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The Commercial Real Estate Crash Cometh, and I know who is leading the way! |
PoorBest
| Written by Reggie Middleton | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Sunday, 06 January 2008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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I told members of my analytical team to screen the commercial real estate trust, service, and development sector for the usual suspects, starting with the the guys that purchased Sam Zell's flipped properties from Blackstone. I made some of the companies available via blog post and download: What is more telling is the window of understanding this opens into the commercial real estate space in the US. It is my opinion that most are extremely over-optimistic regarding the prospects for this space.
An Overview of What I Found
We have also looked for the historical NAV trend for GGP. However, since NAVs are not publicly available (GGP does not report NAV for its portfolio), we haven't had much luck thus far. Specifically, the REIT NAVs computed by Green Trust Advisors, one of the most popular REIT investment advisory concerns, are also not publicly available for the recent periods. The latest NAVs we could find from this source were for early 2007 when GGP stock was trading at around 10% discount to NAV. However, we believe that due to the subsequent difficulties in the credit market, the situation may have reversed of late. I have the Mod Squad continuing to explore this area and will post the findings on the blog. Other issues of note
The above observations are based on initial assessment and valuation of GGP properties in different geographies in the US, and we shall come out with some more and refined observations as we advance our research on the company.
Cap Rate Analysis
Equity Summary
Leverage Summary
Read more on Commercial Real Estate and Residential Real Estate. Trackback(0)
Comments (18)
![]() written by R, January 06, 2008
Incredible analysis Reggie.
Have you looked at ARE? BTW, the site formatting in Internet Explorer 6 is messed up. written by Rob Dawg, January 06, 2008
Excellent as usual. The real problem with so many negative equity properties is portfolio dilution. They'll be forced to sell/encumber the better properties to cover failures. But my question: What kind of vacancy rates did you assume in your best/mid/worst case analysis?
GGP also seems to be carrying a lot of raw land. Enough to make a difference if marked to market? One minor criticism. I can understand what you are saying with careful reading and context but for instance this next fragment you wrote; "the downside to the valuation may increase to 10-15% while with the worst case scenario assumptions considering expected recession conditions, it may further move up to around 20%." The phrasing has many possible interpretations. The first part could be taken to incorrectly) mean that the stock may be worth 10-15% more as the downside. Downside/increase, percentages all positive numbers, move up 20% referring to the potential overvaluation...we all aren't as smart as you Reggie. For we slow readers could you try to use consistent descriptors so we can keep up? Thanks. Oh, and awesome call seeing as your price point was immediately confirmed by the market.
Other CRE Short Candidates
written by isaac stewart, January 06, 2008
Reggie,
First Thanks for the wondeful analyssis 2 questions. 1. What does your gut say GGP's stock price will be at the end of 2008? 2. What other 3 CRE stocks would be your short candidates in order of vulnerablity to a crash in their stock price IN 2008? Thanks written by Robj, January 06, 2008
Great analysis!
The formatting in Firefox is messed up as well. written by Anonymous_1, January 06, 2008
Hi Boombastic,
Thank you for your research. The first day you mentioned CRE, I showed my husband and he went ahead and shorted some random 12 of the CRE companies, GGP being one of them. We are young, 29/28 olds, with very little savings n on top of it with our education loans... so put 800/stock and made some moolah to compensate unstoppable inflation which is on the way. Thanks for your blog and helping out small families like us who have zero means or time to do all the research that you do, but are ultimate victims of inflation with disappearing savings. We got burned with our initial foray in 06-07 into the stock market following cnbc and mr.cramer, but this time around all we do is to get our info from internet. Thank you for your unselfish posts. -SK & JK
...
written by Capital Gain, January 06, 2008
Funny stuff.
I'm a lease paying tenant in a number of power centers owned by GGP and DDR, so of course I've been shorting them. Paying my rent to them with the gains from their haircut was just too tempting to pass up. written by Test, January 07, 2008
There are couple other guys who did similar research on CREs and concluded that PKY is the most vulnerable in the lot.
written by DJ, January 08, 2008
For those who are interested . . . attached is a quick write up on another CRE short idea. I'd be curious to know if anyone thinks it is a crazy idea as well.
Maguire ("MPG") is the largest owner of Class A office properties in Southern California. Almost 91% of its portfolio is in three markets: Los Angeles (47%), Orange Country (42%), and San Diego (2%). I believe MPG will trade down to a cap rate of ~8% comparable to nationwide cap rates in 2001/2002 as the commercial real estate market declines from its 2007 peak, which would imply a tock price of $20, or ~30% downside from the current price. In addition, the prior cycle peak multiple of FFO was 12.5x FFO. MPG currently trades at ~30.0x 2009E FFO, which suggests massive downside if multiples contract. The downside to shorting Maguire is 10% - 15% if the Company is actually taken out at a ~5.3% cap rate (5.3% would imply a share price of ~$33). (MPG announced an intention to pursue strategic alternatives on 12/11/2007 when the stock was at $25.26. The stock closed on 12/26/2007 at $30.55, a 20% increase, so much of this is priced in.) Investment highlights ? Commercial real estate market has peaked - The U.S. commercial real estate market is beginning to show a negative inflection points after a seven year bull run. Some of these indicators include: a) prices falling 1.2% nationwide in September for the first monthly decline in seven years per Moody's, b) U.S. office sales falling 70% y-o-y in October per Real Capital Analytics, and c) a recent report by J.P. Morgan suggests that banks will be stuck with $40BN in CBMS (commercial mortgage back securities) at year-end which will limit future deals and re-financings (Centro is a prime example) and lead to a decline in property values. ? Pending dividend cut - The Company has debt to capitalization of ~75%, which is at the high end of its peer group. MPG is currently paying a $1.60 per share dividend, which is well above the $1.00 in FFO it will generate in 2008E. In my current base case, the Company's dividend will be under-funded in 2008 and 2009, suggesting that a dividend cut may be unavoidable. In addition, the Company has 400,000 square feet (totally unleased) in its development pipeline that will require capital investment. ? Weak markets - As mentioned, MPG is heavily exposed to the Southern California market, which has been softening. In its recent Q3 results, MPG reported a 10% decline in occupancy in its Orange Country portfolio (sub-prime lenders Ameriquest and New Century terminated 210K square feet in leases) and overall Company vacancy increased to 14.4% from 9.7% sequentially. Investment risk ? MPG is acquired at a large premium - My view is the Company will not get sold due to an inability to finance the deal. That said, if the Company were to sell in the 5.3% - 5.0% cap rate range, on current vacancy rates, the implied price would be $33.00 - $35.00. written by living off dividends, February 09, 2008
how the hell can they justify buying a property with a less than 3% cap rate?
borrowing money at 5% means you're negative straight off the bat (and I'd be amazed if they found commercial loans at less than 7%, even 2-3 years ago).
Strip Mall Mayhem written by Eric Johnson, June 15, 2008
I live in Houston Texas where at least the economy is still fairly strong thanks to the oil biz. We are seeing foreclosures rise, however, and new home building has slowed way down (but mysteriously not stopped yet). The Rental market and commercial market is way over built right now in all parts of the city. But the strip markets have been growing like mushrooms after a rain. They are everywhere now and are almost all 25% to 50% empty -- and still building! Even more confusing to me is that most of the tenants look like they must be very marginal businesses in good times, let alone a recession. How many nail/day spa salons can there be? Do we need a dry cleaner in every block of the city? What about pool builders and specialty retail shops catering to Christian book readers and Comic Book/Game players, etc. This area of the economy is a sinkhole that just hasn't opened up yet, but when it does, it's going to make the housing crisis seem tame.
I don't know. I do know this is great site. Thank you, Reggie. Write comment
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"But these days Mr. Macklowe is scrambling for financing yet again. He has a $6.4 billion debt payment coming due next month in connection with his purchase of seven other Midtown Manhattan office buildings a year ago. When he bought those buildings from Equity Office Properties, he more than doubled the size of his real estate portfolio and used only $50 million of his own money to do so; he borrowed $7 billion to finance the rest of the purchase.
As often happens in real estate, a once-frothy national cycle is losing steam and the market has turned against many buyers. Mr. Macklowe, with his empire of 15 prime office towers and two development sites in one of the world?s best business districts, is awash in expensive, short-term debt at the very moment that financial backing for megadeals has all but shut down. One of his loans is backed by a $1 billion personal guarantee, and he is already in default on $510 million in development loans for a Park Avenue project.
Mr. Macklowe?s predicament marks the denouement of an unprecedented four-year period in which developers threw gobs of money at real estate as prices for office towers, especially in Manhattan, doubled and tripled almost as fast as sales could be recorded. Investment banks avidly underwrote the binge, often basing loans not on existing rents but on projections of rental income well into the future.
All of this worked swimmingly so long as the economy hummed along and banks could pool the loans and sell them to investors. Now, the economy is showing signs of stress, and Wall Street?s repackaging machine is sputtering.
?In hindsight, everybody should have been more cautious,? said Robert Bach, the chief economist at Grubb & Ellis, the national real estate brokerage firm. ?We all knew this wasn?t going to last, but we hoped it would end with a whimper, not a bang.?