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Is this the Breaking of the Bear? |
PoorBest
| Written by Reggie Middleton | ||||||||
| Sunday, 27 January 2008 | ||||||||
Page 1 of 6 How we got startedAnybody who follows my blog knows that I am extremely bearish on the global macro environment, particularly risky and financial assets. As I see it, the Doctor(s) FrankenFinance are constantly percolating econo-alchemical brews such as that of the ongoing “Great Macro Experiment,” eliciting undulating waves of joy and elation from amateur speculators such as myself while simultaneously creating risk/reward traps that many a financial and real asset concern may never escape from. While discussing with my team how best to move forward to find a target of our “Macro Experiment” victim analysis in the financial sector, I was queried as to what to look for in creating the short list. Evaluating investment banks, like evaluating the monolines, is not necessarily a straightforward endeavor. No matter how you do it, someone is going to disagree. This is what makes what I do so appealing. All I have to answer to is performance. I just need a profitable result in order to be successful. No corporate politics or conflicts of interests to get in my way. In the end, absolute return is the ultimate criteria, and not whether it is accepted by the ivy league or academia, industry practitioners, sponsors, clients or whether or not XZY bank has been doing it differently for the last 25 years. Investing for your own account enforces a certain code of realism that, at times, may not be shared by others. So, I used that realism as my strength and my focal point to guide the creation of a short list, the ultimate target, and the valuation/risk analysis methodology. I simply said, in the REAL world where I would have to make some money from some REAL assets,throwing off REAL cash flows and REAL market transactions? Using this “Reggie REALity Engine” (so to speak) to power the analysis proved very enlightening. We found banks that counted spread guesstimates as assets. We found banks that could not afford to keep their best employees. We found too many banks that faced insolvency in the very near future. We found a lot. To keep this story short, let’s just say we used the engine to find that truth that nobody really wants to hear. That truth as marked to reality. This resulted in a short list of 2 firms. The first one is Bear Stearns, which we will delve into here. The second one is what I call, “The Riskiest Bank on the Street”, and the blog post and analysis will be out in a few days. Using a Sherlock Holmes style of forensic analysis, we have tried very hard not to leave anything out of our scope of analysis. In the case of Bear Stearns, it was not easy since very little info was available outside of the plain vanilla 10Q, 10K, etc. They also volunteered very little information. Much of this is investigative analysis and it would be much more detailed if we had access to the Bear Stearns inventory. We wrote to Bear Stearns’ investor relations department asking for more information on the company’s exposure to risky assets and their breakup. So far, no word back. No need to be concerned for my health, I’m not holding our breath…Alas, as I stated earlier, it is that truth that no one wants to hear. So if you are one of those "no ones" that don't want to hear the truth, cover your ears, cause here we go... Bear Stearns is in Real troubleBear Stearns will soon be, if not already, in a fight for its life. It is beset with the possibility of a criminal indictment (no Wall Street firm has ever survived a criminal indictment), additional civil litigation, and client defection and alienation. Despite all of these, the biggest issues don't seem all that prevalent in the media though. Bear Stearns is in a real financial bind due to the assets that it specialized in, and it is not in it by itself, either. For some reason, the Street consistently underestimates the severity of this real estate crash. If you look throughout my blog, it appears as if I have an outstanding track record. I would love to take the credit as superior intelligence, but the reality of the matter is that I just respect the severity of the current housing downturn - something that it appears many analysts, pundits, speculators, and investors have yet to do with aplomb. With a primary value driver linked to the biggest drag on the US economy for the last century or so, Bear Stearn's excessive reliance on highly "modeled" and real asset/mortgage backed products in its portfolio may potentially be its undoing. This is exacerbated significantly by leverage, lack of transparency, and products that are relatively illiquid, even when the mortgage days were good.The last year at the Bear hasn’t been a good one – a quick recapBear Stearns Companies Inc (BSC) has been at the forefront of the ongoing subprime mortgage crisis and has been considered the main trigger for the credit turmoil with the failure of its two hedge funds in July 2007. These failures marked the beginning of credit turmoil and severely tarnished the company’s reputation. Bear Stearns also has significant exposure toward the troublesome mortgage securities as compared to its peers in terms of the equity of the company. Bear Stearns specialized in mortgage related securities, at a time when real estate (both residential and commercial) and real estate related credit, experienced a severe bursting of a prolonged and historically unprecedented bubble. If historical mean values are any indication of future trends, we are just in the very beginning of a very steep correction in both residential and commercial real estate values. This bodes quite ill for the Bear.Bear Stearns has a Level 3 assets (see Banks, Brokers, & Bullsh1+ part 1 ) worth $27 billion, investments in SIVs of $41 billion, and off balance sheet SIVs of $21.3 billion. Furthermore, Bear Stearns has counterparty credit exposure (Banks, Brokers, & Bullsh1+ part 2 ) towards Ambac which recently was downgraded from AAA to AA by Fitch Rating Agency. I have written extensively on Ambac – material that was quite controversial, and in hindsight highly prescient. I feel I have a handle on this company's situation, and it is not as positive as management and investors would make it out to (see Ambac is Effectively Insolvent & Will See More than $8 Billion of Losses with Just a $2.26 Billion of Equity, Follow up to the Ambac Analysis, Monolines swoon, CDOs go boom & I really wonder why the ratings agencies are given any credibility, Ambac Management Should Read Blogs More Often, Ambac Now Has a Municipal Bond Issue to Worry About - I'm not going to say I told you so! , and Download a "Window" into Ambac's Problems). Faltering counterparties have further aggravated the company's credit position. Bear Stearns' 5 year CDS spread is also widening significantly, following concerns that the company will need to take additional write down on assets in the coming quarters. The deteriorating US credit situation has negatively impacted almost all the banks and brokers alike with $133 billion of asset write downs to date, with two of the biggest names in the industry, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, leading the pack. We believe the amount of write downs taken by Bear Stearns as compared to other big investment banks seems insufficient. Moreover, the selling of stakes by some of the top executives at Bear Stearns validates the trouble at the company is far from over and is likely to get worse. Back to the Basics: The Customer is Always RightBear Stearns’ most visible problem is probably its most basic as well. It has alienated its customer. With ex-clients lined up in court trying to reclaim their money from what was once their trusted advisor, to clients cooperating with the government in pursuing a federal indictment (no Wall Street firm has ever survived a criminal indictment), it is apparent the main source of revenue (the customer) is a tad bit disenfranchised with the Bear. This is a short and simple point, but it is probably the most poignant and underappreciated as well. Money Making Talent Caught in a Bear Hug: Show Me the Money?Would Bear Stearns be able to entice me for a gig (that is, assuming I am a hot commodity and I knew what I was doing with this finance and investment stuff)? Probably not, and this is how many worth their mettle will feel given the Bear’s current situation. One of the key points that we have observed in the case of Bear Stearns is that compensation expense as a percentage of revenues has increased to 57.1% in 2007 compared to 47.1% in 2006. This was despite the compensation expenses coming down to $326 million in Q407 from $664 million in Q307 and $1,052 million in Q406. In addition, the executive committee has decided that they will receive no compensation this year (last year they made $156 million, or 3.6% of total compensation expense). Now, if I compare this to some of Bear’s key competitors, the average increase for other investment banks’ compensation expense is in the range of 20-21% with Lehman Bros. giving a 10% increase, Goldman Sachs 23% and Morgan Stanley increasing the compensation expenses by 19%. In this scenario, it is likely to be extremely difficult for Bear to attract, and more importantly retain, people who will be able to make real money (and in the past have made real money) for them. This is a point that can’t be overemphasized. Intellectual capital service organizations, such as investment banks and consulting firms, have only their human capital as a primary, yet highly competitive resource, with financial capital being a commodity that is normally (although not the case recently) relatively easy to come by. Without competitive human capital, any services entity, be it an investment bank, investment fund or consulting firm is doomed to failure. Wall Street has created an environment where human capital is simply paid for, it flocks to the highest bidder with the highest cache in terms of stature and potential for future payout. Currently, in my opinion, Goldman Sachs takes this pole position here (although we feel they have some skeletons sporting big bones in their closet), with Bear Stearns at the rear in terms of major US investment banks. Without adequate financial capital to bid for and retain the human capital necessary to compete, Bear Stearns will find itself in a downward spiral that is self-reinforcing – the worse its performance, the harder it will be to attract and retain money makers, hence degrading its performance relative to its peers. |
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| Last Updated ( Thursday, 08 January 2009 ) | ||||||||
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