Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog
A digital diary of my global economic outlook combined with a focus on fundamental and forensic analysis
Tag >> Banking
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Research, Mortgage Banking, Legislation, Law & the Government, Investment Banks, Heard on the Street, Global Macro, Financial Shenanigans, Current Affairs, Commercial Banks, Capital Markets, Banking |
21 Nov 2008 12:00 AM |
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I told you so, from Doo Doo to TARP and back to Doo Doo
by Reggie Middleton |
First, read the "Doo Doo 32" post, then the "Anatomy of a Sick
Bank", then reference the TARP list (corporate welfare) below (source:US Treasury Emergency Economic DEstabilization Act). Ya' see
anybody familiar??? It's almost like having a crystal ball - filled
with doo doo! I actually believe this particular move was necessary on behalf of the Treasury, and was what I recommended when Paulson originally released his 3 page tome of economic domination (see
WARNING: the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 may significantly DESTABILIZE the economy!, Shock & Awe: redux
and
Reggie Middleton asks, "Do you guys know who you're messin' with?"). After reading Doo Doo 32 and the Sick Bank articles, no one can honestly say that they didn't know who was to end up on this list.
| Date |
Seller |
Transaction Type |
Description |
Price Paid |
Pricing Mechanism |
|
|
| Name of Institution |
City |
State |
|
|
|
|
|
| 10/28/2008 |
Bank of America Corporation |
Charlotte |
NC |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$15,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Citigroup Inc. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$25,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$10,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
JPMorgan Chase & Co. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$25,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Morgan Stanley |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$10,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
State Street Corporation |
Boston |
MA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$2,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Wells Fargo & Company |
San Francisco |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$25,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 10/28/2008 |
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. |
New York |
NY |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$10,000,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Bank of Commerce Holdings |
Redding |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$17,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
1st FS Corporation |
Hendersonville |
NC |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$16,369,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
UCBH Holdings, Inc. |
San Francisco |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$298,737,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Northern Trust Corporation |
Chicago |
IL |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,576,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
SunTrust Banks, Inc. |
Atlanta |
GA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,500,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Broadway Financial Corporation |
Los Angeles |
CA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$9,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Washington Federal Inc. |
Seattle |
WA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$200,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
BB&T Corp. |
Winston-Salem |
NC |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,133,640,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Provident Bancshares Corp. |
Baltimore |
MD |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$151,500,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Umpqua Holdings Corp. |
Portland |
OR |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$214,181,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Comerica Inc. |
Dallas |
TX |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$2,250,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Regions Financial Corp. |
Birmingham |
AL |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,500,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Capital One Financial Corporation |
McLean |
VA |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$3,555,199,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
First Horizon National Corporation |
Memphis |
TN |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$866,540,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Huntington Bancshares |
Columbus |
OH |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,398,071,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
KeyCorp |
Cleveland |
OH |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$2,500,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Valley National Bancorp |
Wayne |
NJ |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$300,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Zions Bancorporation |
Salt Lake City |
UT |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,400,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
Marshall & Ilsley Corporation |
Milwaukee |
WI |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$1,715,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
U.S. Bancorp |
Minneapolis |
MN |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$6,599,000,000 |
Par |
| 11/14/2008 |
TCF Financial Corporation |
Wayzata |
MN |
Purchase |
Preferred Stock w/Warrants |
$361,172,000 |
Par |

When I first introduced my American Express research in June, I expected (and was not disappointed) many to tug the name brand line in saying that Amex was the cream of the crop, they deal only with high end consumers, large business accounts, yada yada yada. Name brand marketing, it seems, fools many investors.
If one were to peruse the reseach in the Amex link above, you will see where practically each and every admonition has come to fruitition. Hopefully, this in combination with the events of the recent past should convince readers that hard core fundamental and forensic research trumps name branding every time - all the time. As with my Goldman Sachs research, Morgan Stanley research, and many other name brands, I was (to my knowledge) the only one bearish on these companies at the beginning of this year where the share prices were still high enough to profitably short or get out of (if you have a "long only" mandate).
From Bloomberg:
American Express Co. won Federal
Reserve approval to convert to a commercial bank, gaining access
to funds as credit losses build and sales of asset-backed bonds
plummet.
The Fed waived a 30-day waiting period on the application
``in light of the unusual and exigent circumstances affecting the
financial markets,'' according to a statement released today in
Washington. Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and his colleagues
unanimously voted for the action.
Credit-card holders failed to repay loans in the third
quarter at almost twice the rate of a year earlier, New York-
based American Express said last month. With defaults rising
along with the unemployment rate, October marked the first month
since 1993 that card companies were unable to sell bonds backed
by customer payments.
``That business has totally dried up,'' said Frederic
Dickson, who helps oversee about $20 billion as chief market
strategist at D.A. Davidson & Co. in Lake Oswego, Oregon. ``If I
were a shareholder, it wouldn't send a very warm and fuzzy
message to me,'' he said today in a phone interview.
American Express, the largest U.S. credit-card company by
purchases, joins former investment banks Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
and Morgan Stanley, which were allowed by the Fed in September to
become commercial banks.

This is part 29 of Reggie Middleton on the Asset Securitization Crisis. If you are new to my blog there is a sidebar below with a full roadmap to the crisis. Before we go on with this installment let's get a firming of the defintion of the term "inflation" with a little help from Wikipedia:
Inflation can be considered a general rise in the level of prices. For increases in the money supply, see the description below. I, being the simpleton that I am, like to consider it the effective rise in prices. For instance, nominal prices can go up 10% but if buying power rises 15%, we actually have a drop in effective, real prices. The exact opposite is currently happening in housing right now. Nominal housing prices are dropping through the floor. Unfortunately, they are not dropping with the same intensity and velocity that credit terms are tightening, crediit availability is shrinking, and the labor force is contracting. Thus, housing prices from a simpleton's perspective (such as mine) are at the very best, remaining level and probably from a more realistic perspective, increasing. This undercuts the argument that one must "stabilize" housing prices in order to stem the ongoing financial malaise. Reggie Middleton posits that the housing market is attempting to stabilize after an unprecedented and fundamentally unjustified meteoric run up in prices. The deflationary pricing IS the markets attempt at stablization and anything that would effect it otherwise will produce de-stabilizing results. You know what grandma use to say, "What goes up (too far), must come down". If our regulators want to end the malaise (and to do so prematurely will also lead to destabilization since the system must clean itself out) they should be working on employment and real productivity - and not the artificial elevation of already inflated and glutted housing stock in an effort to save financial institutions that failed to use the risk management prudence that my 7 year old exercises in an average game of Monopoly. Read more... 
I was very clear in warning about the "everyman for himself" phenomenon back when the first US bailout package was announced in the US. All of the money given banks are going straight to the bank's coffers and nowhere else. It is a farce to believe that banks will act against their own self interest when given money. PNC took the money and bought a bank with a risky loan portfolio to boost deposits, AIG is paying margin calls with its taxpayer money, JP Morgan and Merrill chiefs flat out said, "No, I will not lend the new money out", and the Euro banks are also designing special textual diagrams to display their views on handling the new low interest rates they are benifititing from by way of the UK government. See what I just pulled off of the memorandum of understanding between HSBC and the government: |