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		<title>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog</title>
		<description>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog site syndication</description>
		<link>http://boombustblog.com</link>
		<lastBuildDate>Sun, 07 Sep 2008 01:13:49 +0100</lastBuildDate>
		<generator>FeedCreator 1.7.2</generator>
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			<url>http://boombustblog.com/images/M_images/joomla_rss.png</url>
			<title>Reggie Middleton's BoomBustBlog.com, Micro Views of Macro Markets</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com</link>
			<description>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog site syndication</description>
		</image>
		<item>
			<title>NY Times on China's bind</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/541/34/</link>
			<description> Main Bank of China Is in Need of Capital   

	
	By KEITH BRADSHER (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/keith_bradsher/index.html?inline=nyt-per)
	
	
	
	HONG KONG &amp;mdash; China&amp;rsquo;s central bank is in a bind.
	
	
	
	
	It has been on a buying binge in the United States over the last seven years, snapping up roughly $1 trillion worth of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed debt issued by Fannie Mae (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/fannie_mae/index.html?inline=nyt-org) and Freddie Mac (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/freddie_mac/index.html?inline=nyt-org).
	
	
	
	
	Those investments have been declining sharply in value when converted from dollars into the strong yuan, casting a spotlight on the central bank&amp;rsquo;s tiny capital base. The bank&amp;rsquo;s capital, just $3.2 billion, has not grown during the buying spree, despite private warnings from the International Monetary Fund (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/international_monetary_fund/index.html?inline=nyt-org).
	
	
	
	
	Now the central bank needs an infusion of capital. Central banks can, of course, print more money, but that would stoke inflation. Instead, the People&amp;rsquo;s Bank of China has begun discussions with the finance ministry on ways to shore up its capital, said three people familiar with the discussions who insisted on anonymity because the subject is delicate in China.
	
	



 This is actually an interesting article and I urge you to read the rest (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/05/business/worldbusiness/05yuan.html?pagewanted=1&amp;_r=2&amp;ref=business) . As you know, I have been bearish on the Asian nations and the chickens are finally coming home to roost. See my China macro update (http://boombustblog.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=519&amp;Itemid=34) . 


</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title>I was wondering when these guys would tire of losing money...</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/542/34/</link>
			<description>
From CNBC (http://www.cnbc.com/id/26547623) , that bastion of financial news stuffs:


	
	Pimco&amp;rsquo;s legendary bond investor  drill down (http://boombustblog.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=398&amp;Itemid=34), the forensic analysis (http://boombustblog.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=417&amp;Itemid=34) and the Q2 highlights (http://boombustblog.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=472&amp;Itemid=34). 


</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Preview of analysis on tap, USG Corp.</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/543/34/</link>
			<description> This is my proprietary Z score analysis of USG Corp. I will be posting a summary and full forensic report on this company for subscribers very soon. The debt rating is a rough draft of my own proprietary system. It needs some work, but I included it anyway.           	 		 			 			 			USG Corp 			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Z-score analysis - 			Interpretation of Z-score 			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Above 2.99 			 			 			 			 			 Indicates financial soundness  			 			 			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Between 1.81 and 			2.99 			 			 			 			 			 Indicates warning signals - potential 			financial problems  			 			 			  		 		 			 			 			Below 1.81 			 			 			 			 			 Indicates serious financial trouble and a 			high probability of bankruptcy  			 			 		 		 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Debt Rating  (Stand alone entity) 			 			 			 			 			2005 			 			 			 			 			2006 			 			 			 			 			2007 			 			 			 			 			2008E 			 			 			 			 			2009E 			 			 			 			 			2010E 			 			 			 			 			2011E 			 			 			 			 			2012E 			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Working Capital / 			Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			     0.26  			 			 			 			 			     0.37  			 			 			 			 			     0.15  			 			 			 			 			     0.13  			 			 			 			 			     0.12  			 			 			 			 			     0.13  			 			 			 			 			     0.15  			 			 			 			 			     0.17  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Retained Earnings / 			Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			    (0.10) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.06) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.05) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.08) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.09) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.07) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.04) 			 			 			 			 			     0.00  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			EBIT (trailing 12 			months) / Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			     0.12  			 			 			 			 			     0.18  			 			 			 			 			     0.04  			 			 			 			 			    (0.04) 			 			 			 			 			     0.00  			 			 			 			 			     0.05  			 			 			 			 			     0.07  			 			 			 			 			     0.08  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Market Value of Equity 			/ Book Value of Total Liabilities 			 			 			 			 			     0.36  			 			 			 			 			     1.09  			 			 			 			 			     1.74  			 			 			 			 			     1.16  			 			 			 			 			     1.06  			 			 			 			 			     1.03  			 			 			 			 			     1.01  			 			 			 			 			     0.98  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Sales (trailing 12 			months) / Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			     0.84  			 			 			 			 			     1.08  			 			 			 			 			     1.13  			 			 			 			 			     1.00  			 			 			 			 			     1.02  			 			 			 			 			     1.09  			 			 			 			 			     1.15  			 			 			 			 			     1.22  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Z-score ( Standalone 			entity) 			 			 			 			 			     1.62  			 			 			 			 			     2.71  			 			 			 			 			     2.40  			 			 			 			 			     1.61  			 			 			 			 			     1.68  			 			 			 			 			     1.92  			 			 			 			 			     2.10  			 			 			 			 			     2.26  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Debt rating 			 			 			 			 			 D  			 			 			 			 			 CCC  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 			 			 			 D  			 			 			 			 			 D  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 		 	         	 		 			 			 			Debt Rating  (Stand alone entity) 			 			 			 			 			4Q-06 			 			 			 			 			1Q-07 			 			 			 			 			2Q-07 			 			 			 			 			3Q-07 			 			 			 			 			4Q-07 			 			 			 			 			1Q-08 			 			 			 			 			2Q-08 			 			 			 			 			3Q-08e 			 			 			 			 			4Q-08e 			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 			 			 			  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Working Capital / 			Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			     0.37  			 			 			 			 			     0.21  			 			 			 			 			     0.20  			 			 			 			 			     0.18  			 			 			 			 			     0.15  			 			 			 			 			     0.14  			 			 			 			 			     0.14  			 			 			 			 			     0.13  			 			 			 			 			     0.13  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Retained Earnings / 			Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			    (0.06) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.06) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.05) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.04) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.05) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.06) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.06) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.07) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.08) 			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			EBIT (trailing 12 			months) / Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			     0.18  			 			 			 			 			     0.18  			 			 			 			 			     0.13  			 			 			 			 			     0.08  			 			 			 			 			     0.04  			 			 			 			 			     0.00  			 			 			 			 			    (0.03) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.04) 			 			 			 			 			    (0.04) 			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			MV of Equity / BV of 			Total Liabilities 			 			 			 			 			     1.29  			 			 			 			 			     1.80  			 			 			 			 			     1.89  			 			 			 			 			     1.46  			 			 			 			 			     1.53  			 			 			 			 			     1.44  			 			 			 			 			     1.10  			 			 			 			 			     1.04  			 			 			 			 			     1.06  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Sales (trailing 12 			months) / Total Assets 			 			 			 			 			     1.08  			 			 			 			 			     1.22  			 			 			 			 			     1.17  			 			 			 			 			     1.13  			 			 			 			 			     1.13  			 			 			 			 			     1.08  			 			 			 			 			     1.02  			 			 			 			 			     1.00  			 			 			 			 			     1.00  			 			 		 		 			 			 			  			 			 			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  			  		 		 			 			 			Z-score ( Standalone 			entity) 			 			 			 			 			     2.83  			 			 			 			 			     3.07  			 			 			 			 			     2.90  			 			 			 			 			     2.42  			 			 			 			 			     2.27  			 			 			 			 			     2.03  			 			 			 			 			     1.67  			 			 			 			 			     1.56  			 			 			 			 			     1.55  			 			 		 		 			 			 			Debt rating 			 			 			 			 			 CCC  			 			 			 			 			 CCC  			 			 			 			 			 CCC  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 			 			 			 CCC-  			 			 			 			 			 D  			 			 			 			 			 D  			 			 			 			 			 D  			 			 		 	        </description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>FDIC Fridays...</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/544/34/</link>
			<description>
Heard on the street...


This is unconfirmed, but word is that Ameribank should be one of the next banks to be siezed... the Feds sent out term sheets this week for deposit purchase. If anyone can confirm this, feel free to reach out to me.

</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>FDIC Fridays...</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/545/34/</link>
			<description>
From the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122066426856206115.html?mod=djemalert):


    


	
	Regulators shut down Silver State Bank, the latest in a series of bank failures and one that could ripple through the presidential campaign. 
	
	
	 
	
	
	Until recently, the son of Republican nominee Sen. McCain sat on Silver State's board and was a member of its three-person audit committee, which was responsible for overseeing the company's financial condition. Andrew McCain left the Henderson, Nev., bank July 26 after five months on the board, citing &quot;personal reasons.&quot; He is Sen. McCain's adopted son from his first marriage. 
	

</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title>Who do you favor in November and why?</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/546/34/</link>
			<description>
Okay, it's time to light the fuse under the political stick of dynamite. Who do you favor in November and why? From war to economics, the two presidential candidates are as different as black and white (seriously, no pun intended). 


From the NY Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/business/31view.html?em=&amp;adxnnl=1&amp;adxnnlx=1220666469-NU4DLURhlmv/IYMr/1Hyog) :


	
	Many Americans know that there are characteristic policy differences between the two parties. But few are aware of two important facts about the post-World War II era, both of which are brilliantly delineated in a new book, &amp;ldquo;Unequal Democracy,&amp;rdquo; by Larry M. Bartels, a professor of political science at Princeton. Understanding them might help voters see what could be at stake, economically speaking, in November.
	
	
	I call the first fact the Great Partisan Growth Divide. Simply put, the United States economy has grown faster, on average, under Democratic presidents than under Republicans.
	
	
	The stark contrast between the whiz-bang Clinton years and the dreary Bush years is familiar because it is so recent. But while it is extreme, it is not atypical. Data for the whole period from 1948 to 2007, during which Republicans occupied the White House for 34 years and Democrats for 26, show average annual growth of real gross national product (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/united_states_economy/gross_national_product/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier)  of 1.64 percent per capita under Republican presidents versus 2.78 percent under Democrats.
	
	
	 That 1.14-point difference, if maintained for eight years, would yield 9.33 percent more income per person, which is a lot more than almost anyone can expect from a tax cut. 
	

</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title>An insiders real estate view from California</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/537/34/</link>
			<description>
These are highlights from an email I received recently from a RE professional in California. I thought the readership would find it interesting:







 


It seems like some banks are too swamped to even start the
foreclosure process, according to this article in our local (North Carolina) paper:


 


Housing: Banks waiting longer to foreclose 



http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/08/30/business/zad421415c27f7dbb882574b3007c50a5.txt (http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/08/30/business/zad421415c27f7dbb882574b3007c50a5.txt)


 


 I've
been negotiating about 20 REO sales over the past week.  I
noticed a couple of things.


 


1.    There is still
a good amount of demand, or as I like to call it &quot;ability&quot; to buy. I have had several of properties that had
multiple good offers submitted on them. 
At least that helps us slow down the free fall.


2.    Rents ratios
are getting close to making sense.  Still
not right yet but close.  Many of the
condos in the toughest markets are being pushed down to basically the
cost-per-door that they would have been if they were still part of a make-sense
apartment building.


3.    My daughter is
attempting to buy in the San Fernando Valley area of Los Angeles and has had
just brutal competition in the under $400,000 range.  One house she looked at for $380,000 had been
previously encumbered for over $600,000.


4.    I spoke to 2
reporters this week and they were both sniffing out an angle on more of the
higher end markets and homeowners that were now facing foreclosure or walking
away from their houses.  My REO research
department that does Broker Price Opinions (BPO&amp;acirc;&amp;euro;&amp;trade;s) confirmed that they are
doing a lot more in the affluent area of San Diego County, places like La
Jolla, Carmel Valley and Encinitas.  One
reporter was from a local source - Voice of San Diego, but the other was from
Bloomberg!.


5.    Fannie Mae is
really pushing a financing program with PHH called Express Path Mortgage (aka
Insta Close).  On qualifying properties
buyers can buy with 100% financing, no Mortgage Insurance. 
Just over 700 FICO's and combined debt-to-income of no more than 40%
at competitive rates.  Believe it or not,
they will even let investors buy with 100% financing (on selected
properties).  My take on it is that they
would rather churn a non-performing asset into a performing asset. 100% investor loans are not available in CA, FL, NV or AZ


 


 


I found this article interesting about your local market,
I don't think they interviewed  you
before writing it.


 


New York Housing Shines for now


http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/28/news/big.apple.fortune/index.htm?


 

</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Navistars results analysis</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/539/34/</link>
			<description>    

Navistar&amp;rsquo;s results analysis:

  

In 3Q2008, Navistar reported revenues increased 34% to $4.0 bn over $3.0 bn in 3Q2007 as increased contribution from military products and improved pricing helped the company to more than offset the weakness in traditional truck markets, engine parts and financial segment. Navistar&amp;rsquo;s U.S military sales increased significantly to $1.2 billion in 3Q2008 compared to just $59 million in 3Q2007 (over a 20x increase, a exasperatingly unbelievable pop that raises many questions) . As a result of higher military sales, Navistar&amp;rsquo;s largest customer exposure tilted from Ford (a company struggling with its own solvency issues that actually ended up on our short scan) previously to the U.S government in 3Q2008. The U.S. government contributed the largest proportion to company&amp;rsquo;s sales with 32% of revenues in 3Q2008 as against 3% in 3Q2007. Besides higher military sales, Navistar&amp;rsquo;s pricing improved substantially due to change in product mix and introduction of ProStar products. Navistar&amp;rsquo;s unit price in the truck segment increased 55% y-o-y while engine unit price increased 13.5% y-o-y leading to expansion of margins. Despite a 28% increase in cost of product sold, Navistar&amp;rsquo;s gross margins increased to 21.2% as against 17.9% in 3Q2007 while its operating margins increased to 6.6% in 3Q2008 versus a negative operating margin of 0.6% in 3Q2007. However despite improved pricing and increased contribution from military segment, Navistar&amp;rsquo;s traditional truck and engine segment continued to face challenges. In 3Q2008 shipments of school buses shipments and expansion markets cloaked a y-o-y volume decline of 16% and 4%, respectively while engine shipments excluding intercompany sales witnessed a decline of 68% in 3Q2008 over 3Q2007. Segment profit from the engine segment declined 92.3% to $5 mn in 3Q2008 from $65 mn in 3Q2007 while financial services reported a loss of $1 mn as against profit of $40 mn in 3Q2007. However higher profits from the truck segment at $357 mn in 3Q2008 against $7 mn in 3Q2007, helped Navistar to report profit before tax of $280 mn versus $5 mn in 3Q2007. Overall improved pricing and higher military sales resulted in Navistar&amp;rsquo;s net income to increase to $272 mn (or $3.68 per share) versus a loss of $4 mn (or $0.05 per share) in 3Q2007. As a result of record growth in 3Q2008, Navistar has raised its guidance for full year. Earlier in August 13, 2008 (just over two weeks ago) Navistar issued full year EPS guidance between $4.26 and $5.72. 

</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>An analytical view of the Navistar surprise</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/540/34/</link>
			<description>
Navistar came up with its 3Q2008 earnings
release yesterday reporting net income of $272 mn as compared to a loss of $4 mn in
3Q2007. This was powered by improved pricing and higher contribution from
military segment as contribution from military segment increased to $1.2
billion in 3Q2008 versus only $59 million in 3Q2007. 


Navistars earning came as a
surprise to the investor community surpassing analyst and our EPS expectations
of $1.42 and $0.93, respectively. Following its robust reported 3Q2008 earnings, Navistar
raised its full year 2008 guidance nearly 50% or $2 per share to between $6.35
and $7.45. It actually seems that the robust results left the company itself by
surprise which had recently one month ago, in August 2008, had issued FY2008
EPS guidance between $4.26 and $5.72. Navistars timing of muted
guidance in August 2008 with only 1 month away from 3Q2008 results raises
serious questions about the company managements precision and confidence
on their own numbers - or possibly something a little less benevolent. Since I don't want to jump to conclusions and to be as fair as possible we will wait for the conference call and do a little more digging. 


We have carried out variance analysis
between our expected
results and a summary of financial highlights for Navistar (please refer
to the previous post  3Q2008 result analysis). The primary reason
for difference between our expected earnings and Navistars earnings was
due to higher than expected pricing improvement. We expected Navistars
revenues to increase by 23% while the company reported revenue growth of 34%. This
was primarily due to higher-than-expected improvement on the pricing front. 


</description>
			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>GGP closes on another mortgage and the stock rises</title>
			<link>http://boombustblog.com/content/view/534/34/</link>
			<description>
But it appears as of the traders have not thought this through:


    


A partial answer to a question: http://www.emediaworld.com/press_release/release_detail.php?id=152954 (http://www.emediaworld.com/press_release/release_detail.php?id=152954)

  

They
are heavily encumbering their properties in an effort to dig  out of
this hole. A pertinent question would be the actual terms of this
latest funding and how much the terms differ from the debt that it is
refinancing (we all know the answer: much more expensive and more
restrictive)? They still have significantly more debt to refinance this
year, and the year is almost over. Where is the money coming from
(exactly) and when is it the money coming? At what terms and how will
those terms differ from the loans being refinanced?


It
appeared to be a rough ride this year in terms of funding. What is the
game plan for refinancing debt in &amp;rsquo;09 and &amp;rsquo;10? Do you plan on
encumbering even more properties than this year? Are you now accepting
recourse in the terms of your new loans? What brought about that
decision? How do you think it effects the value of your organization?

  

 

  

Financing and foreclosure:

    

At
the end of 2007, GGP needed to get refinanced $2.62 bn of its total
debt in 2008. However after six months in 2008, GGP debt due for
refinance stood at $2.55 bn (as of June 30, 2008). Since GGP last
reported results in June 2008, GGP had repaid only $391 mn of mortgage
loans as per its September 5,

  

2008
press release ( or just 15% of the loan). With such slow progress
towards refinancing, what is GGP's plan for financing the remainder
$2.16 bn of its debt due in 2008?

  

In
addition to huge debt liabilities for 2008, the company has $3.3 bn,
$4.5 bn, $8.3 bn and $46 bn debt due for repayment in 2009, 2010, 2011
and 2012, respectively. How is the company planning to refinance/repay
these debt liabilities? Also looking at the current credit market
conditions where financing is difficult, we would like to know if
company has alternative plans to raise finance including that from sale
or foreclosure of its properties.

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			<category>Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog - MyBlog</category>
			<pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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