The EurAsian Global Distressed Asset Acquisition Initiative
Last month I penned the piece Abu Dhabi & the UAE Can Leverage PetroDollar profits to capitalize on the plight of EU nations, wherein I announced that I was putting together an initiative to capitalize on the inevitable deleveraging of European (and soon Asian) banks and sovereign (as well as quasi-sovereign) nations. Those insititions and UHNW individuals who are interested in said initiative should click through and read the article and contact me afterward as there has already been significant indications of interest. I already have my analysts going through a plethora of opportunities, identifying hard assets first, and financial assets with deep, deep discounts in mind (100%+ cash on cash return within one year, unlevered).
As fate, and an adherence to viewing things analytically, would have it the opportunities may come to bear sooner than expected - to wit: European Banks Could Deleverage by $2.6 Trillion: IMF
A drastic contraction of European bank balance sheets during the next 18 months could jeopardise financial stability and economic growth, according to the IMF. The FT reports.
This is simply a reiteration of my warnings from as far back as 14 months ago, proffered in explicit detail, simple reference Is Another Banking Crisis Inevitable? (Attention subscribers: The subscription document is available as well The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis)
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Banks NPAs to total loans |
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Source: IMF, Boombust research and analytics |
Euro banks remain weak as compared to their US counterparts
Later on today I will post the first of several documents to professional/institutional subscribers detailing what I have in mind in this potential asset grab.
Portuguese Liquidity Trap: When You Add Too Much Liquidity To F.I.R.E. It Burns!
In this followup to Greece Is Trying To Convince Portugal To Make F.I.R.E. Hot I think we should get straight to the point - Anyone who doesn't believe that Portugal is clearly set up to for a bond route, and that it is seriously considering a default is either lying to themselves, believe human nature has changed, and/or really hasn't bothered to review the math. Here's proof of a Portuguese default presented with logic, numbers and pretty colorful graphs. The full spreadsheet behind all of the calculations, scenarios, bond holdings and calculations can be viewed online here (click this link) by professional level subscribers. Click here to subscribe or upgrade.
For one, we are on up to the 3rd Greek Bailout (Portugal has only received one hence it could be getting envious:-)). Portugal has had extreme austerity measures inflicted upon it. So extreme that it has materially and significantly depressed the economy. Portugal's GDP growth contracted even further by 1.3% q/q in Q4. Its HICP Moderated to 3.4% y/y in January. Very high unemployment (currently at 14% and rising), weakening wages, and a total dearth of credit to businesses and households (do you really think bond-busted banks are lending to and within Portugal like the good 'ole days) will lead to a downward spiraling self-fulfilling prophecy that is the antithesis of what appears to be driving all of those rosy estimates behind reports that Portugal won't default. I do mean rosy, see Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! for examples. Let it be known that instead of growing the economy out of the doldrums, Portugal's austerity measures will push it down the drain.Due to total reliance on funny munny from the ECB, required due to the lack of external financing avialable from the markets (unless Portugal defaults/restructures and starts from scratch, which is inevitable anyway) the Portuguese machine will still be in arrears accumulation mode - a mode which is essentially unsustainable.
Despite what I see as practically unassailable facts, the MSM is still steadfastly and unrealistically bullish, as per Bloomberg, Portugal Bond Rout Overstates Greek Likeness. Well, the Portugal Bond Yield is at 13% Despite Greek Deal - that's right, the 3rd Greek deal and one that include 74% haircut!!! Portugal will default/restructure and there's a very, very strong chance that right behind them will be Spain and then Greece again. That's right, Greece, again!
Who was right about the Greek default, running against the consensus two years ago? See 2010 posts - Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe”, Prodi Says – I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! and then A Comparison of Our Greek Bond Restructuring Analysis to that of Argentina. In The Anatomy of a Portugal Default: A GraphicalStep by Step Guide ... I walked through the financial tangle that is Portugal about two years ago, as excerpted.
This is the carnage that would occur in the OPTIMISTIC if the same restructuring were to be applied to Portugal today.
Yes, it will be nasty. That 35% decline in cash flows will be levered at least 10x, for that is how much of the investors in these bonds purchased them. A 35% drop is nasty enough, 35% x 10 starts to hurt the piggy bank! As a matter of fact, no matter which way you look at it, Portugal is destined to default/restructure. Its just a matter of time, and that time will probably not extend past 2013. Here are a plethora of scenarios to choose from...
This is Portugal's path as of today.
Even if we add in EU/IMF emergency funding, the inevitability of restructuring is not altered. As a matter of fact, the scenario gets worse because the debt is piled on.
Well, I took said model and updated it with recent historical GDP results as well as projections which incorporated the most recent developments. Do you think things look better or worse?
This is what Portugal's situation looks like today...
image012The Portuguese bond yield has spiked since the Greek deal. Methinks Mr. Credit market (who is much wiser than Mr. Eqiuity market, probably due to the increased difficulty in manipulating Mr. Credit's demeanor) seems to agree with Reggie...
image011| Issuer | Issue date | Maturity | Amt Out(M) | Interest Due(M) | Years to maturity | Coupon rate |
| Portugal Treasury Bill | 07/17/09 | 7/23/2010 | 4.50 | 0.00 | -1.64 | 0.000% |
| Portugal Treasury Bill | 09/18/09 | 9/17/2010 | 2.75 | 0.00 | -1.49 | 0.000% |
| Portugal Treasury Bill | 11/20/09 | 11/19/2010 | 3.10 | 0.00 | -1.31 | 0.000% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 12/16/05 | 12/16/2010 | 0.51 | 0.01 | -1.24 | 2.690% |
| Portugal Treasury Bill | 01/22/10 | 1/21/2011 | 2.05 | 0.00 | -1.14 | 0.000% |
| Portugal Treasury Bill | 02/19/10 | 2/18/2011 | 2.35 | 0.00 | -1.06 | 0.000% |
| Portugal Treasury Bill | 03/19/10 | 3/18/2011 | 2.03 | 0.00 | -0.99 | 0.000% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 11/16/05 | 4/15/2011 | 4.67 | 0.15 | -0.91 | 3.200% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 03/13/01 | 6/15/2011 | 4.96 | 0.26 | -0.74 | 5.150% |
| CP - Comboios de Portugal EPE | 02/26/02 | 2/26/2012 | 0.25 | 0.00 | -0.04 | 0.990% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 02/13/02 | 6/15/2012 | 7.64 | 0.38 | 0.26 | 5.000% |
| Portugal Government International Bond | 08/28/09 | 8/28/2012 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.46 | 2.400% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 07/08/09 | 7/8/2013 | 0.80 | 0.03 | 1.32 | 3.500% |
| Polo III-CP Finance Ltd | 07/29/03 | 7/29/2013 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 1.38 | 4.500% |
| Ana-Aeroportos de Portugal SA | 08/28/09 | 8/28/2013 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 1.46 | 4.050% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 05/22/98 | 9/23/2013 | 7.16 | 0.39 | 1.53 | 5.450% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 10/29/03 | 6/16/2014 | 6.00 | 0.26 | 2.26 | 4.375% |
| Polo Securities II Ltd | 06/26/02 | 6/26/2014 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 2.29 | 2.880% |
| ANAM - Aeroportos da Madeira SA | 07/29/04 | 7/29/2014 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 2.38 | 5.340% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 10/15/04 | 10/15/2014 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 2.59 | 4.191% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 06/03/09 | 10/15/2014 | 5.32 | 0.19 | 2.59 | 3.600% |
| Portugal Government International Bond | 11/17/09 | 11/17/2014 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 2.68 | 3.064% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 12/18/07 | 12/18/2014 | 1.02 | 0.03 | 2.77 | 3.250% |
| Refer-Rede Ferroviaria Nacional SA | 03/16/05 | 3/16/2015 | 0.60 | 0.02 | 3.01 | 4.000% |
| Portugal Government International Bond | 03/25/10 | 3/25/2015 | 1.02 | 0.04 | 3.03 | 3.500% |
| Polo III-CP Finance Ltd | 07/29/03 | 7/29/2015 | 0.30 | 0.01 | 3.38 | 4.700% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 07/13/05 | 10/15/2015 | 7.64 | 0.26 | 3.59 | 3.350% |
| Portugal Government International Bond | 10/24/86 | 5/20/2016 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 4.19 | 9.000% |
| Portugal Government International Bond | 05/20/86 | 5/20/2016 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 4.19 | 9.000% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 07/17/06 | 10/15/2016 | 5.00 | 0.21 | 4.60 | 4.200% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 05/03/07 | 10/16/2017 | 6.08 | 0.26 | 5.60 | 4.350% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 03/04/08 | 6/15/2018 | 6.27 | 0.28 | 6.26 | 4.450% |
| Refer-Rede Ferroviaria Nacional SA | 02/18/09 | 2/18/2019 | 0.50 | 0.03 | 6.94 | 5.875% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 03/03/09 | 6/14/2019 | 6.86 | 0.33 | 7.26 | 4.750% |
| CP - Comboios de Portugal EPE | 10/16/09 | 10/16/2019 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 7.60 | 4.170% |
| Portugal Government AID Bond | 03/08/90 | 2/25/2020 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 7.96 | 1.520% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 02/17/10 | 6/15/2020 | 5.26 | 0.25 | 8.26 | 4.800% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 09/22/05 | 9/22/2020 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 8.54 | 3.567% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 12/28/05 | 12/28/2020 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 8.80 | 2.423% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 02/23/05 | 4/15/2021 | 7.08 | 0.27 | 9.10 | 3.850% |
| Refer-Rede Ferroviaria Nacional SA | 12/13/06 | 12/13/2021 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 9.76 | 4.250% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 06/10/08 | 10/25/2023 | 6.53 | 0.32 | 11.63 | 4.950% |
| Refer-Rede Ferroviaria Nacional SA | 10/16/09 | 10/16/2024 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 12.60 | 4.675% |
| Refer-Rede Ferroviaria Nacional SA | 11/16/06 | 11/16/2026 | 0.60 | 0.02 | 14.69 | 4.047% |
| Parpublica - Participacoes Publicas SGPS | 11/16/06 | 11/16/2026 | 0.25 | 0.01 | 14.69 | 4.200% |
| CP - Comboios de Portugal EPE | 03/05/10 | 2/5/2030 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 17.91 | 5.700% |
| Portugal Obrigacoes do Tesouro OT | 03/22/06 | 4/15/2037 | 6.97 | 0.29 | 25.11 | 4.100% |
| Governo Portugues Consolidado | 01/01/40 | 1/29/2049 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 36.91 | 3.987% |
| Governo Portugues Consolidado | 02/01/42 | 2/28/2049 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 36.99 | 2.997% |
| Governo Portugues Consolidado | 03/15/43 | 3/29/2049 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 37.07 | 2.764% |
| Governo Portugues Consolidado | 12/01/41 | 12/29/2049 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 37.82 | 3.520% |
Does Anyone See This Emergency As An Emergency, Or Is A Half Trillion Euro Pay Day Loan Bullish?
Today's big headline from Bloomberg: Euro-Area Banks Tap ECB for Record Amount of Three-Year Cash
Euro-area banks tapped the European Central Bank for a record amount of three-year cash in an operation that may boost bond and equity markets.
The Frankfurt-based ECB said today it will lend 800 financial institutions 529.5 billion euros ($712.2 billion) for 1,092 days. Economists predicted an allotment of 470 billion euros, according to the median of 28 estimates in a Bloomberg News survey. In the ECB’s first three-year operation in December, 523 banks borrowed 489 billion euros.
So, basically, nearly twice as many banks are in trouble now as compared to just three months ago. This is bullish, right???!!!
“The astonishing number this time is the number of banks participating, which signals that a lot more small banks looked for the money and it is likely they will pass it on to the economy,” said Laurent Fransolet, head of fixed income strategy Barclays Capital in London, who estimates about 300 billion euros of the total is new lending. “So the impact may be bigger than with the first one.”

I'm not familiar with the quality and/or strength of the shit they smoke over there in London, but from the looks of things it appears to be potent enough. Let's take this bloke's comment to hear, "it is likely they will pass it on to the economy,” . Okay, now where do I begin? Exactly how much of first LTRO made it into the actual economy versus being hoarded by the banks? Is the "pass[ing] it on the the economy" the reason why there is now so much liquidity in European CRE? Here's a quick reminder of where I stand on this...
So, it's safe to say that all of those European REITs and real estate concerns with property mortgages coming up for renewal while underwater will definitively see most of that LTRO 2 money, right? Let's all take a deep breath and hold it as we wait for that one to happen. Ready? One... Two... Three...
What do you think, pray tell, happens when the liquidity starved, capital deprived, over leveraged banks fail to roll over all of that underwater Eu mortgage debt?
Investors seeking safety in Germany, the UK and France may truly be in for a rude awakening!
Reggie Middleton Featured in Property EU, one of Europes leading real estate publicatios
Those who wish to download the full article in PDF format can do so here: Reggie Middleton on Stagflation, Sovereign Debt and the Potential for bank Failure at the ING ACADEMY-v2.
And The Next Stop On The European Bank Flu Express Is
As global equity markets gap downward the trading day after I suggested Watch The Pandemic Bank Flu Spread, can kicking will get progressively harder from this point on. As I have said in my many interviews, the only way out of this is debt destruction, which will crush big European banks leveraged up on debt marked at par of close enough to it.
reggie_on_RT
Having made clear that default was the only way out, Iceland has once again proven me correct. And just to jog the memory, I made it clear that default was the only way out nearly two years ago...
Online Spreadsheets (professional and institutional subscribers only)
- Greek Default Restructuring Scenario Analysis
- Greek Default Restructuring Scenario Analysis with Sustainable Debt/GDP Limits and Haircuts
- Portugal's Debt Ridden Finances: An Analysis of Haircuts, Restructuring and Strategy - Professional Analysis
- The Spain Sovereign Debt Haircut Analysis for Professional/Institutional Subscribers
- Ireland Default Restructuring Scenario Analysis with Sustainable Debt/GDP Limits and Haircuts
Bloomberg reports: Iceland May Hold Krona Auctions Within Weeks
The island, whose banks defaulted on $85 billion in 2008, is moving into the final stages of its resurrection plan as the last vestiges of crisis management are gradually removed. Iceland’s decision, taken together with the International Monetary Fund, to impose capital controls three years ago was key to surviving the bleakest moments of the crisis and helped prevent an all-out run on the island’s assets, Gudmundsson said.
“Without the capital controls it would have been much more difficult to ensure stability in the exchange rate, calling for much higher interest rates and an inability to shelter the domestic economy as well as we did,” he said. “With the turbulence in the international markets lately, the capital controls have sheltered Iceland considerably, since there’s no way of doing a run on the financing of the Icelandic state or the financing of the Icelandic banks.”
It is clear that capital controls are coming to the EU, and I'm sure there already in place in some form or fashion. It is quite ironic how the so-called "in the know" pundits alleged that Iceland would be osctrazied from the captial markets for defaulting when they are the ones actually returning to the markets as the TPTB in the EU are being shunned. Just default already and get it over with, or you just may find yourself working for an Icelandic boss momentarily... You can try to save all of your banks and end up saving no banks at all, or you can go the logical route - the route that Iceland democratically allowed their populace to choose, which also so happened to be the right way. Hmmm... Democaracy! Capitalism! We just don't seem to be seeing those concepts in the Euro area much these days...
Outperforming Euro Area
Iceland’s economy will grow faster than the euro-area average this year and next, the IMF estimated in September. The cost of insuring against an Icelandic default, using credit default swaps, is lower than the average for the euro area.
Iceland’s economy will grow 2.5 percent this year and next, versus 1.6 percent in the euro area this year and 1.1 percent in 2012, the IMF said Sept. 20. Next year, Iceland’s current account surplus will widen to 3.2 percent of the economy and unemployment will be 6 percent, versus 9.9 percent joblessness in the euro area, the fund said.
The stabilization of the island’s economy has allowed the central bank to press ahead with capital liberalizations that the government estimates won't be fully dropped until 2013. The approach allows foreign investors eager to offload their krona holdings to transfer them to foreign or local investors willing to commit long-term to the island, according to the central bank.
'Nuff said. Now, on to my other premonitions, predilections and predictions for which my subscribers pay me so dearly for... CNBC reports Moody's Warns On French Rating Outlook
A rise in interest rates on French government debt and weaker growth prospects could be negative for the outlook on France's credit rating, Moody's warned in a report on Monday, adding to pressure on European debt markets.
Worries that France has the weakest economic fundamentals among the euro's six AAA-rated countries have drawn the euro zone's second largest economy into the firing line in the debt crisis this month.
The rating agency said the deteriorating market climate was a threat to the country's credit outlook, though not at this stage to its actual rating.
"Elevated borrowing costs persisting for an extended period would amplify the fiscal challenges the French government faces amid a deteriorating growth outlook, with negative credit implications," Senior Credit Officer Alexander Kockerbeck said in Moody's Weekly Credit Outlook dated Nov.21.
"As we noted in recent publications, the deterioration in debt metrics and the potential for further liabilities to emerge are exerting pressure on France's creditworthiness and the stable outlook (though not at this stage the level) of the government's Aaa debt rating," the Moody's note read.
The yield differential between French and German 10-year government bonds rose above 200 basis points last week, a new euro-era high.
Moody's said that at that spread level, France pays nearly twice as much as Germany for long-term funding, adding that a 100 basis point increase in yields roughly equates to an additional three billion euros in yearly funding costs.
In early Monday trade, the French 10-year spread was up about 20 basis points at 167 bps following publication of Moody's report but remained well short of the 202 bps hit last week.
The CAC 40 index, which was down 1.7 percent in opening trade, was down 2.2 percent after an hour of trade.
"With the government's forecast for real GDP growth of a mere one percent in 2012, a higher interest burden will make achieving targeted fiscal deficit reduction more difficult," Moody's said.
On Oct 17, Moody's said it could place France on negative outlook in the next three months if the costs for helping to bail out banks and other euro zone members overstretched its budget.
"The French social model cannot be financed if the French economy's potential is not preserved.
... The stress on banks' balance sheets can lead to further increases of liabilities on the government's balance sheet when further state support to banks is needed, it added.
The events are unfolding like clockwork. Just go back a few months - or a year - or two years - in the BoomBustBlog archives for the Eurozone topic...
Italy’s Woes Spell ‘Nightmare’ for BNP - Just As I Predicted But Everybody Is Missing The Point!!!
BNP, the Fastest Running Bank In Europe? Banque BNP Exécuter
When French bankers gorge on roasting PIIGS - OR - Can You Fool Everybody All Of The Time?
So, does BNP have a funding problem, or is it at risk of the same?
BoomBustBlog subscribers know full well the answer to this question. I'm also going to be unusually generous this morning being that our prime French bank run candidate has approached my "crisis" scenario valuation band. So, as to answer the question as to BNP, let's reference
Bank Run Liquidity Candidate Forensic Opinion - A full forensic note for professional and institutional subscribers, and otherwise known as BNP Paribas, First Thoughts...
The WSJ article excerpted above quotes BNP management as saying: "The bank has €135 billion in "unencumbered assets after haircuts" that are eligible to central banks."
OK, I'll bite. Excactly how did BNP get to this €135 billion figure? Was it by using Lehman math? Methinks so, as clearly delineated in my resarch report on the very first page:
BNP_Paribus_First_Thoughts_4_Page_01
The following two pages of this report go on to reveal the games being played to potentially come up with a figure such as the 135 billion quoted above. Boys and girls, I fear those may be Lehman bucks!
For those not familiar with the banking book vs trading book markdown game, I urge you to review this keynote presentation given in Amsterdam which predicted this very scenario, and reference the blog post and research of the same:
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- a research note to subscribers,
The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis, - followed by blog posts on the same, see Is Another Banking Crisis Inevitable?, as excerpted...
- a research note to subscribers,
CNBC and Bloomberg report S&P to Update Bank Credit Ratings Within 3 Weeks. You know that means (or at least should mean)... Next stop of the bank flu express... Germany!
I may post an update on German banks in a week, but I want subscribers to remember that if when things really kick off, this is going to be an explosion that no one said they expected but will blow everybody's ears out - posted behind the paywall well over a month ago and still priced inexpensively relative to those other banks: Blowup Bank - Haircuts, Derivative Risks and Valuation
When The Duopolistic Owners Of The EU Printing Presses Disagree On The Color Of The Ink!
CNBC reports: France and Germany Clash Over ECB Crisis Role
France and Germany, Europe's two central powers, have stepped up their war of words over whether the European Central Bank should intervene more forcefully to halt the euro zone's debt crisis after modest bond purchases failed to calm markets.
Facing rising borrowing costs as its 'AAA' credit rating comes under threat, France urged stronger ECB action, adding to mounting global pressure spelled out by U.S. President Barack Obama.
BoomBustBlog readers and subscribers saw this coming a mile away. The Duopoly that ruled the economics of the EU have divergent needs now, hence divergent interests. Expect this to get worse in the near term. The reasons have been spelled out in Italy’s Woes Spell ‘Nightmare’ for BNP - Just As I Predicted But Everybody Is Missing The Point!!! You see, France, As Most Susceptible To Contagion, Will See Its Banks Suffer because stress in the Italian bond markets will be a direct cause of a French bank run - with the largest of the French banks running the hardest BNP, the Fastest Running Bank In Europe? Banque BNP Exécuter. For those who don't follow me regularly, I warned subscribers on BNP due to the Greco-Italiano risk factor causing a liquidity run born from imminent writedowns. No one from the sell side apparently had a clue. Reference the series:
- Saturday, 23 July 2011 The Anatomy Of A European Bank Run: Look At The Banking Situation BEFORE The Run Occurs!: I detail how I see modern bank runs unfolding
- Thursday, 28 July 2011 The Mechanics Behind Setting Up A Potential European Bank Run Trade and European Bank Run Trading Supplement
The Italian problems were brought to the Attention of BoomBustBlog subscribers over a year and a half ago (subscribers reference Italy public finances projection from March of 2010) and each of the major Italian banks undergoing major distress righ now were identified and outlined over a year and a half ago as well, when their share prices were multiples of what they are now. Subscribers should reference Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note.Long term puts and shorts on these banks (you could've simply closed your eyes and picked two or three) would have made any fund manager's year. Those who don't subscribe can still see the aftermath, after the fact, as referenced by Bloomberg... UniCredit Trades as Junk With $51B Due
Bonds of UniCredit SpA (UCG), the Italian bank that posted a surprise 10.6 billion-euro ($14.3 billion) third-quarter loss this week, are trading as junk as the lender prepares to refinance $51 billion of debt coming due next year.
Fixed-income investors are pricing the Milan-based lender’s bonds at levels that imply a rating of B1, four levels below investment grade and eight steps lower than its A2 ranking, according to Moody’s Analytics. The 13.4 billion euros of UniCredit debt securities that are contained in Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s Euro Corporates Banking index have lost 2.8 billion euros since the start of June.
UniCredit, Italy’s biggest bank, has the highest amount of bonds maturing in 2012 by a major European lender, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Concern that Italy will struggle to cut Europe’s second-highest debt load and tame the sovereign crisis drove the country’s debt yields to euro-era records, infecting UniCredit’s 40 billion euros of Italian bonds.
The Catch 22 is that Germany's woes are not that far detached from France's, yet it appears that they do not see this. I reiterate, then query again - Italy’s Woes Spell ‘Nightmare’ for BNP - Just As I Predicted But Everybody Is Missing The Point!!! This is a Pan-European sovereign debt crisis, not a southern or western European sovereign debt crisis. The countries fates are inextricably linked.
And for those who believe what Fed Member Bullshitterard said, at least according to CNBC: European Debt Crisis Unlikely to Impact US: Fed's Bullard, I refer you to my extended, self-answered query, "Is The Entire Global Banking Industry Carrying Naked, Unhedged "Risk Free" Sovereign Debt Yielding 100-200%? Quick Answer: Probably! " I place this stamp on Bullard's comments...
grade_a_bullshit_alert_trans
If you really want to know the truth, simply read my post from yesterday, Squids, Morgans & Counterparty Risk: Blowing Up The World One Tentacle At A Time
Bond market turmoil is spreading across Europe. Italian 10-year bond yields have risen above 7 percent, unaffordable in the long term. Yields on bonds issued by France, the Netherlands and Austria — which along with Germany form the core of the euro zone — have also climbed.
Asian shares and the euro fell further on Thursday as doubts deepened about Europe's ability to stop its sovereign debt crisis from spinning out of control.
MSCI's broadest index of Asia Pacific shares outside Japan fell 0.2 percent, while Japan's Nikkei stock average opened down 0.5 percent.
The euro hovered near five-week lows against the dollar, trading not far off Wednesday's trough around $1.3430, a low not seen since Oct. 10.
"The ECB's role is to ensure the stability of the euro, but also the financial stability of Europe. We trust that the ECB will take the necessary measures to ensure financial stability in Europe," French government spokeswoman Valerie Pecresse said after a cabinet meeting in Paris.
French Finance Minister Francois Baroin repeated Paris's view that the euro zone's EFSF bailout fund should have a banking license, something Berlin opposes. Such a move would allow the fund to borrow from the ECB, giving it extra firepower to fight the spreading crisis.
"The position of France ... is that the way to prevent contagion is for the EFSF to have a banking license," Baroin said on the sidelines of an awards ceremony.
But German Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear Berlin would resist pressure for the central bank to take a bigger role in resolving the debt crisis, saying European Union rules prohibited such action.
"The way we see the treaties, the ECB doesn't have the possibility of solving these problems," she said after talks with visiting Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny.
The only way to recover markets' confidence was to implement agreed economic reforms and build a closer European political union by changing the EU treaty, Merkel said.
ECB policymakers continue to reject international calls to intervene decisively as Europe's lender of last resort, stressing that it is up to governments to resolve the debt crisis through austerity measures and reforms.
However, many analysts believe such a move now represents the only way to stem the contagion, despite the potential risk of inflation from printing money.
Short Respite
Traders said the ECB bought Spanish and Italian bonds on Wednesday, but the respite was short and there was no sign of a change in its policy of limited, stop-go purchases to calm markets temporarily while maintaining pressure on governments.
Fitch Ratings warned it might lower its "stable" rating outlook for U.S. banks because of contagion from problems in troubled European markets.
But didn't Fitch here what Fed Member Bullshitterard said??? What's the problem? Are those Fitch guys reading BoomBustBlog now??? Tired of the HPA non-sense (as in [residential] housing perpetual price appreciation). Yep! Those guys from Fitch justified their AAA ratings on Bullshit based upon the concept of prices in housing increasing at XX% per year, FOREVAAAAH!!!! You thought I forget about that, guys???
grade_a_bullshit_alert_trans
Back to CNBC's article...
The size and mood of the rally, the first big protest in almost a month, will signal just how bitterly a restive public will fight further tax rises and spending cuts that international lenders demand in return for a massive bailout.
Greece's main conservative leader Antonis Samaras has refused to bow to EU demands for a written commitment to the bailout program and called for elections in three months to restore social peace.
New data showed that Greece's austerity-fuelled recession had widened the budget deficit in October, the government failing to boost revenues despite unpopular new taxes.
ECB President Mario Draghi has said the 17-nation currency bloc will be in a mild recession by the end of the year, making it tougher for governments to put their finances in order, and Europe's debt crisis is also increasing strains in the money market, the plumbing of the international financial system.
Euro zone banks are finding it harder to obtain dollar funding. While the stresses are nowhere the levels of the 2008 financial crisis, they have continued to mount despite ECB moves to provide unlimited liquidity to banks.
Do Black Swans Really Matter? Not As Much as the Circle of Life, The Circle Purposely Disrupted By Multiple Central Banks Worldwide!!!
With all due respect to that Nassim Taleb dude who popularized the term "Black Swasn", Black Swan events are both overrated and the term is sloppily bandied about by those who may not be putting the requisite thought into just how utilitarian the knowledge of Black Swans actually are. Since you can't accurately predict, nor back test against, nor adequately hedge against such events, exactly what good is a Black Swan discussion. Well, I can answer that question. Black Swan events do maximum damage when the economic cycle is at its weakest. In Reggie Middleton's Economic Circle of Life (think the Lion King) it is the right portion of the circle in which Black Swan events do the most damage.
Actually, it is not the Black Swan events themselves that do the damage but said event do serve as the catalyst that either bust a bubble that was waiting to pop anyway, or break a structure that was hobbling along on one leg as it was - where we happen to be now in many places of the developed world - sans rampant propaganda, misinformation and disinformation from less than disinterested sources.
I have always been of the contention that the 2008 market crash was cut short by the global machinations of a cadre of central bankers intent on somehow rewriting the rules of economics, investment physics and global finance. They became the buyers of last resort, then consequently the buyers of only resort while at the same time flooding the world with liquidity and guarantees. These central bankers and the countries they allegedly strive to serve took on the debt and nigh worthless assets of the private sector who threw prudence through the window during the "Peak" phase of the circle of economic life, and engaged in rampant speculation. Click to enlarge to print quality...
The Financial Times Vindicates BoomBustBlog's Stance On Goldman Sachs - Once Again!
I read this headline from the Financial Times and said to myself, "Okay Reg, Don't say 'I told you so'". Thus, you won't hear it from me, at least not this time. As reported today in the Financial Times: Goldman reveals fresh crisis losses and Goldman’s republished results present a new picture
Goldman Sachs has revealed details of about $5bn in investment losses suffered during the crisis for the first time this week, in a move that will deepen the debate over companies’ financial disclosures. The figures, issued as part of internal reforms aimed at silencing Goldman’s critics, show that the bank suffered $13.5bn in losses from “investing and lending” with its own funds in 2008. But Goldman’s regulatory filings and its executives’ comments to investors at the time pointed to about $8.5bn of losses arising from its investments in debt and equity, as markets were rocked by the turmoil.
Hmmmm! I walked through this in explicit detail in “When the Patina Fades… The Rise and Fall of Goldman Sachs???“ and I did it without being privvy to Goldman's financial innards. It was more or less common damn sense. Goldman and its employees do not walk on water, they do not shit gold, and they cannot perform miracles. If one takes an objective approach to their equity analysis, and simple plug the numbers into a spreadsheet (objectively) you would have come up with the exact same conclusions that I gave my subscribers all of these years. Let's reminisce, shall we?
So, what is GS if you strip it of its government protected, name branded hedge fund status. Well, my subscribers already know. Let’ take a peak into one of their subscription documents (
Professional" width="16" height="16" border="0" /> Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional 2009-04-20 10:06:45 4.04 Mb - 131 pages). I believe many with short term memory actually forgot what got this bank into trouble in the first place, and exactly how it created the perception that it got out of trouble. The (Off) Balance Sheet!!!
Contrary to popular belief, it does not appear that Goldman is a superior risk manager as compared to the rest of the Street. They may
the same mistakes and had to accept the same bailouts. They are apparently well connected though, because they have one of the riskiest
balance sheet compositions around yet managed to get themselves insured and protected by the FDIC like a real bank. This bank’s portfolio looked quite scary at the height of the bubble.
And back to the FT article...
Introducing The BoomBustBlog Sovereign Contagion Model: Thus far, it has been right on the money for 5 months straight!
Anybody who has been following for the last fiscal quarter or so (or has seen my Spanish bank work in 2009) knows that I believe that the EMU as it stood in 2009 would probably be non-existent by the end of 2010. All of the pundits who proclaimed that the European debt crisis was over with the mere declaration that Greece may receive some additional debt either were abjectly lying or truly didn't understand the gravity of the situation. To be honest, there are a lot (and I mean a whole lot) of data points, angles and contingencies to grasp thus it is not necessarily easy. Then again, isn't that what these market professionals get paid for.
Very early in the year, I virtually guaranteed that the Greek banks would fall, or at least have to be rescued (a 2nd time) before they fell. I practically promised it. In the news today...
Lagarde to discuss Greece support with banks: French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde will meet with bank leaders on Wednesday to discuss how its banks could participate in the Greek rescue package. Lagarde told the French parliament the country's banks will reiterate their support for the rescue process on Wednesday but she said tomorrow's meeting could lead to them taking on a more active role, along the lines of what German banks have done. French banks have so far not been asked by the government to participate directly in the Greek rescue package, two sources in France's banking sector said earlier on Tuesday. They have only been asked to maintain their exposure to Greece and have agreed to do this, the sources said. "Nothing beyond this has been requested by the government," one of the sources told Reuters. France has overall the highest exposure to Greek debt, with about $75.2 billion worth of assets in total, according to Bank of International data as at end-2009. Germany's top banks and insurers offered support on Tuesday mainly by keeping open credit lines to banks and by agreeing not to sell Greek bonds for the duration of a wider IMF-led bailout. Germany's Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said that German financial firms had agreed to buy bonds issued by state controlled bank KfW as a way to help finance the bailout. Deutsche Bank Chief Executive Josef Ackermann said it was important to extinguish the fire in Greece and pledged to help the country. Ackermann is helping to coordinate efforts by the private sector to support the Greek rescue package.
I suggest one references my post, How Greece Killed Its Own Banks!.
So, How Many Banks and Analysts Were Bearish On Goldman Before Today?
I know I'll raise my hand to the aforementioned question. The issue is, as I huffed and puffed about how overvalued GS is, particularly considering the amount of risk that it faced, I got a lot of blow back. The same blow back I got in early 2008 when I shorted GS from $180 to $75 (see Reggie Middleton on Risk, Reward and Reputations on the Street: the Goldman Sachs Forensic Analysis). Well, I guess we can all see the risk that I was referring to, right???
When the Patina Fades... The Rise and Fall of Goldman Sachs??? Tuesday, 16 March 2010
I have warned my readers about following myths and legends versus reality and facts several times in the past, particularly as it applies to Goldman Sachs and what I have coined "Name Brand Investing". Very recent developments from Senator Kaufman of Delaware will be putting the spit-shined patina of Wall Street's most powerful bank to the test. Here is a link to the speech that the esteemed Senator from Delaware (yes, the most corporate friendly state in this country). A few excerpts to liven up your morning...
Reggie Middleton vs Goldman Sachs, Round 1Tuesday, 08 December 2009 and Reggie Middleton vs Goldman Sachs, Round 2 Sunday, 31 January 2010
On December 8th of last year, I penned "Reggie Middleton vs Goldman Sachs, Round 1"wherein I challenged all to take a critical look at exactly how much money was lost by Goldman Sachs' clients. Well, here comes round 2, which is directed at Goldman (over)valuation.
More on Lehman Brothers Dies While Getting Away with Murder: Introducing Regulatory Capture
From Banks, Brokers, & Bullsh1+ part 1:
A thorough forensic analysis of Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and Lehman Brothers has uncovered...
Let’s get something straight right off the bat. We all know there is a certain level of fraud sleight of hand in the financial industry. I have called many banks insolvent in the past. Some have pooh-poohed these proclamations, while others have looked in wonder, saying “How the hell did he know that?”
- Is this the Breaking of the Bear? It wasn’t hard to see Bear Stearns collapsing 3 month before bankruptcy. Why didn’t our regulators see what I saw?
- As I see it, 32 commercial banks and thrifts may see the feces hit the fan blades It wasn’t hard to see that nearly all of these 32 banks would be facing the threat of insolvency. Why didn’t our regulators see what I saw?
- The Commercial Real Estate Crash Cometh, and I know who is leading the way! It wasn’t hard to see that commercial real estate was ready to implode and that GGP was about to collapse under its own weight. Why didn’t our regulators see what I saw?
- Yeah, Countrywide is pretty bad, but it ain’t the only one at the subprime party… Comparing Countrywide Countrywide and Washington Mutual’s collapse were visible AT LEAST a year in advance!
- The Next Shoe to Drop: Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Counterparty Risk – Beware what lies beneath! ‘Nuff said…
- … and even Lehman Brothers: Is Lehman a Lying Lemming?
The list above is a small, relevant sampling of at least dozens of similar calls. Trust me, dear reader, what some may see as divine premonition is nothing of the sort. It is definitely not a sign of superior ability, insider info, or heavenly intellect. I would love to consider myself a hyper-intellectual, but alas, it just ain’t so and I’m not going to lie to you. The truth of the matter is I sniffed these incongruencies out because 2+2 never did equal 46, and it probably never will either. An objective look at each and every one of these situations shows that none of them added up. In each case, there was someone (or a lot of people) trying to get you to believe that 2=2=46.xxx. They justified it with theses that they alleged were too complicated for the average man to understand (and in business, if that is true, then it is probably just too complicated to work in the long run as well). They pronounced bold new eras, stating “This time is different”, “There is a new math” (as if there was something wrong with the old math), etc. and so on and associated bullshit.
So, the question remains, why is it that a lowly blogger and small time
individual investor with a skeleton staff of analysts can uncover
systemic risks, frauds and insolvencies at a level that it appears the
SEC hasn’t even gleaned as of yet? Two words, “Regulatory Capture”. You
see, and as I reluctantly admitted, it is not that I am so smart, it is
that the regulator’s goals are not the same as mine. My efforts are
designed to ferret out the truth for enlightenment, profit and gain.
Regulators’ goals are to serve a myriad constituency that does not
necessarily have the individual tax payer at the top of the heirachal
pyramid. Before we go on, let me excerpt from a piece that I wrote on
the topic at hand so we are all on the same page: How
Regulatory Capture Turns Doo Doo Deadly
First off, some definitions:
- The Doo Doo, as in the Doo
Doo 32: A list of 32 banks that I created on May 22, 2008 which set the stage for my investment
thesis of shorting the regional banks. At that time, I was one of the
very few, if not one of the only, to warn that the regional banks would
hit the fan.- Regulatory capture (adopted from Wikipedia): A
term used to refer to situations in which a government regulatory
agency created to act in the public interest instead acts in favor of
the commercial or special interests that dominate in the industry or
sector it is charged with regulating. Regulatory capture is an
explicit manifestation of government failure in that it not only
encourages, but actively promotes the activities of large firms that
produce negative externalities. For public
choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs because groups or
individuals with a high-stakes interest in the outcome of policy or
regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and
energies in attempting to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while
members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the
outcome, will ignore it altogether. Regulatory capture is when this
imbalance of focused resources devoted to a particular policy outcome
is successful at “capturing” influence with the staff or commission
members of the regulatory agency, so that the preferred policy
outcomes of the special interest are implemented. The risk of
regulatory capture suggests that regulatory agencies should be
protected from outside influence as much as possible, or else not
created at all. A captured regulatory agency that serves the interests
of its invested patrons with the power of the government behind it is
often worse than no regulation whatsoever.About a year and a half ago, after sounding the alarm on the
regionals, I placed strategic bearish positions in the sector which
paid off extremely well. The only problem is, it really shouldn’t have.
Why? Because the problems of these banks were visible a mile away. I
started warning friends and family as far back as 2004, I announced it
on my blog in 2007, and I even offered a free report in early 2008.Well, here comes another warning. One of the Doo Doo 32 looks to be
ready to collapse some time soon. Most investors and pundits won’t
realize it because a) they don’t read BoomBustblog, and b) due to
regulatory capture, the bank has been given the OK by its regulators to
hide the fact that it is getting its insides gutted out by CDOs and
losses on loans and loan derivative products. Alas, I am getting ahead
of myself. Let’s take a quick glance at regulatory capture, graphically
encapsulated, then move on to look at the recipients of the Doo Doo
Award as they stand now…A picture is worth a thousand words…
So, how does this play into today’s big headlines in the alternative,
grass roots media? Well, on the front page of the Huffington
Post and ZeroHedge, we have a damning expose of Lehman
Brothers (we told you this in the first quarter of 2008, though),
detailing their use of REPO 105 financing to basically lie about their
liquidity positions and solvency. The most damning and most interesting
tidbit lies within a more obscure ZeroHedge article that details
findings from the recently released Lehman papers, though:
On September 11, JPMorgan executives met to discuss significant
valuation problems with securities that Lehman had posted as collateral
over the summer. JPMorgan concluded that the collateral was not worth
nearly what Lehman had claimed it was worth, and decided to request an
additional $5 billion in cash collateral from Lehman that day. The
request was communicated in an executive?level phone call, and Lehman
posted $5 billion in cash to JPMorgan by the afternoon of Friday,
September 12. Around the same time, JPMorgan learned that a security
known as Fenway,which
Lehman had posted to JPMorgan at a stated value of $3 billion, was actually asset?backed
commercial paper credit?enhanced by Lehman (that is, it was Lehman,
rather than a third party, that effectively guaranteed principal and
interest payments). JPMorgan concluded that Fenway was worth
practically nothing as collateral.
Hold up! Lehman was pledging as collateral allegedly “investment grade”,
“credit enhanced” securities that were enhanced by Lehman, who was
insolvent and in need of liquidity, itself. For anybody who is not
following me, how much is life insurance on yourself worth if it is
backed up by YOU paying out the proceeds after you die bankrupt? Lehman
was allowed to get away with such nonsense because it was allowed to
value its OWN securities. Think about this for a second. You are in big
financial trouble, you have only a $10 bill to your name, but your
favorite congressman (whom you have given $10 bills to in the past) has
given you the okay to erase that number 10 on the $bills and put
whatever number on it you feel is “reasonable”. So, when your creditors
come a callin’ , looking for $20 in collateral, what number would you
deem reasonable to put on that $10 bill.
Ladies and gentlemen, in the short paragraph above, we have just
encapsulated the majority of the mark to market argument. Let’s delve
farther into the ZH article:
By early August 2008, JPMorgan had learned that Lehman had pledged
self-priced CDOs as collateral over the course of the summer. By August
9, to meet JPMorgan’s margin requirements, Lehman had pledged $9.7
billion of collateral, $5.8 billion of which were CDOs priced
by Lehman, mostly at face value. JPMorgan expressed
concern as to the quality of the assets that Lehman had pledged and,
consequently, Lehman offered to review its valuations. Although JPMorgan
remained concerned that the CDOs were not acceptable collateral, Lehman informed JPMorgan that
it had no other collateral to pledge. The
fact that Lehman did not have other assets to pledge raised some
concerns at JPMorgan about Lehman’s liquidity
Hmmm!!! Three day old fish has a fresher scent, does it not? So where
was the SEC, the NY Fed, or anybody the hell else who’s supposed to
safeguard us against this malfeasance? Even bloggers picked up on this
months before it collapsed. The answer, dear readers: REGULATORY
CAPTURE!
Again, from ZH:
The SEC was not aware of any significant issues with Lehman’s liquidity
pool until September 12, 2008, when officials learned that a large
portion of Lehman’s liquidity pool had been allocated to its clearing
banks to induce them to continue providing essential clearing services.
In a September 12, 2008 e?mail, one SEC analyst
wrote: Key point: Lehman’s
liquidity pool is almost totally locked up with clearing banks to cover
intraday credit ($15bnjpm, $10bn with others like citi and bofa). withThis is a really big
problem.
BoomBustBlog featured several warnings starting January of 2008!
One would think that after all of this, the problem would have been
rectified. To the contrary, it has been made worse. Congress has
pressured FASB to institutionalize and make acceptable the lies that
Lehman told its investors, counterparties and regulators. That’s right,
not only will no one get in trouble for this blatant lying, the practice
is now actually endorsed by the government – that is until somebody
blows up again. At that point there will be a bunch of finger pointing
and allegations and claims such as “But who could have seen this
coming”.
Do you not believe me, dear reader. Reference
About the Politically Malleable FASB, Paid for Politicians,
and Mark to Myth Accounting Rules: the nonsense is unfolding and
collapsing right now, even as I type this sentence.
The next place to look??? Who knows? Maybe someone should take an An
Independent Look into JP Morgan .. or maybe even an unbiased
gander at Wells Fargo (see
The Wells Fargo 4th Quarter Review is Available, and Its a
Doozy!). After all, If
a Bubble Bubble Bursts Off Balance Sheet, Will Anyone Be There to Hear
It?
More on Lehman Brothers Dies While Getting Away with Murder: Introducing Regulatory Capture:
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