Earlier this morning I stated Structural Problems Cannot Be Solved Though Bailouts! As A Matter Of Fact, Bailouts Make The Situation Worse in reference to the situation surrounding Portugal's downgrade to junk status and its inevitable default (in some form or fashion, most likely draped in the political nomenclature of something considerably more palatable to the sheeple). Well, the same goes for Greece, although to a much more drastic extent.

Bloomberg reports: Portugal Rating Cut on Possible Greek Follow

Europe is now inching toward a goal of getting banks to roll over 30 billion euros of Greek bonds, instead of opening a hole for the official lenders to fill. French banks, with the biggest holdings in Greece, worked out a rollover formula that is serving as an example elsewhere, with two options for bondholders to replace their maturing securities.

At the same time, Standard & Poor’s said this week the plan may temporarily place Greece in “selective default” if implemented.

Portugal this year joined Ireland and Greece in turning to the EU and the International Monetary Fund for emergency funding after their budget deficits ballooned. Moody’s yesterday said it also based its credit rating cut on risks that Portugal won’t be able to fully achieve its deficit-reduction target.

“It’s a reminder that the sovereign debt crisis does not end with Greece and that risks remain with other nations in addition to Greece,” said Gary Pollack, who helps oversee $12 billion as head of fixed-income trading at Deutsche Bank AG’s Private Wealth Management unit in New York.

I'd like to make this perfectly clear and have absolutely no problem going on the record with it in full HD fidelity...

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There has been a large amount of capital lent to (and invested in) Greece. The collateral behind (recipient of) said capital has devalued along with popping of the asset securitization crisis bubble to such an extet that it is a mere fraction of what it was valued at when said capital was invested. What does this mean? Well, it means that no matter what financial engineering scheme you attempt to wrap around it (and I happen to be particularly skilled at financial engineering, so I should know), no matter what socio-political finanacial nomenclature you attempt to drape it in, and not matter how far you attempt to kick said can down the road in a "delay and pray" tactic of pushing the inevitable collapse past your particular tenure at the helm in an attempt to make it someone else's problem... The only way out of this for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and other profligate states is an old fashioned reneging on its payback oblications. A plain vanilla default. The explicit action that unequivocally informs you in no uncertain terms - You ain't gettin' your money back!

The chart above is an obvious reason why Greece not only has an inevitable default in its future, but why the faster they default the better off Greece is as a whole. Reference the test case known as Iceland whose banks defaulte on $85 billion, from Bloomberg:

Debt Raters Miss Iceland Rebound

The credit rating companies that were too slow in predicting Iceland’s economic collapse in 2008 may be underestimating the strength of its resurrection.

Fitch Ratings said in May it may take two years for the island to shed its junk status, while Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s give Iceland their lowest investment grades. That hasn’t deterred investors from trying to buy twice the amount offered in last month’s $1 billion bond sale as the island returned to global capital markets less than three years after its banks defaulted on $85 billion in debt.

“When you look at how successful that auction was, it’s clear that investors are now crunching the numbers themselves and that the credit grades from the rating agencies are less relevant,” Valdimar Armann, an economist at Reykjavik-based asset manager Gamma, said in a July 4 interview.

Iceland’s experience shows the rating companies may be overcompensating after failing to identify some of the risks that led to the global financial crisis, said Armann. While Moody’s kept a Aaa rating on Iceland until five months before its banks collapsed, reluctance to raise the island’s credit grade now is blocking the country’s access to a broader investor base. Debt derivatives show the low ratings may be unwarranted as credit default swaps on Iceland indicate it’s less likely to default than euro member Spain.

You see, the only true workable solution is to expunge the debt and have the original debt investors take realize their significant and material capital losses. As it stands now, for political reasons and to maintain the status quo of the existing banking oligarhcy, more debt is being piled onto these nations for the tax paying populace to attempt (and fail) to service! Thus, severe and aggressive austerity plans are being implemented to payback banks and other lenders (at what can be considered usurious terms, enter the IMF), thuse forcing recessionary pressures upon the working populace. This is a thick and heavy shaft, one that is onerous enough to quite possibly require grease for the citizens and denizens of Greece to consider palatable. On the other hand, they can do the Iceland, who is already lapping Greece in both economic growth and demand for its debt!

The situation between the 1st and 2nd Greek (and soon to be Portuguese) bailouts have essentially remained unchanged!

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As excerpted from It Should Be Obvious To Many That The Risk Of Defaulting Sovereign Bonds Can Spark A European Banking Crisis

If you think those charts look painful, imagine if the Maastricht treaty was actually respected. Our models haven’t pushed passed 80% debt to GDP, but if you were to put the treaty’s debt ceiling in you would see the very definition of contagion. The following chart represents the first order consequences of a 62% haircut on Greek debt…

Despite the fact that the only way out of this is a true default and destruction of the debt capital proffered during profligate times, TPTB will try their best to find a workaround, because what's best for the people of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and as we have already seen - Iceland, is absolute anathema to the bankers that binged on this stuff at 40x leverage ans sitting on 50% devaluations as we speak. You simply do the math: 40 x (-50%) = what kind of returns? Insolvency, first and foremost!

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