Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog
A digital diary of my global economic outlook combined with a focus on fundamental and forensic analysis
Tag >> Current Affairs
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Research, Mortgage Banking, Legislation, Law & the Government, Investment Banks, Heard on the Street, Global Macro, Financial Shenanigans, Current Affairs, Commercial Banks, Capital Markets, Banking |
21 Nov 2008 12:00 AM |
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I told you so, from Doo Doo to TARP and back to Doo Doo
by Reggie Middleton |
First, read the "Doo Doo 32" post, then the "Anatomy of a Sick
Bank", then reference the TARP list (corporate welfare) below (source:US Treasury Emergency Economic DEstabilization Act). Ya' see
anybody familiar??? It's almost like having a crystal ball - filled
with doo doo! I actually believe this particular move was necessary on behalf of the Treasury, and was what I recommended when Paulson originally released his 3 page tome of economic domination (see
WARNING: the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 may significantly DESTABILIZE the economy!, Shock & Awe: redux
and
Reggie Middleton asks, "Do you guys know who you're messin' with?"). After reading Doo Doo 32 and the Sick Bank articles, no one can honestly say that they didn't know who was to end up on this list.
| Date |
Seller |
Transaction Type |
Description |
Price Paid |
Pricing Mechanism |
|
|
| Name of Institution |
City |
State |
|
|
|
|
|
| 10/28/2008 |
Bank of America Corporation |
Charlotte |
NC |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$15,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Citigroup Inc. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$25,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$10,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
JPMorgan Chase & Co. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$25,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Morgan Stanley |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$10,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
State Street Corporation |
Boston |
MA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$2,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Wells Fargo & Company |
San Francisco |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$25,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$10,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Bank of Commerce Holdings |
Redding |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$17,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
1st FS Corporation |
Hendersonville |
NC |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$16,369,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
UCBH Holdings, Inc. |
San Francisco |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$298,737,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Northern Trust Corporation |
Chicago |
IL |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,576,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
SunTrust Banks, Inc. |
Atlanta |
GA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,500,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Broadway Financial Corporation |
Los Angeles |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$9,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Washington Federal Inc. |
Seattle |
WA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$200,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
BB&T Corp. |
Winston-Salem |
NC |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,133,640,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Provident Bancshares Corp. |
Baltimore |
MD |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$151,500,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Umpqua Holdings Corp. |
Portland |
OR |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$214,181,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Comerica Inc. |
Dallas |
TX |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$2,250,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Regions Financial Corp. |
Birmingham |
AL |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,500,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Capital One Financial Corporation |
McLean |
VA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,555,199,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
First Horizon National Corporation |
Memphis |
TN |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$866,540,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Huntington Bancshares |
Columbus |
OH |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,398,071,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
KeyCorp |
Cleveland |
OH |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$2,500,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Valley National Bancorp |
Wayne |
NJ |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$300,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Zions Bancorporation |
Salt Lake City |
UT |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,400,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Marshall & Ilsley Corporation |
Milwaukee |
WI |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,715,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
U.S. Bancorp |
Minneapolis |
MN |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$6,599,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
TCF Financial Corporation |
Wayzata |
MN |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$361,172,000 |
Par |

I was very clear in warning about the "everyman for himself" phenomenon back when the first US bailout package was announced in the US. All of the money given banks are going straight to the bank's coffers and nowhere else. It is a farce to believe that banks will act against their own self interest when given money. PNC took the money and bought a bank with a risky loan portfolio to boost deposits, AIG is paying margin calls with its taxpayer money, JP Morgan and Merrill chiefs flat out said, "No, I will not lend the new money out", and the Euro banks are also designing special textual diagrams to display their views on handling the new low interest rates they are benifititing from by way of the UK government. See what I just pulled off of the memorandum of understanding between HSBC and the government: …………………../´¯/) ………………..,/¯../ ………………./…./ …………./´¯/’…’/´¯¯`·¸ ………./’/…/…./……./¨¯\ ……..(’(…´…´…. ¯~~/’…’) ………\……………..’…../ ……….”…\………. _.·´ …………\…………..( …………..\………….\ HSBC Defies Brown, Signals It Won't Pass On All of Rate Cuts to Customers From Bloomberg: Read more... 
Las Vegas Review Journal :
General Growth borrowed to create a massive portfolio of more than 200 properties in 44 states, including a $14 billion deal in 2004 to purchase the Rouse Co., which owned Fashion Show mall, Summerlin Centre and several other Las Vegas properties.
Company stock started slipping several months ago as prospects for consumer spending waned.
Shares went into freefall more recently when investors realized the confluence of the credit crunch with an emerging recession would make it difficult, if not impossible, for General Growth to make good on its debts.
Financial blogger Reggie Middleton, whose detailed criticisms of General Growth were posted online at www.boombustblog.com in January, months before management acknowledged serious problems, said the news Monday wasn't a surprise.
"Of course it could have," been prevented, said Middleton. "They didn't take care of the problems."
He criticized management not only for over-leveraging the company long ago but for compounding the problem through mismanagement.
Middleton said General Growth officials heaped blame on short sellers for forecasting a demise, got the company added to the list of firms protected from short sellers that was created in September to protect banks, then dumped millions of their own shares to meet margin calls.
"The latter part of the share price compression was the management's own making," Middleton said. "They owned a lot (of stock) on margin. They sold more shares than speculators like me ever would."...
... Wally Brewster, General Growth Properties senior vice president of marketing and communications, said the malls are healthy on an operational level...
... As for the notion that General Growth officials would seek a buyer for the entire company, "We always look at all the options."
Brewster also responded to the idea that company officials could have averted the problem by taking action earlier.
"I think we stand on our success of the past 50 years," Brewster said. "We are now dealing with an environment I don't think the U.S. has seen since the Great Depression."...
... Moore agreed with Middleton that the moves on Monday aren't likely to preserve General Growth as a complete entity. He added that current problems could have been averted had management girded the balance sheet before the credit markets went south.
The moral of the story?
"Leverage is very, very dangerous," Moore said.
In November and December of 2007, I plainly forecasted this turn of events in painfully explicit detail Don't tell me this could not have been seen coming. Greed and avarice vs. ignorance - the battle of the vices...
Read more... 
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