Many have asked me if I believe in austerity measures or the Keynsian approach of spending out of recession. I have stated, time and again, that the question is loaded - hence the answer can never be sufficient. When you are trying to go from your home to the market across town in a crowded urban environment, you cannot make the trip successfully by deciding ahead of time that you are just going to make left turns (austerity? Austrian?) or right turns (stimulus? Keynsian?). You come to an intersection and you make the turn that's necessary to get you where you want to go. It might sound overly simplistic and common, but I'll be damned if common sense is one of the most uncommon things I've come across over the last 7 years or so!

On that note, there does appear to be a misunderstanding on how government finances work as compared to finances in the private sector. The government is not a for profit player that competes directly with those in the private sector, but is instead a universal support network that benefits from the success of the private sector. Hence, the government must work in the best interests of the private sector in order to thrive. This sometimes entails taking the other side of the trade to ensure that a trade can take place. One pundit who has done a good job of explaining this through pretty charts that explain the peculiar situation that we are now in (a balance sheet recession), is Dr. Richard Koo of Nomura Securities. See the FT.com article abstract:

In 2008, Barack Obama told the US people the nation’s economic crisis would take a long time to overcome. In 2012, many of those voters are losing patience, because they have not been told why this recession has lasted so long or why his policies were the correct response. Here is the missing explanation – based on not only the US experience, but also that of Japan and Europe. 

when-the-government-tries-premature-fiscal-consolidation-things-get-much-worse-and-debt-goes-higher

Today, the US private sector is saving a staggering 8 per cent of gross domestic product – at zero interest rates, when households and businesses would ordinarily be borrowing and spending money. But the US is not alone: in Ireland and Japan, the private sector is saving 9 per cent of GDP; in Spain it is saving 7 per cent of GDP; and in the UK, 5 per cent. Interest rates are at record lows in all these countries.

For those who may not get the gravity of this statement, it makes no sense to save money with a negative risk/reward proposition, unless of course the saver does not see it that way. One must save if savings are in deficit, and the risk to invest funds is considered greater than the benefit of having said funds in the first place. We are still attempting to wade through the bursting of a massive bubble, and we are playing defensive - not offensive.  In other words, are Americans seeking return OF capital over return on said capital? We are over-leveraged, and to effectively delever you cannot borrow more money or take the risk of aggressive investments. This is so even if investment capital is being offered at zero interest rates. Mr. Koo illustrates the consequences of such behavior eloquently...

However, if someone is saving money or paying down debt, someone else must be borrowing and spending that money to keep the economy going. In a normal world, it is the role of interest rates to ensure all saved funds are borrowed and spent, with interest rates rising when there are too many borrowers and falling when there are too few. 

But when the private sector as a whole is saving money or paying down debt at zero interest rates, the banks cannot lend the repaid debt or newly deposited savings because interest rates cannot go any lower. This means that, if left unattended, the economy will continuously lose aggregate demand equivalent to the unborrowed savings. In other words, even though repairing balance sheets is the right and responsible thing to do, if everyone tries to do it at the same time a deflationary spiral will result. It was such a deflationary spiral that cost the US 46 per cent of its GDP from 1929 to 1933. 

Those with a debt overhang will not increase their borrowing at any interest rate; nor will there be many lenders, when the lenders themselves have financial problems. This shift from maximising profit to minimising debt explains why near-zero interest rates in the US and EU since 2008 and in Japan since 1995 have failed to produce the expected recoveries in these economies. 

For some reason, the Fed doesn't seem to get what Mr. Koo and BoomBustBloggers do!

With monetary policy largely ineffective and the private sector forced to repair its balance sheet, the only way to avoid a deflationary spiral is for the government to borrow and spend the unborrowed savings in the private sector.

Wait a minute! The EU states are definitely borrowing, but they are not redploying the capital back into the private sector, they are simply bailing out banks! In addition, the banks are not deploying the capital into the private sector, they are simply sitting on it, just as Mr. Koo stated they would in the article excerpt above! So, after trillions of borrowing, there's no surprise why there's just relatively pennies making it into the private sector. What Mr. Koo and many who follow Keynsian economic theories seem to forget to include, is that upon borrowing the money to plunge into the private sector, you have to have a plan for paying said monies back. When you borrow said monies and simply waste them (ex. perpetual dead bank bailouts) you create a truly structural problem. Simply ask Greece, or see How Greece Killed Its Own Banks! and then move on to...

As The Year Comes An End The Ability Of Greece To Kick The Can Mirrors The Chances Of A Man With No Feet

Despite extensive, self-defeating, harsh and punitive austerity measures that have combined with a lack of true economic stimulus, Greece has (to date) failed to achieve Primary Balance. For the non-economists in the audience, primary balance is the elimination of a primary deficit, yet the absence of a primary surplus, ex. the midpoint between deficit and surplus before taking into consideration interest payments.

Greece_Primary_balanceGreece_Primary_balanceGreece_Primary_balance

The primary balance looks at the structural issues a country may have.

Government expenditures have outstripped revenues ever since 2007 and have gotten worse nearly every year since, despite 3 bailouts a restructuring, austerity and a default!

Greece_Primary_deficit_copy

On to Mr. Koo's diatribe... 

Recovery from this type of recession takes time because the flow of current savings must be used to reduce the stock of debt overhang, necessarily a long process when everyone is doing it at the same time. Since one person’s debt is another person’s asset, there is no quick fix: shifting the problem from one part of society to another will solve nothing.

The challenge now is to maintain fiscal stimuli until private sector deleveraging is completed. Any premature attempt to withdraw that stimulus will result in a deflationary implosion – as in the US in 1937, Japan in 1997, and Spain and the UK most recently.

Japan’s attempt in 1997 to reduce its deficit by 3 per cent of GDP – the same size as the “fiscal cliff” now facing the US – led to a horrendous 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 68 per cent increase in the deficit. At that time, Japan’s private sector was saving 6 per cent of GDP at near zero interest rates, just like the US private sector today. It took Japan 10 years to climb out of the hole.

when-the-government-tries-premature-fiscal-consolidation-things-get-much-worse-and-debt-goes-higher

Average citizens find it hard to understand why the government should not balance its budget when households and businesses must all do so. It is risky for politicians to explain but, until they make it clear that the economy will implode if everybody is saving and nobody is borrowing, public support for the necessary fiscal stimulus is likely to weaken, as seen during the past four years of the Obama administration.

The US economy is already losing forward momentum as the 2009 fiscal stimulus is allowed to expire. There is no time to waste: the government must take up the private sector’s unborrowed savings, to keep the economy from imploding and to provide income for businesses and households so they can repair their balance sheets. Fiscal consolidation should come only once the private sector has repaired its finances and returned to profit-maximising mode.

I have ventured along these lines several times in the past. Here is the subscription research that I feel is best poised to take advantage of the guaranteed mistakes to be made ahead, simply click your industry/sector for the most recent research (note, non-subscribers will only be able to view free reports, you may click here to subscribe)...

As for whether Mr. Koo is correct in the application of severe austerity when one should be trying to prime the pump....

Greece Is To Pathogen As Cyprus Is To Contagion As Spain Is To Infected...

CNBC reports Greece Austerity Strike Will Hurt GDP Further even as Cyprus Expects Bailout as S&P Cuts Ratings to Junk:

Cyprus said on Wednesday it expected talks to start with lenders on badly needed aid next week, as ratings agency Standard & Poor's pushed it deeper into junk territory, implying domestic political expediency lay behind a delay in clinching a deal. One of the smallest nations in the euro zone, Cyprus sought European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid in June after its two largest banks suffered huge losses due to a write-down of Greek debt.

Well, our Contagion Model showed clear paths of the knock on effects of Greek infection, and we haven't even gotten started with the economic pathogen party yet!

 

Although it seems as if Tyler is being a smart ass, he couldn't be farther from the truth. Reference my piece Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! concerning the accuracy of the IMF's baseline scenarios...

image005.pngimage005.png

And back to the ZH post:

....Breakdown of IMF deleveraging forecasts for the three scenarios, of which the realistic one is highlighted:

  • Under weak policies, the withdrawal of foreign investors accelerates to twice the pace seen since 2009. Periphery spreads widen by about one standard deviation above the baseline.

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube

 

 
Published in BoomBustBlog

ZeroHedge, in its snarky, smart ass, Reggie Middleton-like manner made me chuckle this morning with this headline: Mario Draghi Sends Risk Reeling After Exposing Bitter European Truth

It was shaping up like the perfect overnight ramp following yesterday's Goldilocks election result... and then Mario Draghi opened his mouth.

    • DRAGHI SAYS DEBT CRISIS STARTING TO HURT GERMAN ECONOMY
    • DRAGHI SAYS GERMAN RATES LOWER THAN THEY WOULD BE OTHERWISE

And so finally, after months and months of explaining the fundamental dichotomy in Europe (see here), it is finally becoming transparent. And it is as follow: Germany, which is the economic dynamo of Europe, needs a weaker EURUSD to keep its export economy running. Period, end of Story. The problem is that the lower the EURUSD, the greater the implied and perceived EUR redenomination risk, which in turns send the periphery reeling, and will force first Spain, and then everyone else to eventually demand (not request) a bailout.

A quick search on the topic reveals much more of the same...

Draghi admits Germanys f234ked

I emphasize this point because this problem was woefully evident nearly a dull year ago. On Thursday, 12 January 2012, after railing on the US education system (How Inferior American Education Caused The Credit/Real Estate/Sovereign Debt Bubbles and Why It's Preventing True Recovery), I made clear to all Harry Potter aficionados (you know, those Euro-types who would rather believe magic over math) that biggest threat to the 2012 economy was sitting right beneath their noses couched as a savior more than a threat. Reference The Biggest Threat To The 2012 Economy Is??? Not What Wall Street Is Telling You..., wherein I painstakingly took the tie to attempt to reassert the authority of math over magic. With the exclusion of central bank mysticism and the attrition of the belief that these bastards can create something out of nothing, or more to the point, can drive nearly everything towards nothing and then suddenly state that they have created something, I bring you my warning prescient warning on Germany and the macro-fundamental call to be aware of the bear Bund trade, to wit:

I believe Germany poses the biggest threat to global harmony for 2012. Here's why...

European banks are (in addition to borrowing on a secured basis from those customers they usually lend to) also paying insurers and pension funds to take their illiquid bonds in exchange for better quality ones, in a desperate bid to secure much-needed cash from the ECB, which only provides cash against collateral. This may not be as safe a measure as it sounds. Below is a sensitivity analysis of Generali's (a highly leveraged Italian insurer, subscribers see File Icon Exposure of European insurers to PIIGS) sovereign debt holdings.

image004image004

As you can see, Generali is highly leveraged into PIIGS debt, with 400% of its tangible equity exposed. Despite such leveraged exposure, I calculate (off the cuff, not an in depth analysis) that it took a 10% hit to Tangible Equity. Now, that's a lot, but one would assume that it would have been much worse. What saved it? Diversification into Geman bunds, whose yield went negative, thus throwing off a 14% return. Not bad for alleged AAA fixed income. But let's face it, Germany lives in the same roach motel as the rest of the profligate EU, they just rent the penthouse suite! Remember, Germany is not in recession after a rip roaring bull run in its bonds, and I presume the recession should get much deeper since as a net exporter it has to faces its trading partners going broke. Below you see what happens if the bund returns were simply run along the historical trend line (with not extreme bullishness of the last year).

image005image005

Companies such as Generali would instantly lose a third of their tangible equity. This is quite conservative, since the profligate states bonds would probably collapse unless the spreads shrink, which is highly doubtful. Below you see what would happen if bunds were to take a 10% loss.

image006image006

That's right, a 10% loss in bunds translates into a near 50% loss in tangible equity to this insurer, which would realistically be 60% plus as the rest of the EU portfolio will compress in solidarity. Combine this with the fact that insurers operating results are facing historically unprecedented stress (see You Can Rest Assured That The Insurance Industry Is In For Guaranteed Losses!) and it's not hard to imagine marginal insurers seeing equity totally wiped out. The same situation is evident in banks and pension funds as well as real estate entities dependent on financing in the near to medium term - basically, the entire FIRE sector in both European and US markets (that's right, don't believe those who say the US banks have decoupled from Europe).

thumb_Reggie_Middleton_on_Street_Signs_Fire

Now, all of this excerpt above was written BEFORE Tropical Storm Sandy hit the east cost. Now, its a whole difference ball game in terms of combined ratios and operating losses. Exactly how are those operating losses are going to be paid once the truth becomes widespread, re: Germany vs the periphery?

First: See FIRE Burns From Hurricane Sandy - Fear The Insurance Companies, Twice Over - Just Ask the ECB, Greece, Spain & Portugal

Second: Go long magic wands and Harry Potter paraphenalia!!! 

The damage to banks will probably be worse due to the higher level of leverage in European institutions. This is saying a lot since Italy's Generali is truly levered up the ASS! As excerpted from our professional series (subscribers see File Icon Bank Run Liquidity Candidate Forensic Opinion:).. (click here to continue reading)

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube
Published in BoomBustBlog

WSJ.com reports: The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is investigating alleged unauthorized trading at Rochdale Securities LLC

Daniel Crowley, Rochdale's president, said Finra, a Wall Street self-regulator, was investigating trading that has put the company in a precarious financial position, adding, "The firm is recapitalizing and should be talking to the market shortly." He declined to offer more details on the trading or the investigation.

A person familiar with the thinking of Rochdale executives said a trader at the firm received an order for stock in Apple Inc. AAPL +0.63% but bought 1,000 times the number of shares requested. The trader is saying the extra shares were ordered by mistake, the person said, but the firm is alleging the actions were intentional. The company suspects the trader was working with an outside party to execute the trade and profit at the firm's expense, according to this person.

This is bullshit no matter which way you look at it. If you can mistakenly place an order for 1,000 times your intended purchases, then the risk management systems of this so-called institutional brokerage is less robust than grandma's retail web page at E-trade! If the trader did it on purpose, then he likely did it with management's consent and they didn't subscribe to BoomBustBlog - travesty within itself since all who subscribed knew it was time to short Apple! See The Blog That Could Have Saved Institutional Broker - Or - Beware Of Those Poison Apples!!

aapl research accuracy copy

Rochdale, based in Stamford, Conn., is an institutional broker and equity-research firm that employs prominent bank analyst Richard Bove. As of the end of 2011, Rochdale had $3.4 million in capital, according to a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On Saturday, Mr. Crowley said the errant trading had left the company with a "negative capital position."

Amazingly enough, very few (if any) queried as to why Rochdale, with a capital base of $3.4 million dollars could execute a trade worth a billion dollars. Let's take an off the cuff measure of the leverage involved here... $1,000,000,000/$3,400,000 = roughly 294x the trader levered up the firms capital base, give or take. Who was the idiot(s) on the other side of the trade and more importantly where the hell was FINRA before this tiny bank had the nerve to go against BoomBustBlog research with a 294x levered trade? Methinks FINRA was a little less than effective here, no? Dick Bove, the rosk star bank analysts paid by Rochdale Securities (and probably paid nearly as much as Rochdale's capital base), should have alerted Rochdale to the risks therein, no?

Dick seems like a nice guy, but we don't always see eye to eye, reference CNBC Favorite Dick Bove Admits To Being Wrong On Banks, But For The Right Reasons, But Those Reasons Are Still Wrong!!!:

Last week I posted a rather scathing diatribe, basically ridiculing the fact that Dick Bove get's so much MSM airtime for his virtually consistently wrong calls and analysis:, as excerpted: A BoomBustBlog Deep Dive on Dick

... Now, speaking of Europe, particular Dexia (France, Belgium Wrangle About Dexia Deal: Reports), this brings to mind another highlighted headline focusing on the oft quoted sell side banking analyst US Stress Tests Not Worrying: Bove... Dick Bove is one of the, if not most oft quoted sell side bank analyst in the mainstream media. I disagree with him, regularly. As the uber independent investor/analyst that I am, I will never be accurately accused of kissing [up to] Dick - regardless, let's grab Dick by the base [of his assumptions] and see if we can yank something usable out of it, shall we?

Okay, I admit I was a bit harsh, and it appears as if Mr. Bove may have read said diatribe and used his cache with the MSM to post a response - very professional one at that - and one to which I must give him credit - alas, he was still wrong! To wit:

Bove: Why I Was Wrong on Bank Stocks

With a month left in 2011 and—barring a miracle—bank stocks headed for a negative year, Dick Bove is admitting he was wrong.

This is both commendable and respectable. It is honorable and healthy to admit when you are wrong, and we all have the opportunity to do so since nobody is right all of the time!...

It is my belief that this country idolizes Wall Street, and does so foolishly. Attempting a trade on Apple which is obviously on decline at 294 times leverage with no apparent risk management mechanisms rivaling that of a mere eTrade account is silly, and does not connote "Masters of the Universe" status. In closing, keep in mind that as I drove from my apartment shortly after the Sandy storm, I noticed that the Goldman Sachs HQ had lights and electricity almost immediately. Why? Because it was triple sandbagged against the elements with underground vents properly sealed. Notice that the surrounding hospitals and schools failed to receive similar attention. Where exactly are our resourced flowing and for what reason. Happy voting on this historical election day.

Subscribers expect fresh research and content later this week.

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube
Published in BoomBustBlog

 In the post After My Contrarian Calling Apple's 3rd Miss Accurately, I Release My Apple Research Track Record For 2 1/2 Years, I came clean with the historical performance of my Apple research. Of course, many a hater had their hearts crushed as math and common sense once again ruled the day. Still, we see herd mentality and brand loyalty effect even those who're really supposed to know what they're doing - to wit: Rochdale Trader Made Unauthorized Purchases Of As Much As $1 Billion In Apple Stock Last Month

... a trader at Rochdale Securities made unauthorized purchases of $750 million to $1 billion in Apple stock last month and now the firm is seeking a lifeline. 

It's unclear when the unauthorized stock purchases took place, but shares of Apple have dropped around 11.5% since Oct. 1.

Stamford, Connecticut-based Rochdale, which employs noted bank analyst Dick Bove, is looking for a possible deal to recapitalize such as a capital injection or a merger, Bloomberg reports citing sources familiar. 

Well, it's obvious the brokerage didn't buy that trader a subscription to BoomBustBlog. I've been following Apple for roughly two years now and have been one of the (if not the) most accurate fundamental pundits on said matter, with my valuations hugging Apple's share price rather tightly for the entire time I have followed it.

aapl research accuracy copy

Reference Apple - Competition and Cost Structure 05/16/2011, which is now available for download to all due to its dated nature - even those who do not subscribe. Please note that this report only includes base case scenarios, while the latter reports included base, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios - which is much more realistic. Although some of the later reports are also stale-dated, they contain valuable knowledge that I'm not prepared to release to the public for free at this time.

On Friday, 12 October 2012 I posted A Review Of The Accuracy Of Last Quarter's Apple Earnings Notes where in I went over the true value of my last quarterly review of Apple's performance. Please note that this was before the Q3 earnings release:

A subscriber convinced me to post the 1st quarter's valuation bands (subscribers, see Apple Margin & Valuation Note 03/15/2012) for Apple to squelch the comments of those who are guessing what's behind the firewall. Our base case scenario was right on target, and  during the target and after the earnings release I realized that we underestimated international (especially Asian) sell though and shifted the weight towards the optimistic band which also proved fairly accurate. As all can notice, the pessimistic band is not shown, and that is where the value lies here. I am now shifting my bias towards (that's towards, not to) the pessimistic band, for I feel Apple has now started to feel the competitive and margin pressures that I warned of, and has done so right at the deadline that I gave in 2010 (this is just as much a factor of luck as it is skill, alas, if it bears fruit it bears fruit). The latest valuation bands can be accessed by paying subscribers below (click here to subscribe):

Apple 4Q2012 update professional & institutional
Apple 4Q2012 update - retail
"iPhone Margin worksheet - blog download

Just to make this perfectly clear, I've been stating that Apple had margin compression stemming from extreme competition coming for two years now. That does not mean that Apple will collapse. As a matter of fact, I've included my stale Apple reports and a graph that shows I've pretty much been on target with Apple's share price the whole while. And for those who are so concerned with timing, I've highlighted in bold font where I've told subscribers to turn pessimistic on Apple's share price. This was October, roughly 12% ago in share price and many tens of billions of dollars in market value.

image005

Keep the following in mind as you peruse this post...

apple product chart growth

I discussed this in detail with Lauren Lyster on Capital Account. The margin discussion started at 7:55.

For those who haven't heard my description of Apple's arch competitor, Google's, business model, look here:

See Right On Time, My Prediction Of Apple Margin Compression 8 Quarters From My CNBC Warning Landed Right On The Money! for more on the mechanics of the margin compression theory for Apple.

The latest Apple valuation bands (including the advanced pessimistic bands) can be accessed by paying subscribers below (click here to subscribe):
Published in BoomBustBlog

I have thoroughly warned (since 2009) that Spain will be one of the most catalyzing states suffering the Eurocalypse. Even more interesting, the rating agencies have a very significant (although not very utilitarian) role, see The Embarrassingly Ugly Truth About Spain: The IMF, EC and ALL Major Rating Agencies Are LYING!!!

thumb_Reggie_Middleton_on_Street_Signs_Fire

Looking at today's news, my ruminations take form, but the question of the day is that, unlike with Greece whose bonds have killed banks (see How Greece Killed Its Own Banks! and Dead Bank Deja Vu? How The Sovereigns Killed Their Banks & Why Nobody Realizes They're Dead) until the ECB bought the pain from the municipal muppets in a Pan-European Ponzi-style shell game (see ECB As European Lender Of Last Resort = Institutional Purveyor Of A Pan-European Ponzi Scheme), Spain's asset and credit bubble pop ramifications are much too large too large to simply stuff in an ECB side pocket. So, what happens to those banks that leveraged up and gorged on all of this risky ass, risk free European sovereign debt??? Well, first let's peruse today's media as Bloomberg reports Spain’s Economy Shrinks for Fifth Quarter Amid Bailout Talk

 Spain’s economy contracted for a fifth quarter, adding pressure on Premier Mariano Rajoy to seek more European aid even as the euro area’s fourth-largest economy met a bill-sales target.

Gross domestic product fell 0.4 percent in the three months through September from the previous quarter, matching the contraction of the second quarter, the Bank of Spain said in an estimate in its monthly bulletin released in Madrid today. That compares with a median forecast for a 0.7 percent contraction in a Bloomberg News survey of 10 economists.

Moody's passed on cutting Spain's sovereign rating (to below investment grade) recent and the general sigh of relief has been short-lived.  Moody's cut Catalonia's rating (by two notches to Ba3) and four other regions.  The rating agency cited two main factors.  First is the deterioration in the liquidity situation of the regions, as evidenced by the low levels of cash reserves.  Second, it cited the heavy reliance on short-term credit lines.    
Three of the regions that were downgraded (Catalonia, Murcia and Andalucia) face large redemption before year end.  Madrid had established a fund to help the regions secure financing of 18 bln euros.  Eight of the 17 regions have requested funds, including 4 of the five that were downgraded by Moody's.  These requests amount to a little more than 17 bln euros, practically exhausting the fund.   
Separately, Spain's finance ministry acknowledged that is year's deficit, as in recent years, will overshoot the government's target.  Indeed, this year's new projection of 7.3% overshoots not only the relaxed 6.3% shortfall, but even the 6.8% that Rajoy unilaterally suggested coming out of the EU meeting in which the leaders endorsed the fiscal pact.  The 10.5 bln social security (not just pensions, but unemployment compensation and other transfer payments) deficit is being blamed, which itself is partly a function of the austerity face of economic weakness.   

 You can't say I didn't warn 'ya...

Well, the most stringent warning is also probably the most profitable if timed correctly, and that was the warning on the FIRE sector on CNBC (Reggie Middleton Sets CNBC on F.I.R.E.!!! and First I set CNBC on F.I.R.E., Now It Appears I've Set...):

">http://plus.cnbc.com/stickers/partners/cnbcplayershare/{/iframe}

For more on this, see The F.I.R.E. Is Set To Blaze! Focus On Banks, part 1. A lot of people, even professionals, truly believed that the FIRE malaise would not be European in nature. Whaattt????!!! As expected, this European Insurer Needs Insurance As $6B Of Its Bonds Are Instantly Subordinated Due To "Spain's Pain". Insurers are very heavy investors in European sovereign debt AND the debt of financial institutions. But hey, weren't the European financial institutions getting killed by choking on Sovereign debt (reference Dead Bank Deja Vu? How The Sovereigns Killed Their Banks & Why Nobody Realizes They're Dead)? So, you know what's up next right?

European Bank Run Watch: Spaniard Edition

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube
 
Published in BoomBustBlog

You know, I don't even bother to go over banking statements anymore. They are so steeped in bullshit, quasi-fraudulent fallacy and muppetology, that I'm simply waiting for Bernanke to slip up and true market pricing to come to the fore before I jump back into the game. ZeroHedge comments on JPM's earnings as follows JPM Beats On Loan Loss Reserve Release Despite Drop In Trading Revenues And NIM, Surge In Non-Performing Loans:

There is a lot of verbiage in the official JPM Q3 Earnings press release which directs to a bottom line number of $1.40, or $5.7 billion on expectations of $1.24, with revenue of $25.9 billion on expectations of $24.53 billion. The primary reason for the lack of disappointment: no major losses in Corporate from CIO, with corporate generating $221 million in Q3, up from a loss of $(1.777) billion in Q2. And then come the adjustments:  $900 million pretax benefit ($0.14 per share after-tax increase in earnings) from reduced mortgage loan loss reserves in Real Estate Portfolios; $825 million pretax incremental charge-offs ($0.13 per share after-tax decrease in earnings) due to regulatory guidance on certain residential loans in Real Estate Portfolios; $888 million pretax benefit ($0.14 per share after-tax increase in earnings) due to extinguishment gains on redeemed trust preferred capital debt securities in Corporate; $684 million pretax expense ($0.11 per share after-tax decrease in earnings) for additional litigation reserves in Corporate; Then there is a DVA loss of $211 MM in banking. Net-net, after taking into account all one-off adjustments, the Q3EPS was really $1.26. But for all the data fudging, and attempts to make the reported EPS non-comparable to the expected one, following an avalanche of one-time adjustments, the bottom line is this: revenues from trading dropped both sequentially and Q/Q while banking expenses rose, Net Interest Margin dropped to a new record low, even as the firm too a major $967 million loan loss reserve release on its loans to $22.8 billion, even as its total Non-Performing Loans rose by a whopping $1.3 billion to $11.370 billion, the largest quarterly jump in years! Just how JPM can justify such a major contribution to earnings coming from loan losses when NPLs have soared is unclear to anyone with a frontal lobe.

On that note, let's reminisce to the days of Q2 2011, where I penned There's Something Fishy at the House of Morgan. Let me know if you've seen this story before. It's amazing that banks can dance this dance, over and over again and STILL not get called on it:

I invite all to peruse the mainstream financial media and sell side Wall Street's take on JP Morgan's Q1 earnings before reading through my take. Pray thee tell me, why is there such a distinct difference? Below are excerpts from the our review of JP Morgan's Q1 results, available to paying subscribers (including valuation and scenario analysis): JPM Q1 2011 Review & Analysis.

JPMorgan’s Q1 net revenue declined 9% y-o-y ad 3% q-o-q to $25.2bn as non-interest revenues declined 5% y-o-y (down 5% q-o-q) to $13.3bn while net interest income declined 13% y-o-y and (-2% q-o-q) to $12.5bn. However, despite decline in net revenues, noninterest expenses were flat at $16bn. Non-interest expenses as proportion of revenues was 63% in Q1 2011 compared with 58% a year ago and 61% in Q4 2010. However, due to substantial decline in provision for credit losses which were slashed 83% y-o-y (63% q-o-q) to $1.2bn from $7.0bn, PBT was up 78% y-o-y (15% q-o-q).

Lower reserve for loan losses and consequent decline in Eyles test (an efficacy of ability to absorb credit losses) coupled with higher expected wave of foreclosures which is masked by lengthening foreclosure period and overhang of shadow inventory, advocate a cautionary outlook for banking and financial institutions. As a result of consecutive under-provisioning since the start of 2010, JP Morgan’s Eyles test have turned negative and is the worst since at least the last 17 quarters. The estimated loan losses after exhausting entire loan loss reserves could still eat upto 8% of tangible equity.

Non-interest revenues

Non-interest revenue declined 5% y-o-y (down 5% q-o-q) to $13.3bn from $14.0bn in the previous year. Investment banking fees were up 23% y-o-y as debt underwriting fees and advisory fees were up 29% y-o-y and 44% y-o-y, respectively partially offset by 8% decline in equity underwriting fees. Principal transactions revenues were up 4% y-o-y to $4.8bn, the highest at least since last 17 quarters. Asset management revenues were up 10% y-o-y $3.6bn. The bank reported a loss of $0.5bn on mortgage fees and related income compared with gain of 0.7bn in the corresponding quarter last year while securities gains for Q1 2011 declined to $102m from $610m in Q1 2010. Credit card income was up 6% y-o-y to $1.4bm while other income increased 40% y-o-y to $574m.

I have warned of this event. JP Morgan (as well as Bank of America) is literally a litigation sinkhole. See JP Morgan Purposely Downplayed Litigation Risk That Spiked 5,000% Last Year & Is Still Severely Under Reserved By Over $4 Billion!!! Shareholder Lawyers Should Be Scrambling Now Wednesday, March 2nd, 2011.

Traditional banking revenues: manifest destiny as forwarned - Weakening Revenue Streams in US Banks Will Make Them More Susceptible To Contingent Risks

Net interest income declined 13% y-o-y (-2% q-o-q) to $11.9bn versus $13.7bn in the previous year as interest income fell 7% to $15.6bn while at the same time interest expenses increased 19%. Interest income declined as a result of steep decline in yield on interest bearing assets despite a 2% y-o-y and 4% sequentially increase in interest bearing assets. Low interest rates and lower proportion of high yield assets have caused a strain on yield on interest bearing assets. The proportion of loans to interest bearing assets (high yield assets) have declined to 34% in Q1 2011 from 36% in Q1 2O10 and 39% in Q1 2O09 while at the same time proportion of Feb Funds rate (low yield assets) to interest bearing assets have increased.  Yield on interest bearing assets which is in a downward trajectory declined to 3.06% in Q1 2011 versus 3.35% in Q1 2010.

Interest expense increased to 19% as interest bearing liabilities increased 2% y-o-y while at the same time yield on interest bearing liabilities increased to 0.81% from 0.69%. Overall, the bank’s net interest margin declined to 3.1% in Q1 2011, the lowest since 2007 as low interest rate environment coupled with low risk appetite have taken a toll on banks net interest margin.

Again, I have warned of this occurrence as well. See my interview with Max Keiser where I explained how the Fed's ZIRP policy is literally starving the banks it was designed to save. Go to 12:18 in the video and listen to what was a highly contrarian perspective last year, but proven fact this year!

Provisions and charge-offs: I have been warning about the over-exuberant release of provisions to pad accounting earnings since late 2009!

Declines in provision was one of the major contributors to bottom line. JPMorgan reduced its provision for loan losses to $1.2bn (0.7% of loans) in Q1 2011 from $7.0bn (4.2% of loans) in Q1 2010 and from $3.0bn (1.8% of loans) in Q4 2010 while charge-offs declined to $3.7bn (2.2% of loans) in Q1 2011 from $7.9bn (4.4% of loans) in Q1 2010 and from $5.1bn (2.9% of loans) in Q4 2010. Although banks delinquency and charge-off rate has declined, the extent of decline in provisions is unwarranted compared to decline in charge-off rates. As a result of higher decline in provisions compared to charge-offs, total reserve for loan losses have decreased to 4.3% in Q1 from 5.3% in Q1 2010 and 4.7% in Q4 2010. At the end of Q1 the banks allowances to loan losses is lowest since 2009.

Although the reduction in provisions has helped the banks to improve its profitability it has seriously undermined the banks’ ability to absorb losses, if economic conditions worsen. As a result of under provisioning for the past five quarters, the banks Eyles test, a measure of banks’ ability to absorb losses, has turned to a negative 7.7% in Q1 2011 compared with +6.4% in Q1 2010. A negative Eyles test has serious implications to shareholders – the losses from banks could not only drain entire allowances for loan losses which are inadequate but can also wipe off c7.7% of shareholder’s equity capital. The negative value of 7.7% for JPM’s Eyles is the lowest in this downturn.

 

For those of you who believe the housing market has put in a bottom, JPM may be the company to believe in. For those a bit more grounded in reality, realize...

For those who still do not believe that the Fed's ZIRP is starving the banks, I strongly suggest reading Did Bernanke Permanently Cripple the Butterfly That Is US Housing? The Answer Is More Obvious Than Many Want To Believe Monday, March 28th, 2011, as excerpted:

Do Black Swans Really Matter? Not As Much as the Circle of Life, The Circle Purposely Disrupted By Multiple Central Banks Worldwide!!!, Bernanke et. al. have snipped the chrysalis of the US markets and economy one too many times. He has interrupted the circle of life...

I have always been of the contention that the 2008 market crash was cut short by the global machinations of a cadre of central bankers intent on somehow rewriting the rules of economics, investment physics and global finance. They became the buyers of last resort, then consequently the buyers of only resort while at the same time flooding the world with liquidity and guarantees. These central bankers and the countries they allegedly strive to serve took on the debt and nigh worthless assets of the private sector who threw prudence through the window during the “Peak” phase of the circle of economic life, and engaged in rampant speculation. Click to enlarge to print quality…

The result of this “Great Global Macro Experiment” is a market crash that never completed. BoomBustBlog subscribers should reference File Icon The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis while non-subscribers should see Is Another Banking Crisis Inevitable?as well as The True Cause Of The 2008 Market Crash Looks Like Its About To Rear Its Ugly Head Again, With A Vengeance. All four corners of the globe are currently “hobbling along on one leg”, under the pretense of a “global recovery”.

Reminisce while traipsing through our real estate analysis and research:

  1. On Employment and Real Estate Recovery Monday, April 25th, 2011
  2. A First In The History Of Mainstream Media? NAR Is Identified As A Joke! Tuesday, March 29th, 2011
  3. The True Cause Of The 2008 Market Crash Looks Like Its About To Rear Its Ugly Head Again, With A Vengeance Friday, March 11th, 2011
  4. Reggie Middleton ON CNBC’s Fast Money Discussing Hopium in Real Estate Friday, February 25th, 2011
  5. Further Proof Of The Worsening Of The Real Estate Depression Thursday, February 24th, 2011
  6. In Case You Didn’t Get The Memo, The US Is In a Real Estate Depression That Is About To Get Much Worse Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011
  7. When Will the Mainstream Media Be Ready To Call The NAR The Sham That It Really Is? Tuesday, February 22nd, 2011
Published in BoomBustBlog

Bloomberg reports S&P Downgrades Spain, Citing Region Backtracking on Bank:

Spain’s debt rating was cut to one level above junk by Standard & Poor’s, which cited euro-region peers’ backtracking on a pledge to severe the link between the sovereign and its banks as it considers a second bailout. The country was lowered two levels to BBB- from BBB+, New York-based S&P said in a statement yesterday. S&P assigned a negative outlook to the nation’s long-term rating and lowered the short-term sovereign level to A-3 from A-2.

The downgrade comes after Spain announced a fifth austerity package in less than a year and published details about stress tests of its banks. Creditworthiness concerns have grown since the government requested as much as 100 billion euros ($129 billion) in European Union aid in June to shore up its lenders and amid signals that the deficit target is in jeopardy.

CNBC adds:

Spain’s credit rating downgrade was necessary because of a deepening recession and the uphill battle the country faces in pushing through an unpopular reform program, Moritz Kraemar, managing director for European Sovereign Ratings at Standard & Poor’s told CNBC Thursday. S&P cut Spain’s credit rating to just one notch above junk late or BBB-minus on Wednesday with a negative outlook — the third cut this year — as the embattled country tries to fight off growing calls for a bailout. Spain expressed surprise at the downgrade claiming it was “unhelpful.”“Politically and socially the reform agenda is very difficult. This recession could keepunemployment up and intensify the social discontent and friction between Madrid and the regional governments,” he said.

Query: Why has this taken so long? Let's do this by the numbers...

Monday, 08 February 2010: I warned of the undeniable storm that was the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, with a specific note on Spain simply being a bigger Greece!!! This was TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO!

 spain_vs_greece.png

March 30th, 2010: I forensically explained that Spain was essentially a default waiting to happen, in explicit detail via a report for paying subscribers - File Icon Spain public finances projections_033010

April 27th, 2010: I explicitly warned on Spanish bank sovereign exposure for paying subscribers: File Icon A Review of the Spanish Banks from a Sovereign Risk Perspective – retail.pdf and File Icon A Review of the Spanish Banks from a Sovereign Risk Perspective – professional

Fast forward roughly TWO YEARS and the rating agencies jump into the mix - yes, all after the fact... I penned S&P Downgrades Spain (After I Did) Two Notches ... as a response:

Of course, we all know how reliable and timely the rating agencies are, right? See Rating Agencies vs Reggie Middleton, Part 3 and the Interesting Documentary on the Power of Rating Agencies, with Reggie Middleton Excerpts. You can see the full video here, but only about half of it is in English. I appear in the following spots: 22:30 and 40:00... You really need to see this video if you haven't for nothing like this will ever get aired in the states, particularly right before presidential elections!!!

spain vs greece

Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 01Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 02Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 03Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 04Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 05Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 06Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 07Spain public finances projections 033010 Page 08spain vs greeceI

then

made clear that You Have Not Known Pain Until You've Seen The True Borrowing Costs Of Spain... -

Yes, I got carried away with this one... The Economic Bloodstain From Spain's Pain Will Cause European Tears To Rain... 

Let's peruse the first four pages of the report from issued to BoomBustBlog subscribers two years ago to see if this last minute downgrade to effectively junk could have been expedited or foreseen...

 

To prevent this post from getting too long, I will post the rest of this nearly three year report in my next rant on this topic. Note how this aged document has been more accurate than the rating agencies reports of today... Hmmm!!!!!

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube
Published in BoomBustBlog

When is the banking system going reboot? Start listening below at 10:40 to about 12:45 (or the whole thing if you want to hear how the Justice Department should take the bad banks down), then read on...

From American Banker:

'Yet Another Bank': One week after New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil case against JPMorgan Chase alleging fraud in how Bear Stearns packaged and sold mortgage-backed securities, Wells Fargo finds itself being sued by the government for nearly a decade's worth of "reckless" mortgage lending. U.S. prosecutors (not affiliated with Schneiderman's mortgage task force, though he has promised more suits are on the way) are seeking "hundreds of millions of dollars" in civil damages from the bank on behalf of the Federal Housing Administration, alleging Wells "made false certifications" about the condition of their mortgage loans so that the government agency would insure them. FHA then had to foot the bill when the bank's alleged "mortgage factory" — Dealbook's interpretation of the complaint — output went belly up. "Yet another major bank has engaged in a longstanding and reckless trifecta of deficient training, deficient underwriting and deficient disclosure, all while relying on the convenient backstop of government insurance," United States attorney in Manhattan Preet Bharara said in a (perhaps obvious) statement.

The Times notes the lawsuits are being filed amidst public criticism of the Justice Department's lack of actual criminal action against banks and their executives regarding the housing boom.

Get the f2*k out of here! Really!!!???

Meanwhile, the Post notes the case is particularly problematic for Wells, which "has been hit with a series of civil actions" related to its mortgage business in recent years (and we would add, unlike JPMorgan, can't blame Bear Stearns for its latest problem). The bank is denying the most recent allegations, saying it acted in "good faith and in compliance" with federal rules.

This is what we saw in WFC 5 years ago, before most bothered to take noticw (rerference Doo-Doo bank drill down, part 1 - Wells Fargo - BoomBustBlog):

image040.pngimage040.png

This stress is real, and is already causing losses in the condo construction and sales markets, retail malls and now office buildings. Please see my primer and series on the Commercial Real Estate Crash and ongoing series of financial shenanigans and excessive debt issues of General Growth Properties for additional information.

image006.pngimage006.png

Sizeable Real Estate loans exposure in troubled markets:  Wells Fargo had $148 bn loan in 1-4 Family Mortgages (WFC has a high correlation to industry-wide losses) which represented nearly 38% of the banks’ total loan. Out of these loans nearly 51% comprised junior lien mortgage loans (much higher probability of total loss and no recovery)After C&D loans, real estate loans have highest NPAs as proportion of total loans.  In 4Q2007, real estate 1-4 family first mortgage NPAs to total loans stood at nearly 1.91% of total loans with total NPAs of $1.4 bn. In terms of geographic exposure, real estate loans from California and Florida comprised 33% and 4% of total real estate loans (i.e 13% and 2% of WFC’s total loan portfolio).

image003.png

This research and more  is available to all paying subscribers here, with a full set of charts, tables and graphics: File Icon WFC 1Q10_Review. Pro subscribers can also reference the full forensic report here: WFC Investment Note 22 May 09 - Pro. Retail subscribers should access it through the subscription content link in the main menu, under commercial and investment banks.

As for Jamie's house, as posted on Thursday, 21 June 2012 11:06

Does JPM Stand For "Just Pulling More" Wool Over Analyst's Eyes?

The latest Q2 qualitative observations for JPM are now available for all paying subscribers to download: JPM June 20 2012 Observations. This document contains a few interesting tidbits that, of course, you will get from nowhere else. For instance, did you know that the Q1 2012 financial results have many hidden secrets? We have looked at the Bank’s Q1 2012 financial results and have the following observations:

  • The Bank reported Q1 2012 revenues of $26.7 billion , an increase of $1.5 billion , or 6% , from the prior-year quarter. That sounds decent for a big bank in tough recessionary times, eh? However, the increase was primarily driven by a $1.1 billion benefit from the Washington Mutual bankruptcy settlement. Excluding this benefit, the revenues were almost the same as that in Q1 2011. With flat revenues like these, just imagine what could happen to the bottom line when a multi-billion dollar trading loss occurs.
  • The Bank had booked a loss on fair value adjustment of Mortgage Service Rights (MSR) in Q1 2011 of $1.1 billion. Hey, you know they just don't make those ephemeral, totally contrived 2nd order derivative products like they used to, eh?

Excluding the effect of the MSR loss along with the impact of gain from Washington Mutual bankruptcy, the bank’s Q1 2012 revenues actually decreased compared to Q1 2011.

Combine these secrets, derivative trading (oops, I mean hedging) losses and that bland ZIRP sauce that sucks profits in an increasingly expensive compensation landscape and you'll get one hell of a safe return for your 401k, right Mr Bove, et. al.? 

From the 2009 BoomBustBlog "I told you so" archives...

To wit regarding JP Morgan, on September 18th 2009 I penned the only true Independent Look into JP Morgan that I know of. It went a little something like this:

Click graph to enlarge

image001.pngimage001.png

Cute graphic above, eh? There is plenty of this in the public preview. When considering the staggering level of derivatives employed by JPM, it is frightening to even consider the fact that the quality of JPM's derivative exposure is even worse than Bear Stearns and Lehman‘s derivative portfolio just prior to their fall. Total net derivative exposure rated below BBB and below for JP Morgan currently stands at 35.4% while the same stood at 17.0% for Bear Stearns (February 2008) and 9.2% for Lehman (May 2008). We all know what happened to Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, don't we??? I warned all about Bear Stearns (Is this the Breaking of the Bear?: On Sunday, 27 January 2008) and Lehman ("Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise?": On February 20th, 2008) months before their collapse by taking a close, unbiased look at their balance sheet. Both of these companies were rated investment grade at the time, just like "you know who". Now, I am not saying JPM is about to collapse, since it is one of the anointed ones chosen by the government and guaranteed not to fail - unlike Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and it is (after all) investment grade rated. Who would you put your faith in, the big ratings agencies or your favorite blogger? Then again, if it acts like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, is it a chicken??? I'll leave the rest up for my readers to decide. 

This public preview is the culmination of several investigative posts that I have made that have led me to look more closely into the big money center banks. It all started with a hunch that JPM wasn't marking their WaMu portfolio acquisition accurately to market prices (see Is JP Morgan Taking Realistic Marks on its WaMu Portfolio Purchase? Doubtful! ), which would very well have rendered them insolvent...

... You can download the public preview here. If you find it to be of interest or insightful, feel free to distribute it (intact) as you wish. JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription 2009-09-18 00:56:22 488.64 Kb

Recent Articles on JPM

Who Will Be The Next JPM? Simply Review The BoomBustBlog Archives For The Answer

Who Caused JP Morgan's Big Derivative Bust? The Shocker - Ben Bernanke!!!

 
Published in BoomBustBlog
Tuesday, 28 August 2012 10:05

European Bank Run Watch: Spaniard Edition

As part of my ongoing series which I started in January of 2010 - Pan-European sovereign debt crisis, I detailed the rapidly developing financial malaise in Europe, detailing the risk to the larger more respected western European nations as well as their perceived profligate brethren to the south. One name popped up that analysts and media failed to harp on... Spain - at least back then. Now, people are wondering how Spain will handle its new found (at least to non-BoomBustBlog subscribers) funding crisis. To wit, and as excerpted from The Spain Pain Will Not Wane:

Professional subscribers can now actually download the original Spanish Bond Haircut Model that we used to calculate loss scenarios - Spain maturity extension_010610 (The Man's conflicted copy). Despite the fact I was probably the most realistically bearish out of the bunch, things have actually gotten materially worse since this model was constructed two years ago, hence it can use a refresh. Alas, it is still quite useful.

In the general subscriber document Spain public finances projections_033010, the first four (or 12) pages basically outline the gist of the Spanish problem today, to wit:

Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_01Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_01

Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_02Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_02

Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_03Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_03

Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_04Spain_public_finances_projections_033010_Page_04

The stress caused by Spain breaking the central bank will bring to full fruition the theory behind our European Banking and Insurance research from the last few quarters. All would do well to remember (and re-read, if need be),

This research, although over 2 years old, has proved to be quite useful and prophetic, till this very day. Ask the editors at CNBC as they ran this story: Spain Recession Deepens as Austerity Weighs

Spain's economy shrank further in the second quarter of the year and a slump in domestic spending accelerated, signaling a protracted recession as the country presses on with efforts to slash its public deficit.

Spain's economy fell back into recession in the first quarter of the year, when output fell 0.3 percent, and government estimates show GDP will probably fall for this year and next year as it pushes through further measures aimed at slashing a bloated deficit.Gross domestic product fell by 0.4 percent in the second quarter of the year, according to final data that confirmed a preliminary reading. But on an annual basis it dropped by 1.3 percent, worse than initial estimates of 1.0 percent.

The data came a day after Spain said its economy performed less well than expected in both of the last two years.

On Tuesday, the National Statistics Institute, INE, also revised down 2011 fourth quarter GDP to -0.5 percent from -0.3 percent.

Close to record high borrowing costs and an economy showing little sign of picking up any time soon is nudging Spain closer to calling for a European bailout, which analysts say is only a matter of time.

Those that follow me know that I have been warning on Europe and its banking system years before the sell side and mainstream financial media (reference the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis series).

Well, fast forward to today's CNBC headlines and you get: Spaniards Pull More Money Out of Banks in July. What a surprise, eh? As excerpted:

A rush by consumers and firms to pull their money out of Spanish banks intensified in July, with private sector deposits falling almost 5 percent as Spain was sucked into the centre of the euro zone debt crisis. Private-sector deposits at Spanish banks fell to 1.509 trillion euros at end-July from 1.583 trillion in the previous month.

Hmmm!!! How's that bank run thingy work again? Oh yeah, as excerpted from the prophetic piece from July 23, 2011 - The Anatomy Of A European Bank Run: Look At The Banking Situation BEFORE The Run Occurs! which detailed for my readers and subscribers the mechanics of the modern day bank run, particular as I see (saw) it occurring in Europe.

image015


image012

 Related links:

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube
Published in BoomBustBlog
Tuesday, 28 August 2012 09:48

European Bank Run Watch: Swiss Edition

 On July 23, 2011 I penned The Anatomy Of A European Bank Run: Look At The Banking Situation BEFORE The Run Occurs! which detailed for my readers and subscribers the mechanics of the modern day bank run, particular as I see (saw) it occurring in Europe.

image015

Those that follow me know that I have been warning on Europe and its banking system years before the sell side and mainstream financial media (reference the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis series).

 A reader has convinced me to consult with him on a specific situation, regarding overseas monies and the (lack of) safety of those funds, which prompted me to dig up the Sovereign Contagion Model that we developed n 2010. In a nutshell, the Swiss banking industry was built upon impenetrable bank privacy for high net worth clients. Once the US decided it needed to boost its tax revenues during hard times, it literally collapse the Swiss hegemony in secret banking and left that banking industry to compete in actual banking versus asset concealment. This left Swiss banks naked, for they don't appear to me to truly be able to compete aggressively and successfully in other areas. 

Add to this mix potential contagion issues for the Swiss banking industry due to the fact that Switzerland has a veritable cornucopia of exposure all over the soon (if not already) serial recession ridden world, and well...

The first chart is raw contagion exposure as a % of GDP. The 2nd chart is the same exposure ran through our “reality” model. Food for thought.

The BoomBustBlog Sovereign Contagion Model

Nearly every MSM analysts roundup attempts to speculate on who may be next in the contagion. We believe we can provide the road map, and to date we have been quite accurate. Most analysis looks at gross claims between countries, which of course can be very illuminating, but also tends to leave out many salient points and important risks/exposures.

Description: foreign claims of PIIGSforeign claims of PIIGSforeign claims of PIIGS

In order to derive more meaningful conclusions about the risk emanating from the cross border exposures, it is essential to closely scrutinize the geographical break down of the total exposure as well as the level of risk surrounding each component. We have therefore developed a Sovereign Contagion model which aims to quantify the amount of risk weighted foreign claims and contingent exposure for major developed countries including major European countries, the US, Japan and Asia major.

image002 copy

I.          Summary of the methodology

·         We have followed a bottom-up approach wherein we have first identified the countries/regions with high financial risk either owing to rising sovereign risk (ballooning government debt and fiscal deficit) or structural issues including remnants from the asset bubble collapse, declining GDP, rising unemployment, current account deficits, etc. For the purpose of our analysis, we have selected PIIGS, CEE, Middle East (UAE and Kuwait), China and closely related countries (Korea and Malaysia), the US and UK as the trigger points of the financial risk dissemination across the analysed developed countries.

·         In order to quantify the financial risk emanating in the selected regions (trigger points), we looked into the probability of the risk event happening due to three factors - a) government default b) private sector default c) social unrest. The probabilities for each factor were arrived on the basis of a number of variables determining the relative weakness of the country. The aggregate risk event probability for each country (trigger point) is the average of the risk event probability due to the three factors.

·         Foreign claims of the developed countries against the trigger point countries were taken as the relevant exposure. The exposures of each developed country were expressed as % of its respective GDP in order to build a relative scale for inter-country comparison.

·         The risk event probability of the trigger point countries was multiplied by the respective exposure of the developed countries to arrive at the total risk weighted exposure of each developed country.

·         Description: File Icon Sovereign Contagion Model - Retail - contains introduction, methodology summary, and findings

·         Description: File Icon Sovereign Contagion Model - Pro & Institutional - contains all of the above as well as a very detailed methodology map that explains what went into the model across dozens of countries.

The bank run in other European nations:

 

Related Pan-European Sovereign Risk Non-bank Subscription Research Archives

·         Ireland public finances projections_040710

·         Spain public finances projections_033010

·         UK Public Finances March 2010

·         Italy public finances projection

·         Greece Public Finances Projections

Follow me:

  • Follow us on Blogger
  • Follow us on Facebook
  • Follow us on LinkedIn
  • Follow us on Twitter
  • Follow us on Youtube

 

Published in BoomBustBlog