Bloomberg reports: Dodd-Frank’s Tentacles Go Deep. They Won’t Be Cut Fast or Easily. It took seven years to put these regulations in place. Is it rational to think they can be removed in less than 4? If not, then the financial's rally may be a tad bit premature and overdone.

 

Published in BoomBustBlog

Bloomberg reports Goldman Traders Lost Money 21 Days in 3Q:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), which relied on trading for 62 percent of revenue so far this year, recorded losses from that business on 21 days in the third quarter, the most since the fourth quarter of 2008.

The firm’s traders lost more than $100 million on one of the days, according to the New York-based company’s quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. They produced more than $100 million on nine days out of 64 total days in the quarter that ended Sept. 30, the filing showed.

Well, you guys know where I stand on this, and I have warned you ad nauseum...the Squid Can't Trade!

thumb_image001_copyLearning to fly with tentacles instead of wings may prove difficult for the Squid!

Note: Subscribers can download the GS 3rd quarter review with the updated valuation opinion hereicon Goldman Sachs Q3 update Final (482.35 kB 2011-11-03 03:03:51)

In our Goldman Sachs update note, “Show me how to trade” (August 2011), we challenged Goldman Sachs’ ability to create alpha. Besides Goldman’s apparent lack of skill in generating returns in downward markets, we also presented an analysis on how its share price is driven by momentum (equity markets) instead of the commonly accepted metric of book value. Those who would have followed the traditional school of thought (sell side) by bidding the price up instead of down would have seen their capital erode by 9%; the stock is down 9% since our most recent publication. Below are some of the extracts from our previous note alongside updated charts including Q3 results to peruse before we delve further into the quarterly results the BoomBustBlog way.

Bloomberg also reports Goldman Has $2.3B ‘Funded’ Credit Exposure to Italy which is probably why they are also reporting Goldman Sachs Said to Raise $1.1 Billion From ICBC Stake Sale. Bascially, it's time to rasie some capital. After all, BoomBustBlogger subscribers saw this coming 4 months ago.

As excerpted from Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?

So, what is the logical conclusion? More phallic looking charts of
blatant, unbridled, and from a realistic perspective, unhedged RISK
starring none other than Goldman Sachs...

 image006image006

And to think, many thought that JPM exposure vs World GDP chart was
provocative. I query thee, exactly how will GS put a real workable
hedge, a counterparty risk mitigating prophylactic if you will, over
that big green stalk that is representative of Total Credit Exposure to
Risk Based Capital? Short answer, Goldman may very well be to big for a
counterparty condom. If that's truly the case, all of you pretty, brand name Goldman counterparties
out there (and yes, there are a lot of y'all - GS really gets around),
expect to get burned at the culmination of that French banking party
I've been talking about for the last few quarters. Oh yeah, that
perpetually printing clinic also known as the Federal Reserve just might
be running a little low on that cheap liquidity antibiotic... Just
giving y'all a heads up ahead of time...

image009

There's plenty more where that came from....

I'm Hunting Big Game Today: The Squid On A Spear Tip

I demonstrate how the market,
the sell side, and most investors are missing one of the biggest
bastions of risk in the US investment banking industry. I will also...

 

Hunting the Squid Part 3: Reggie Middleton Serves Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid

Hunting the Squid, part 4: So, What Else Can Go Wrong With Goldman Sachs? Plenty!

Hunting the Squid, Part 5: Sometimes Your Local Superhero Doesn't Look Like What They Show You In The Movies


 

Published in BoomBustBlog

The graphic below pretty much sums up Goldman's most recent quarter...

thumb_image001_copy

An unmitigated disaster, and worse than practically everybody on the Street anticipated, save that brash-ass blogging dude brandishing those old fashioned analytical weapons of choice... Two months or so ago (Monday, 22 August 2011), I penned the public blog post that also relased my most recent research on Goldman Sachs - The Squid Is A Federally (Tax Payer) Insured Hedge Fund Paying Fat Bonuses That Can't Trade In Volatile Markets? Who's Gonna Tell The Shareholders and Tax Payer??? -  as excerpted:

The chart below demonstrates how the volatility of the revenues from the trading and principal investments trickles down into volatility of the total revenues and profits of Goldman Sachs. I don’t call Goldman the world’s most expensive federally insured hedge fund for nothing!

And for those who haven't been following my Squid Hunting series, there's a lot more to come from those boys at 200 West Street. If you want to know what will happen next, just look at the first few pages of the lastest Goldman subscription docs (click here to subscribe):

After all, eventually someone must query, So, When Does 3+5=4? When You Aggregate A Bunch Of Risky Banks & Then Pretend That You Didn't?

 

 I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction

 

I'm Hunting Big Game Today: The Squid On A Spear Tip

Summary: This is the first in a series of articles to be released this weekend concerning Goldman Sachs, the Squid! In this introduction (for those who do not regularly follow me) I demonstrate how the market, the sell side, and most investors are missing one of the biggest bastions of risk in the US investment banking industry. I will also...

 Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?  

Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?

Welcome to part two of my series on Hunting the Squid, the overvaluation and under-appreciation of the risks that is Goldman Sachs. Since this highly analytical, but poignant diatribe covers a lot of material, it's imperative that those who have not done so review part 1 of this series, I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part...

Reggie Middleton Serves Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid: Goldman Sachs and Market Perception of Real Risks!

Hunting the Squid Part 3: Reggie Middleton Serves Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid

For those who don't subscribe to BoomBustblog, or haven't read I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction and Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?, not only have you missed out on some unique artwork, you've potentially missed out on 300%...
 Hunting the Squid, part 4: So, What Else Can Go Wrong With The Squid? Plenty!!!  

Hunting the Squid, part 4: So, What Else Can Go Wrong With Goldman Sachs? Plenty!

Yes, this more of the hardest hitting investment banking research available focusing on Goldman Sachs (the Squid), but before you go on, be sure you have read parts 1.2. and 3:  I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On A Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To...

I actually show up in person!

Hunting the Squid, Part 5: Sometimes Your Local Superhero Doesn't Look Like What They Show You In The Movies

My next post should also include research on the next bank that we have found that has been (again) overlooked by the market, the media and the sell side. Can we expect the same that we saw in BNP, Bear, Lehman, etc.? Well, paying subscribers shall find out forthwith.

I can be reached via the following channels, or directly via email:

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I will be releasing the date (probably this week), location and time of the NYC meet and greet within the next 24 hours or so, so we can chat, drink, debate, argue and fraternize with pretty woman together in a trendy spot in the Meat Packing District or the Bowery (I apologize in advance to all of my female readers/subscribers). Those who are interested in attending should email customer support. There has been strong interest in the London meeting, enough to warrant the venue - I simply need to get the travel and venue organized due to a change of plans.
For those that are new to the blog, these are pics of previous meet and greets...

The Motherland on the Atlantic Ocean, just outside NYC

The Motherland on the Hudson, NYC

47b8d631b3127cce98548a67f7f900000047100Abs2TFi2ZsWWg.jpg

79st Boat Basin, NYC

DSC06310.jpg

79st Boat Basin, NYC

buddhakahn2.jpg

BuddhaKahn, NYC

Published in BoomBustBlog

I recieved this in the mail from a connected media editor regarding Goldman's very recent investment advisories...

Buy calls for a likely relief rally on earnings (Oct 20th)

We see the potential for a rebound in MS shares on earnings, but the event is not without risk. We believe concerns regarding its European swap and loan exposures appear overdone, as the firm signaled its net exposures to France and the periphery are modest if not immaterial. Uncertainty generated by press reports, as well as difficult markets have driven shares below levels reached when the market was at its March 2009 lows.

Balance sheet strengthened; sell short-dated CDS as fear falls

We believe the recent widening in MS CDS spreads does not reflect actual credit fundamentals. MS appears to have enough capital and liquidity

($182 bn in global liquidity pool + its bank status) to withstand significant market duress. Its 14.6% Tier 1 common ratio is at the high end of the industry. We expect the market focus to remain on European sovereign exposures and liquidity levels, and expect management to discuss this, highlighting the strength of its cash position, hedging and collateral, and progress in reaching its strategic goals, somewhat calming fears.

I responded with the rant below...

A)     Goldman’s investment advice sucks, big time – see Is It Now Common Knowledge That Goldman's Investment Advice Sucks?

B)      The term “net” exposures is misleading and in many cases, make believe. The offsetting hedges used to “alledgedly” hedge the gross exposure were written off of counterparties in the same businesses, trading the same products in the same markets as Morgan. When the feces hits the cooling machine blades, everyone’s liquidity will move in the same direction – downward. There is no true diversity, hence there is no true hedge – only academic hedges written, and traded, in paper form.

a.     I have addressed this ad nauseum on the blog, but the answer to that questions has been put best by Tyler Durden, at ZeroHedge put it best: ...Wrong. The problem with bilateral netting is that it is based on one massively flawed assumption, namely that in an orderly collapse all derivative contracts will be honored by the issuing bank (in this case the company that has sold the protection, and which the buyer of protection hopes will offset the protection it in turn has sold). The best example of how the flaw behind bilateral netting almost destroyed the system is AIG: the insurance company was hours away from making trillions of derivative contracts worthless if it were to implode, leaving all those who had bought protection from the firm worthless, a contingency only Goldman hedged by buying protection on AIG. And while the argument can further be extended that in bankruptcy a perfectly netted bankrupt entity would make someone else who on claims they have written, this is not true, as the bankrupt estate will pursue 100 cent recovery on its claims even under Chapter 11, while claims the estate had written end up as General Unsecured Claims which as Lehman has demonstrated will collect 20 cents on the dollar if they are lucky. The point of this detour being that if any of these four banks fails, the repercussions would be disastrous. And no, Frank Dodd's bank "resolution" provision would do absolutely nothing to prevent an epic systemic collapse.

C)    There is evidence that corroborates bullet point “B” in Goldman’s own missive, and I quote “Balance sheet strengthened; sell short-dated CDS as fear falls.” Are we to believe that Goldman is only giving this advice to those clients large enough, liquid enough, solvent enough and adequately diversified from the financial services, asset management and investment industry (this can be read as absolutely no hedge funds, HNW, pension funds and family offices – Yeah, right!) so as to ensure the ability to pay out these CDS in a fat tailed event? Or is Goldman peddling this advice that is not paid for to incentivize clients act in a fashion that Goldman is paid for, ex. Market maker/broker/principal/agent in the CDS market? As Goldman pushes CDS sales onto any willy nilly who’s willing to wright them, Goldman compounds the risks already inherent in a much less than perfect system. Isn’t that why AIG had to be bailed out to the tune of over a fifth a TRILLION US dollars?

D)    As for the last comment “MS appears to have enough capital and liquidity ($182 bn in global liquidity pool + its bank status) to withstand significant market duress. Its 14.6% Tier 1 common ratio is at the high end of the industry. We expect the market focus to remain on European sovereign exposures and liquidity levels, and expect management to discuss this, highlighting the strength of its cash position, hedging and collateral, and progress in reaching its strategic goals, somewhat calming fears.” I direct you to my latest post on what Superheroes may look like in real life –  Hunting the Squid, Part 5: Sometimes You…

Published in BoomBustBlog

 Yes! I'm still hunting Squid, but the Architeuthis dux apparently has called in an ally, a benefactor, an aid befit those who master the art of regulatory capture, one who is steeped in power, authority and influence. Yes, indeed - this benefactor is no mere game warden, and his mastery over this side of the force is not minimal. As a matter of fact, his mere spoken word today has served to move this elusive member of the Architeuthis genus farther away from equilibrium in terms of fundamental valuation - at least on a risk adjusted basis while at the same time reducing the value of put contracts on it. However, sometimes there exists a counterbalance to such forces.... Actually, more often than many are led to, and probably would like to believe... Superheroes don't look like what you see on TV or in the movies. No capes, tights, or patent leather boots. Sometimes, all they wear and bring to bear is... the Truth!!!

thumb_Reggie_Middleton_as_Tribal_Truth_Seeker_At_Goldman_Sachs_HeadquartersDow Jones reports: Geithner: Morgan Stanley, Other Major US Banks, Not at Risk of Failure

WASHINGTON - Morgan Stanley (MS) and other major U.S. banks aren't at risk of succumbing to the same fate as Lehman Brothers, which fell victim to the 2008 financial crisis, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner assured senators on Thursday.

When asked at a Senate Banking Committee whether the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis could bring down Morgan Stanley or another major financial institution, Geithner said, "Absolutely not."

The largest U.S. firms are much stronger than they were before the crisis, and the direct exposure of the financial system to European countries under the most pressure is "very modest," he said.

However, given Europe's size and interconnectedness, Geithner said leaders there need to "move more aggressively to address this."

 Okay, so either Geither doesn't read me, or he's bluffing. Months before Bear Stearns collapsed, did Tim Geithner and/or the Office of the Treasury warn of it? Did they even know? Hey, the bearer of the Truth warned you (2 months before Bear Stearns fell, while trading in the $100s and still had buy ratings and investment grade AA or better from the ratings agencies) with Is this the Breaking of the Bear? There comes a time when an actual track record of accomplishment means something. So, dear readers, do you look to Tim Geithner and the Office of the Treasure as your hero, championing the cause of Truth and financial insight, or dare you risk looking somewhere a tad less conventional but a hell of a lot more reliable? Long story short, is it time for investors and the media to accept new heroes... After all, before one considers whether Geithner is to be relied upon to accurately opine upon the health of Morgan Stanley and the other banks, one should look to how well he has done in the past. Since there are a raft of incidences upon which he could have used his (super0 powers of deductive reasoning and analytical prowess, he could have very well missed the collapse of Bear Stearns (after all, most of us are merely human) but still would have (or at least should have)...

  1. Warned or know about Lehman (I warned in Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise?),
  2. The housing market crash (I warned in Correction, and further thoughts on the topic and How Far Will US Home Prices Drop?)
  3. The commercial real estate crash (Will the commercial real estate market fall? Of course it will ~ Do you remember when I said Commercial Real Estate was sure to fall? ~ The Commercial Real Estate Crash Cometh, and I know who is leading the way!)
  4. The collapse of state and municipal finances, with California in particular (May 2008): Municipal bond market and the securitization crisis – part 2
  5. The collapse of the regional banks (32 of them, actually) in May 2008: As I see it, these 32 banks and thrifts are in deep doo-doo! as well as the fall of Countrywide and Washington Mutual
  6. The collapse of the monoline insurers, Ambac and MBIA in late 2007 & 2008: A Super Scary Halloween Tale of 104 Basis Points Pt I & II, by Reggie Middleton, Welcome to the World of Dr. FrankenFinance! and Ambac is Effectively Insolvent & Will See More than $8 Billion of Losses with Just a $2.26 Billion 
  7. The ENTIRE Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis (potentially soon to be the Global Sovereign Debt Crisis) starting in January of 2009 and explicit detail as of January 2010: The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis
  8. Ireland austerity and the disguised sink hole of debt and non-performing assets that is the Irish banking system: I Suggest Those That Dislike Hearing “I Told You So” Divest from Western and Southern European Debt, It’ll Get Worse Before It Get’s Better!

If you have not heard from your Office of the Treasure head or Tim Geithner months ahead (or at least in time to do something about the happenstances listed above (and there are a lot more where that came from), then I do suggest it is high time you either started looking for new heroes, or at the very least, realize that Tim Geiithner may not know what the hell he's talking about in regards to which banks are at risk and which are not. That is, unless he is defining at risk as not being on the select list upon which he is willing to bankrupt the country in order to ensure they don't fail.

On that note, let's move on so I can demonstrate that those very same banks that Geithner opines upon do have risks which he has failed to delineate. Never fear, for Reggie will fill said gaps.

If you haven't already, please do review the first four parts of this series, and if so skip past this break and into the nitty gritty--->

 I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction  

I'm Hunting Big Game Today: The Squid On A Spear Tip

Summary: This is the first in a series of articles to be released this weekend concerning Goldman Sachs, the Squid! In this introduction (for those who do not regularly follow me) I demonstrate how the market, the sell side, and most investors are missing one of the biggest bastions of risk in the US investment banking industry. I will also...

 Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?  

Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?

Welcome to part two of my series on Hunting the Squid, the overvaluation and under-appreciation of the risks that is Goldman Sachs. Since this highly analytical, but poignant diatribe covers a lot of material, it's imperative that those who have not done so review part 1 of this series, I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part...

Reggie Middleton Serves Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid: Goldman Sachs and Market Perception of Real Risks!

Hunting the Squid Part 3: Reggie Middleton Serves Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid

For those who don't subscribe to BoomBustblog, or haven't read I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction and Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?, not only have you missed out on some unique artwork, you've potentially missed out on 300%...
 Hunting the Squid, part 4: So, What Else Can Go Wrong With The Squid? Plenty!!!  

Hunting the Squid, part 4: So, What Else Can Go Wrong With Goldman Sachs? Plenty!

Yes, this more of the hardest hitting investment banking research available focusing on Goldman Sachs (the Squid), but before you go on, be sure you have read parts 1.2. and 3:  I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On A Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To...

If there is any doubt as to who to believe, your favorite Blogger Superhero or Timothy Geithner, I'd gladly put my track record up against his and his whole crew in order to ascertain who holds the most credibility!

As excerpted from the Dow Jones article above - yes, we must drive certain points home!:

When asked at a Senate Banking Committee whether the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis could bring down Morgan Stanley or another major financial institution, Geithner said, "Absolutely not."

The largest U.S. firms are much stronger than they were before the crisis, and the direct exposure of the financial system to European countries under the most pressure is "very modest," he said.

Okay, so as we know I run a subscription blog service. Those who actually do subscribe have read content that flies in the face of the assertion above, and have been paid handsomely for it as I Served Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid. As excerpted from the subscription document File Icon Goldmans Sachs Derivative Exposure: The Squid in the Coal Mine?, page 3:

thumb_image024

Mr. Geithner's assertion that "the direct exposure of the financial system to European countries under the most pressure is "very modest,"" really doesn't appear to hold much water, does it? Unless, of course, he doesn't think that France is under, or will be under much pressure? Hey, maybe that's it. Well, if it is, then maybe he should subscribe to BoomBustBlog! France is facing the threat of a serial European bank run as I type this. Reference Dexia Inches Toward Breakup as States Seek to Salvage Parts: Oct. 7 (Bloomberg) -- Dexia SA inched toward a breakup as France, Belgium and Luxembourg sought to protect their local units...

And it's not as if these countries don't have a history of defaulting..,

image022

You see, Now That European Bank Run Contagion Has Started Skipping Across That Big Pond... US Bank Risk Stands Woefully Underappreciated!!! If you scan the news, you will find that Most Headlines Now Show French Bank Run Has Started, And It's Happening Just As Our Research Anticipated. I have warned of the weakness in the French banking system at least a quarter and a half ago, see France, As Most Susceptible To Contagion, Will See Its Banks Suffer. Again, where was Mr. Geithner's salient warning? Be careful who you listen to! Since Geithner wasn't available to issue said warnings, I took it upon myself to create a step by step tutorial on exactly how it will happen....

I then cam forth publicly with much of the content offered to subscribers...

  1. The BoomBustBlog BNP Paribas "Run On The Bank" Model Available for Download
  2. BNP Bust Up: Yet Another Reason Why BNP Paribas Is Still Ripe For Implosion!
  3. I Will Fly In The Face Of Common Wisdom & Walk Through A Run On BNP On International Television
  4. And The European Bank Run Continues...

Now, back to Mr. Geithner's comments to the US Senate:

Morgan Stanley (MS) and other major U.S. banks aren't at risk of succumbing to the same fate as Lehman Brothers, which fell victim to the 2008 financial crisis, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner assured senators on Thursday... The largest U.S. firms are much stronger than they were before the crisis,

Okay, I'l bite. The US banks have been flooded with capital and assistance since this debacle started. Despite that, their compensation and payout has not been limited and they are essentially back where they started from apart from being in compliance with new and updated capital requirements. I beg thee, ponder hither... Weren't they also in compliance with the then current and revised regulatory capital requirements when they started dropping like flies and requiring Trillions of dollars of additional assistance. Yes! Trillions! AIG alone pulled in nearly $200 billion of aid, and that's just ONE institution! Need I remind you of the magnitude of this situation? As excerpted from Hunting the Squid, part 4: So, What Else Can Go Wrong With Goldman Sachs? Plenty!

GS__Banks_Derivatives_exposure_temp_work_Page_2

This concept was further illustrated in An Independent Look into JP Morgan...

Click graph to enlarge (there is a typo in the graphic - billion should trillion)

image001.png

and again the following year on CNBC...

Mr. Middleton discusses JP Morgan and concentrated bank risk.

Okay, I know many of you are saying, "...but the banks ARE in compliance, right?" I'll dance.

Let's walk through WHY the banks are in compliance since the fact that they were in compliance last go around and still collapsed doesn't seem to move everyone in the room. Reason number one for the subject bank at hand, the SQUID, and reason enough to consider regulatory compliance to be a farce in and of itself in these tumultuous times...

Dilutions

To start with, Goldman Sachs regulatory ratios are adequate to meet Basel 3 norms and we expect the firm to sufficiently maintain its regulatory ratios above the minimum norms prescribed by the regulator, without any further dilution. However, given higher exposure to market risk compared to its peers which have higher weights for risk adjusted capital determination, Goldman Sachs will have the to set aside a higher proportion of capital compared to its peers which could be a source of competitive disadvantage to the firm and economic disadvantage to shareholders’.

Although, Goldman Sachs capital ratios have improved, it has nothing to do with a reduction in risk weighted assets. Risk weighted assets, to the contrary, have increased to $451bn as at end June 2011 from $384bn as at the beginning of 2009. One of the key reasons for increase in capital ratios have been dilutions. As a matter of fact, Goldman Sachs’ diluted shares outstanding have increased by c24% since beginning of 2008.

As excerpted from the subscription document file icon Goldman Sachs Q3 Forensic Review - Professional, page 6:
thumb_Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_06

To make matters even worse, there is a plausible argument that many of these numbers are grossly understated. Here are observation from a BoomBustBlogger who is also a trader at the CME:

My question is does DTCC capture the total amount of CDS outstanding. Lets take Greece for example I think they showed about 77.4 bln. outstanding in gross   notional amount and a net notional amount of 4.2 billion represented by 4,349 contracts (I guess that's net) I admit I have a hard time deciphering even these   basic entries from the DTCC pages. But I suspect that the numbers in the DTCC reports are not accurate.The reason is they say they report trades that are   cleared by one of their designated clearing entities. I suspect the majority of cds contracts are privately negotiated and not cleared by one of DTCC's clearers.

Those who wish to jump on the gravy train of our next US bank analysis featuring those susceptible to this malaise can subcribe here and now!

The many ways to reach Reggie Middleton:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube

Or simply email me.

Meet Reggie Middleton in person in NYC and London!

I will be hosting two BoomBustBlog meet and greets, for those who aren't too put off by my truthful, fact-based style. One in the next couple of weeks in a swank, pretty people laden lounge in downtown Manhattan, and the other potentially in London in mid-November - both wherein we sit down and chew the fat about things financial, global macro and socio-economic over drinks and heated debate. I will have plenty of gratis BoomBustBlog research there as well. I have also recieved significant interest in a paid seminar. Any who would be interest in such, basically tthe ability to bend my ear for 45 minutes or so, without the benefit of drinks and pretty ladies swarming around, please let me know so I can guage interest and arrange as deemed fit. Those who are interested should email the blog Customer Support for info.

 
Published in BoomBustBlog

Yes, this more of the hardest hitting investment banking research available focusing on Goldman Sachs (the Squid), but before you go on, be sure you have read parts 1.2. and 3: 

  1. I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On A Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction
  2. Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?"
  3. Reggie Middleton Serves Up Fried Calamari From Raw Squid: Market Perceptions of Real Risk in Goldman Sachs

So, what else can go wrong with the Squid? 

Plenty! In Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?" I included a graphic that illustrated Goldman's raw credit exposure...

So, what is the logical conclusion? More phallic looking charts of blatant, unbridled, and from a realistic perspective, unhedged RISK starring none other than Goldman Sachs...

 image006

And to think, many thought that JPM exposure vs World GDP chart was provocative. I query thee, exactly how will GS put a real workable hedge, a counterparty risk mitigating prophylactic if you will, over that big green stalk that is representative of Total Credit Exposure to Risk Based Capital? Short answer, Goldman may very well be to big for a counterparty condom. If that's truly the case, all of you pretty, brand name Goldman counterparties out there (and yes, there are a lot of y'all - GS really gets around), expect to get burned at the culmination of that French banking party
I've been talking about for the last few quarters. Oh yeah, that perpetually printing clinic also known as the Federal Reserve just might be running a little low on that cheap liquidity antibiotic... Just
giving y'all a heads up ahead of time...

And for those who may not be sure of the significance, please review my presenation as the Keynote Speaker at the ING Real Estate Valuation Seminar in Amsterdam, below. After all, for all intents and purposes, Dexia has officially collapsed - [CNBC] France, Belgium Pledge Aid for Struggling Dexia... and its a good chance that it's a matter of time before BNP follows suit - exactly as BoomBustBlog predicted for paying subsccribers way back in July.

A step by step tutorial on exactly how it will happen....

 The European banking debacle was predicted at the start of 2010, a full year and a half before this has come to a head. If I could have seen it so clearly, why couldn't the banking industry and its regulators?

Now, back to GS, and considering all of the European falllout coming down the pike, of which Goldman is heavily leveraged into, particulary France (say BNP/Dexia/etc.)...

image009

Let's go over exactly how GS is exposed following the logic outlined in the graphic before this series of videos, as excerpted from subscriber document Goldmans Sachs Derivative Exposure: The Squid in the Coal Mine?, pages 3,4 and 5.

GS__Banks_Derivatives_exposure_temp_work_Page_3

GS__Banks_Derivatives_exposure_temp_work_Page_4

GS__Banks_Derivatives_exposure_temp_work_Page_5

Booyah!

There you go. The markets and the media have concentrated on Morgan Stanely because Goldman has successfully hid much of its risk from those who didn't subscribe to BoomBustBlog. Of course, those who did subscribe picked up those puts ridiculosuly cheap, and are/will reap the benefits as the TRUTH goes VIRAL!

Those who wish to jump on the gravy train of our next US bank analysis featuring those susceptible to this malaise can subcribe here and now!

The many ways to reach Reggie Middleton:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube

Or simply email me.

Meet Reggie Middleton in person in NYC and London!

I will be hosting two BoomBustBlog meet and greets, for those who aren't too put off by my truthful, fact-based style. One in the next couple of weeks in a swank, pretty people laden lounge in downtown Manhattan, and the other potentially in London in mid-November - both wherein we sit down and chew the fat about things financial, global macro and socio-economic over drinks and heated debate. I will have plenty of gratis BoomBustBlog research there as well. Those who are interested should email the blog Customer Support for info.

Published in BoomBustBlog

For those who don't subscribe to BoomBustblog, or haven't read I'm Hunting Big Game Today:The Squid On The Spear Tip, Part 1 & Introduction and Hunting the Squid, Part2: Since When Is Enough Derivative Exposure To Blow Up The World Something To Be Ignored?, not only have you missed out on some unique artwork, you've potentially missed out on 300% to 500% investment gains as well (as of the posting of this message from the beginning of the month)...

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Goldman's share price went down to nearly $50 during the 2009 crisis, and I believe things are worse this time around. Of course BoomBustBlogger, you shouldn't be greedy, subscribers. Cash in your fried calamari chips now, or at the very least hedge them - while you have them and prepare for the next opportunity. There will be plenty, rest assured. Remember how Goldman's stock actually trades...

.. I'd like to announce to the release of a blockbuster document describing the true nature of Goldman Sachs, a description that you will find no where else. It's chocked full of many interesting tidbits, and for those who found "The French Government Creates A Bank Run? Here I Prove A Run On A French Bank Is Justified And Likely" to be an iteresting read, you're gonna just love this! Subscribers can access the document here:

As is customary, I am including free samples for those who don't subscribe, so you can get a taste of the forensic flavor. Here are the first 2 pages of the 19

page professional edition, with illustrative option trade setups soon to follow.

 Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_01Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_01Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_01

Is Goldman Sachs stock really the front running, Mo-Mo traders wet dream?

Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_02Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_02Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_02

 

Published in BoomBustBlog

Watch out, Here Comes the The Fiery Sword of Truth! Contrary to the popular opinion that Goldman is the best and the brightest, Goldman Can't TRADE!!!

The financial markets are in a sense of déjà vu with widespread panic. Markets are as volatile as ever and Goldman Sachs is yet again challenged to demonstrate its ability to create alpha. The beta gazers (those who charge 2 and 20 to simply lever up on the broad market), or more commonly put, MoMo Chasers (those chasing the most popular stocks or strategies), would normally be seeking asylum given the state of recent financial markets. Unfortunately, despite the entire “God’s Work” syndrome attached to Goldman Sachs, its prop desk is yet to exhibit the ability to generate true alpha in highly volatile market, let alone match the success of BoomBustBlog.

Let's get something out in the open immediately so there is no misunderstanding. Goldman cant' trade! It can manipulate its dominant positoins in the markets. It can take advantage of the ignorance of its customers. It can front run those who don't have the reach or ability to defend themselves. It can (and obviously does) take advantage of privileged status in our political system. Those are the things that Goldman can do and apparently is skilled at, yet contrary to the popular opinion that Goldman is the best and the brightest, Goldman Can't TRADE!!! Not only that, but that inability to trade bangs the GS shareholder EVERYTIME volatility roils the markets, and causes many to overvalue GS over the long term.

For a little historical proof of this rather unpopular assertion, let's refer to the BoomBustBlog archives, namely A Few Questions on Goldman Sachs 3rd Quarter 2010 Results That No One Thought to Ask...

Trading revenues under pressure

Goldman Sachs posted Q3 net revenues of $8.9bn, a y-o-y decline of 28%. This is despite strong growth recorded at its investment banking and the asset management division which grew at 24.5% and 7.0%, respectively. The decline was principally led by dismal performance of the trading and principal transaction segment which declined 36% y-o-y as a result of weak market conditions. The decline in overall revenues despite strong growth recorded elsewhere underscores the importance of trading revenues in Goldman Sachs overall performance. Historically, trading and principal transaction segment contributed c60-65% of total revenues underpinning inherent risk in Goldman’s business model which is nothing short of a corporate hedge fund. We have expended considerable ink in demonstrating the overvaluation of Goldman Sachs and the volatility inherent in its revenues, particularly as they have been so dependent on trading - as many hedge funds are. As a matter of fact, I have been issuing this GS warning since 2009 when Goldman had perfect trading quarter and record trading profits. Reference last quarter's quarterly update: The BoomBustBlog Review of Goldman Sach’s 2nd Quarter, 2010 Performance: I Told You So!

About three months ago, Boombustblog forewarned that GS will stand out to be the worst hit in the event of trend reversal in the financial markets and the company will have little means to escape the implications of the same on its profitability and solvency. The company generates 60-70% of the revenues from trading activities which is largely dictated by the unpredictable turn of financial events. While the financial markets were celebrating the US officially coming out of recession in the 1Q10, the subsequent Eurozone crisis (see the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis series) and the slowdown of expectations in 2Q10 has beaten down the irrational exuberance and the markets experienced a spurt in volatility and drop in prices. The consequent softening of trading revenues in 2Q10 vis-à-vis 1Q10 drove 31% drop in revenues and 82% drop in net income.

The chart below demonstrates how the volatility of the revenues from the trading and principal investments trickles down into volatility of the total revenues and profits of Goldman Sachs. I don’t call Goldman the world’s most expensive federally insured hedge fund for nothing!

As you can see above, volatility ramped up in 2008 and Goldman reacted like any other beta-chasing, long only hedge fund (although they aren't long only) - they lost money!

Now, with the benefit of BoomBustBlog hindsight, I'd like to announce to the release of a blockbuster document describing the true nature of Goldman Sachs, a description that you will find no where else. It's chocked full of many interesting tidbits, and for those who found "The French Government Creates A Bank Run? Here I Prove A Run On A French Bank Is Justified And Likely" to be an iteresting read, you're gonna just love this! Subscribers can access the document here:

As is customary, I am including free samples for those who don't subscribe, so you can get a taste of the forensic flavor. Here are the first 2 pages of the 19

page professional edition, with illustrative option trade setups soon to follow.

 Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_01

Is Goldman Sachs stock really the front running, Mo-Mo traders wet dream?

Goldman_Sachs_Q3_Forensic_Review_Page_02 

Given the high correlation of Goldman’s prop trading desk to equity markets and taking into consideration the state of equity markets in Q2-Q3, it would be interesting to see how Goldman Sachs share perform in the coming quarters. Those who would have followed the traditional school of thought and bid the price up would have already seen their capital erode by 20% during the last quarter and by 12% over the last one month alone.

Oh, and while we're at it...

I noticed ZeroHedge (one of the few sites that I syndicate BoomBustBlog content through) caused a tiff with the Canadian academia and pop media by calling attention to the abysmally low TEC ratios of Canadian banks, and comparing them to European banks. For those who didn't have the spare time to catch the cross border banking media soap opera, see:

  1. Is The Next Domino To Fall.... Canada? for the first salvoo
  2. Who is Zero Hedge, and why should we care? for the passive aggressve retort
  3. (as put by Tyler himself) "followed by a more coherent attempt to debunk the claim that a painfully low TCE ratio is never a good thing": Is Zero Hedge looking at the wrong numbers?"

I must say that the argument by those up north is wanting and ZH made a valid point, primarily in that the RWA (risk weighted asset) methodologies are simply too open for manipulation. Of course, that is probably why they are favored by the banking institutions. Let's end this morning's post by illuminating the fact that although, Goldman Sachs capital ratios have improved, it has nothing to do with a reduction in risks weighted assets. Risk weighted assets, to the contrary, have increased to $451bn as at end June 2011 from $384bn as at the beginning of 2009. One of the key reasons for increase in capital ratios have been dilutions. As a matter of fact, Goldman Sachs’ diluted shares outstanding have increased by c24% since beginning of 2008!

Goldman_Sachs_RWA

So, if Goldman really has a problem, why haven't we heard about it from the rest of Wall Street?

Because investment performance is not the Street's business model. If it was, they would have easily foreseen thier own demise back in 2008/9. The street's busness model is churning spreads, fees and commisions from clients and customers. I truly believe BoomBustBlog bests ALL of Wall Street's sell side research, reference Did Reggie Middleton, a Blogger at BoomBustBlog, Best Wall Streets Best of the Best? After all, who else is currently warning of Goldman's risk on the Street? Answer: No one! Then again, who warned back in the summer of 2008 before the share price got cut by nearly 2/3rds? I can only think of one shop....

Goldman Sachs Snapshot: Risk vs. Reward vs. Reputations on the Street: ...t shared by most of the analyst community and those that follow them. This brings me to the issue of Goldman Sachs. I have been bearish on commercial, mortgage and investment banks for over a y... Saturday, 05 July 2008

Reggie Middleton on Risk, Reward and Reputations on the Street: the Goldman Sachs Forensic Analysis: Here is my detailed opinion on Goldman Sachs. Be sure to review my precursor to this report: Goldman Sachs Snapshot: Risk vs. Reward vs. Reputations on the Street. Anybody who is interested in how I Thursday, 24 July 2008

Even after a clear pattern was formed, who on the sell side warned when the markets got rocky in 2010? Hmmm. I sense a trend here... If I may prompt one to reminesce: In What Do Goldman Sachs and B.B. King Have in Common? The Thrill is Gone…,, I made the following note:

GS’s considerable leverage provides a means (the lever) of high returns to shareholders when asset prices are appreciating but the same becomes a very material economic concern when the asset prices lose value. With low trading revenues, GS has little cushion to absorb write-downs on these assets, leading to erosion of equity. As of March, 2010, the GS’s investments portfolio amounted to $339 billion (nearly 566% of the tangible equity). Referencing my previous posts, “Can You Believe There Are Still Analysts Arguing How Undervalued Goldman Sachs Is? Those July 150 Puts Say Otherwise, Let’s Take a Look” and “When the Patina Fades… The Rise and Fall of Goldman Sachs???“, we can reminisce over the fact that Goldman BARELY earns its cost of capital on an economic basis, and that’s before considering the potential horrors which may (and probably do) lay on the balance sheet (for more on BS horror, referenceReggie Middleton vs Goldman Sachs, Round 2) .


As for the Canadian media's retorts on ZeroHede's credible article, I must dare, no... make that double dare, any one to ask in print or on TV, "Who is Reggie Middleton". As a matter of fact, I'll answer that question right now. He's the guy that called...

  1. The housing market crash in the spring of 2006 and publicly in September of 2007: Correction, and further thoughts on the topic and How Far Will US Home Prices Drop?
  2. Home builders falling and their grossly misleading use of off balance sheet structures to conceal excessive debt in November of 2007 (not a single sell side analyst that we know of made mention of this very material point in the industry): Lennar, Voodoo Accounting & Other Things of Mystery and Myth!
  3. The collapse of Bear Stearns in January 2008 (2 months before Bear Stearns fell, while trading in the $100s and still had buy ratings and investment grade AA or better from the ratings agencies): Is this the Breaking of the Bear? | After the collapse, a prudent bullish call as well... Joe Lewis on the Bear Stearns buyout Monday, March 17th, 2008: "The problem with the deal is that it is too low, and too favorable for Morgan. It is literally guaranteed to drive angst from the other side. Whenever you do a deal, you always make sure the other side gets to walk away with something.  If you don’t you always risk the deal falling though unnecessarily. $2 is a slap in the face to employees who have lost a life savings and have the power to block the deal. At the very least, by the building at market price and get the company for free!" | BSC calls are almost free and the JP Morgan Deal is not signed in stone Monday, March 17th, 2008 | This is going to be an exciting, and scary morning Monday, March 17th, 2008 | As I anticipated, Bear Stearns is not a done deal Tuesday, March 18th, 2008 [Bear Stearns stock goes from $1 and change to $10, front month calls literally explode from pennies to several dollars]

  4. The warning of Lehman Brothers before anyone had a clue!!! (February through May 2008): Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise? Thursday, February 21st, 2008 | Web chatter on Lehman Brothers Sunday, March 16th, 2008 (It would appear that Lehman’s hedges are paying off for them. The have the most CMBS and RMBS as a percent of tangible equity on the street following BSC. The question is, “Can they monetize those hedges?”. I’m curious to see how the options on Lehman will be priced tomorrow. I really don’t have enough. Goes to show you how stingy I am. I bought them before Lehman was on anybody’s radar and I was still to cheap to gorge. Now, all of the alarms have sounded and I’ll have to pay up to participate or go in short. There is too much attention focused on Lehman right now. ) | I just got this email on Lehman from my clearing desk Monday, March 17th, 2008 by Reggie Middleton | Lehman stock, rumors and anti-rumors that support the rumors Friday, March 28th, 2008 | May 2008
  5. The fall of commercial real estate in general (September of 2007) and the collapse of General Growth Properties [nation's 2nd largest mall owner] in particular (November 2007): BoomBustBlog.com’s answer to GGP’s latest press release and Another GGP update coming… (among over 700 pages of analysis, review the January 2008 archives or search for “GGP” for more research).
  6. The collapse of state and municipal finances, with California in particular (May 2008): Municipal bond market and the securitization crisis – part 2
  7. The collapse of the regional banks (32 of them, actually) in May 2008: As I see it, these 32 banks and thrifts are in deep doo-doo! as well as the fall of Countrywide and Washington Mutual
  8. The collapse of the monoline insurers, Ambac and MBIA in late 2007 & 2008: A Super Scary Halloween Tale of 104 Basis Points Pt I & II, by Reggie Middleton, Welcome to the World of Dr. FrankenFinance! and Ambac is Effectively Insolvent & Will See More than $8 Billion of Losses with Just a $2.26 Billion
  9. The overvaluation of Goldman Sachs from June 2008 to present): “Can You Believe There Are Still Analysts Arguing How Undervalued Goldman Sachs Is? Those July 150 Puts Say Otherwise, Let’s Take a Look”, “When the Patina Fades… The Rise and Fall of Goldman Sachs???“andReggie Middleton vs Goldman Sachs, Round 2)
  10. The ENTIRE Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis (potentially soon to be the Global Sovereign Debt Crisis) starting in January of 2009 and explicit detail as of January 2010: The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis
  11. Ireland austerity and the disguised sink hole of debt and non-performing assets that is the Irish banking system: I Suggest Those That Dislike Hearing “I Told You So” Divest from Western and Southern European Debt, It’ll Get Worse Before It Get’s Better!
  12. The mobile computing paradigm shift, May 2010: »
  13. The French bank run of 2011

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For all of those calamari fans.... Remember, I warned about "the Squid" before it was trendy to hate them!

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Published in BoomBustBlog

To begin with , Goldman Sachs produces more accounting revenue and accounting profits than its peers. This is because Goldman benefits from virtual monopoly pricing and advantages in several markets. Despite this advantage, when one factors in economic RISK and the cost of capital, Goldman doesn't fare nearly as well as the sell side makes it seem. Of course, the sell side rarely attempts to quantify risk, which is cool until reality rears its (sometimes ugly) head. Before we get to risk adjust returns, let's look at the simple accounting numbers and attempt to throw some logic on them...

I bank mutliples

Above, you see that GS has enjoyed a significant premium over its peers in terms of book valuation. This premium has actually increased over the past year. Let me be the one to remind you that no US company has every survived a criminal judgment, none. Arther Anderson was driven into bankruptcy from charges stemming from the Enron collapse, and that is despite the fact that the Supreme Court overturned the guilty verdict! Assuming, for the benefit of the doubt, GS can somehow set precedence, or more realistically, criminal charges are not filed, we still have to contend with:

Published in BoomBustBlog

After having just stating in an interview earlier this week that although many banks are probably guilty of what Lehman was caught doing with Repo 105's pursuing those actions based upon semantics may be fruitless (it may be called depo 106?), Reuters comes out with this interesting story: Major US banks masked risk levels: report

(Reuters) - Major U.S. banks temporarily lowered their debt levels just before reporting in the past five quarters, making it appear their balance sheets were less risky, the Wall Street Journal said, citing data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

The paper said on Friday 18 banks, including Goldman Sachs Group , Morgan Stanley , J.P. Morgan Chase Bank of America and Citigroup , understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42 percent at the end of each period.

The banks had increased their debt in the middle of successive quarters, it said.

Citi, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley were not immediately available for comment when contacted by Reuters outside regular U.S. business hours.

Excessive leverage by the banks was one of the causes that led to the global financial crisis in 2008.

Due to the credit crisis, banks have become more sensitive about showing high levels of debt and risk, worried their stocks and credit ratings could be punished, the Journal said.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York could not be immediately reached for comment by Reuters.

 

The Wall Street Journal (see their interactive model) and ZeroHedge broke a similar storty with some meat behind it to justify the allegations. Ahhh!!! The return of real reporting, and not just from blogs!

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