higher delinquency rates (30+ days) in its US credit card business, auto finance business and international business at 4.04%, 6.42% and 5.12%, respectively in 1Q2008, up from 3.06%, 4.64% and 4.78%, respectively in 1Q2007.

· Its net charge offs increased 78% to $767 mn in 1Q2008. Also, its allowances for loan losses increased 44% to $3.3 bn.

· Despite increase in delinquency and charge-offs, the company’s provisioning for loan losses seems inadequate. In 1Q2008 COF’s provision to loans were 1.10% while chare-offs to loans stood at 3.07%. Its provision to losses was consistently below its charge-off rate in the previous four quarters

· Its net interest income growth (q-on-q) slowed down drastically to 2.8% in 1Q2008 from 5.6% and 8.5% in 3Q2007 and 4Q2007, respectively.

· Non interest income growth (q-on-q) was negative 4.7% in 1Q2008 compared to 11.1%, 9.0% and 0.4% in 2Q2007, 3Q007 and 4Q2007, respectively.

· Its adjusted leverage also increased from 11.7x in 1Q2007 to 13.4x in 1Q2008

American Express (AXP)

· AXP’s ‘reserves as % of consumer receivables’ at 3.6% in 1Q2008 as against ‘loans 90 days past as % of loans’ at 4.4% reflect that the company has inadequate allowances for bad loans.

· AXP’s write-offs for consumer receivable loans have increased to 0.78% of loans from 0.62% in 1Q2007 while write-offs for Card member loans have increased to 0.74% in 1Q2008 from 0.55% in 1Q2007.

· Despite increase in charge offs and inadequate provisioning, AXP’s adjusted P/B of 6.47x seems significantly higher than its peers

· Leverage has increased from 11.7x in 1Q2007 to 14.6x in 1Q2008.

SLM corporation has also witnessed similar trend in its provision for loan losses and write offs but the stock has already witnessed around 65% decline in its price over the last 12 months. Therefore, the same has been excluded from our list of 3 shortlisted banks.

Of the above companies, AXP and Capital One appear more venerable based on initial analysis.

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The mortgage market has not even started to "really" fall apart yet. The "worst is behind us", indeed!

U.S. Mulls Future of Fannie, Freddie

The Bush administration has held talks about what to do in the event mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac falter, according to three people familiar with the matter, as the stock prices of both companies continue to fall sharply.

These were two of the most obvious shorts to make in the mortgage crisis -pure mortgage lenders and insurers!

From Bloomberg: Fannie Mae, Freddie Losses Make Them `Insolvent,' Poole Says :

Chances are increasing that the U.S. may need to bail out
Fannie Mae and the smaller Freddie Mac, former St. Louis Federal
Reserve President William Poole said in an interview. Freddie
Mac owed $5.2 billion more than its assets were worth in the
first quarter, making it insolvent under fair value accounting
rules, he said. The fair value of Fannie Mae's assets fell 66
percent to $12.2 billion, data provided by the Washington-based
company show, and may be negative next quarter, Poole said.

``Congress ought to recognize that these firms are
insolvent, that it is allowing these firms to continue to exist
as bastions of privilege, financed by the taxpayer,'' Poole, 71,
who left the Fed in March, said in the interview yesterday.

The latest BIS Annual Report provides an overview of cross-border lending and interbank exposures. “International claims of BIS reporting banks rose from $6 trillion in 1990 to $37 trillion in 2007 (equivalent to over 70% of world GDP.) The withdrawal of institutions from a major national banking system from international lending could affect advanced industrial economies as well as constrain the financing of emerging markets.” For those that follow these matters, it may be worth reading.

The conclusions drawn from this report are analogous to the one's that my team and I have drawn and it is what is powering the next step in my investment thesis which I will start publishing in a few weeks. We look at this from two perspectives:

First – reduction in international exposure by US and European banks would lead further slower down of these banks as they cut down on their loan (and deposit) exposure in emerging and developing economies. Also, these regions generally offer higher NIM and more opportunities growth in fee based income, etc. The banks and financial institutions might have to cut down their forecasts in view of their strategies to strengthen and revive the plagued liquidity situation in their country of headquarter.

Second – This action by banks and financial institutions is likely to impact the growth in developing and emerging economies dependent on foreign source of finance for their development needs. For eg, Latin American economies have large dependence on US and European banks, and any cut-down in investment will impact growth of sectors like infrastructure, real estate, etc, which require large investment.

I have stated that I believe to be bubblicious as far back as last year - before it was vogue to do so. Now, with the Chinese broad markets down 50%+/-, I still feel they are in a bubble. The banking system is not immune either, contrary to popular opinion, and as I have stated as recently as last week. We are looking into specific potential global shorts, and I will have some others for the short list besides HSBC to post once positions and research is finalized. In the mean time and in between time, here's a smattering of what I have found and summarized that illustrates and/or supports some of my Asian investment thesis.

From Bloomberg: China Banks Stung as Stock Market Rout Spurs Shift Into Costlier Deposits

China's 146 million stock investors,
burned by slumping prices, are pulling money out of equities and
putting it into deposits. That's not necessarily a good thing for
banks.

As the benchmark CSI 300 Index tumbled 46 percent this year,
investors shifted cash from low-yielding ``demand'' deposits to
so-called time deposits that pay interest that's at least four
times as much, according to Credit Suisse Group AG. During the
two-year stock market rally that ended in October, households
were doing the opposite, reducing costs for the banks.

With the government now restricting loans to combat
inflation, Chinese banks face narrower profit margins as they're
unable to compensate for higher deposit costs by accelerating
lending. The stock market drop also is curtailing mutual fund
sales, hampering efforts by banks to increase earnings from
outside their mainstay lending business.

``The situation will get worse unless there's a turnabout in
market sentiment, which seems unlikely anytime soon,'' said Leo
Gao, who helps oversee the equivalent of $2.3 billion at APS
Asset Management Ltd. in Shanghai. The shift to time deposits
``will take a toll on banks' profitability,'' he said.

From Bloomberg: Ambac Says Rating Downgrades Trigger Collateral Calls; May Need More Funds

Ambac Financial Group Inc., the bond insurer that lost its AAA credit ratings this year, said recent downgrades triggered $776 million of collateral posting and termination payments at its investment division.

While the unit has enough resources to meet the requirements, further downgrades may force it to seek funds from Ambac Assurance Corp., the New York-based company said today in a statement. The unit now has $3 billion of collateral and termination payments due, covered by investments with a $5.6 billion market value, Ambac said.

``We have ample liquidity to manage our commitments going forward,'' Chief Executive Officer Michael Callen said in the statement.

Hey, he uttered the "Short me, Please!" phrase. You know, the same one proclaimed by Schwartz of Bear Stearns, Callan of Lehman Brothers, and those guys over there at MBIA. They all have plenty of liquidity, right fellas.... RIIIGHTTTT!!!

You see, I really don't trust these guys when it comes to valuation issues. I took a bearish stance on them beginning in September of last year, and it doesn't look like they have proven me wrong yet. See What does MBIA, Ambac, and Brittany Spears have in common?

Currently, my major gripe with these guys is the assertion that they have adequate liquidty in one breath then trying to back it up by saying that this liquidity stems from investments with varying asset backed securities. Thus far during the crisis, whenever a monoline has had to liquidate it's "marketable securities" (which they appear to be touting as near cash equivalents), they have had to do so at a considerable loss. So, if the book value of these securities say they have a $2.6 billion margin, I bet the market will give them a $1.6 billion dollar margin. In other words, if this call for cash/margin call happens again, even just once more, MBIA and AMBAC are goners. It is not like they are going to be able to raise more capital. Even the uber wealthy tire of seeing their investments get burned.

This is another one of those analyses that you won't be able to get
from your local brokerage house, along the same vein as my last GGP
post (GGP and the type of investigative analysis you will not get from your brokerage house
). It is the stuff only available from the blogoshpere minority, or
high end buy side groups (who really tend not to share much).

I'm a private investor and I pride myself on an analytical approach
to investing. I try very hard to look at things from a scientific
perspective of risk vs. reward. It is an indomitable tenet, one that I
attempt to instill within my three children, and one which has (at
least for the last 8 years or so) has provided me with an investment
return that is multiples of the broad market. Unfortunately (or maybe
fortunately, in regards to my investment record), it is one which is
not shared by most of the analyst community and those that follow them.

This brings me to the issue of Goldman Sachs. I have been bearish
on commercial, mortgage and investment banks for over a year now, and
have made a penny or two from this outlook. In doing this, I noticed
the illogical reverance that Goldman Sachs has recieved, both from the
analytical community and the media (bolstered by the name brand talking
heads). I never did buy into it. Goldman is a fine, well run, well
respected brokerage/banks, but it is still just that. They hire the
same people, who went to the same schools to get the same education, to
use the same strategies to trade/advise on the same products in the
same markets as all of the other banks. To assert that thier shit
doesn't stink breaks from my scientific method of analysis. So, let's
take a more analytical look at the media's Golden Boys...