Financial, Real Estate, Stock Markets Trends and Current Affairs

Let's get something straight right off the bat. We all know there is a certain level of fraud sleight of hand in the financial industry. I have called many banks insolvent in the past. Some have pooh-poohed these proclamations, while others have looked in wonder, saying "How the hell did he know that?"

• Is this the Breaking of the Bear? It wasn't hard to see Bear Stearns collapsing 3 month before bankruptcy. Why didn't our regulators see what I saw?
• As I see it, 32 commercial banks and thrifts may see the feces hit the fan blades It wasn't hard to see that nearly all of these 32 banks would be facing the threat of insolvency. Why didn't our regulators see what I saw?
• The Commercial Real Estate Crash Cometh, and I know who is leading the way! It wasn't hard to see that commercial real estate was ready to implode and that GGP was about to collapse under its own weight. Why didn't our regulators see what I saw?
• Yeah, Countrywide is pretty bad, but it ain’t the only one at the subprime party… Comparing Countrywide Countrywide and Washington Mutual's collapse were visible AT LEAST a year in advance!
• The Next Shoe to Drop: Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Counterparty Risk - Beware what lies beneath! 'Nuff said...
• ... and even Lehman Brothers: Is Lehman a Lying Lemming?

The list above is a small, relevant sampling of at least dozens of similar calls. Trust me, dear reader, what some may see as divine premonition is nothing of the sort. It is definitely not a sign of superior ability, insider info, or heavenly intellect. I would love to consider myself a hyper-intellectual, but alas, it just ain't so and I'm not going to lie to you. The truth of the matter is I sniffed these incongruencies out because 2+2 never did equal 46, and it probably never will either. An objective look at each and every one of these situations shows that none of them added up. In each case, there was someone (or a lot of people) trying to get you to believe that 2=2=46.xxx. They justified it with theses that they alleged were too complicated for the average man to understand (and in business, if that is true, then it is probably just too complicated to work in the long run as well). They pronounced bold new eras, stating "This time is different", "There is a new math" (as if there was something wrong with the old math), etc. and so on and associated bullshit.

The Financial Times has published an Op-Ed piece I penned on bonuses in the banking industry. Enjoy!

A bank employee recently asked me: "As a trader, my bonus is derived directly from my profit and loss, which is accrued over the quarter and kept in a separate account. It does not go into the firm's bottom line and then back out to me. Also, like most traders, I accrue 2% of my gains in a loss provision account in case I have a major write-down in the year. My bonus is 10% of my profit for the year. If I make $50m for the year my bonus is $5m. What does my bonus have to do with the mortgage-backed securities [MBS] trader who is sitting on losses? Did I or did I not show a profit of $40m to the firm's bottom line?"

Main Street is absolutely flabbergasted that bankers do not understand the core issues of this bonus question. Allow me to clearly outline the problem and propose a solution. Assuming this trader works for a prominent US bank that received a bailout, he is not entitled to a $5m bonus if he made $50m for the year. Why not? Because he generated that 10% return from taxpayer capital, not firm capital. For example, Goldman Sachs would have had the drawdown from purgatory had it not been rescued from a $30bn credit default swap deal with AIG.

Let's assume AIG would have negotiated a 40% payout to Goldman Sachs, which is realistic given that litigation with an insolvent company that had many more contingent and direct claims would probably have resulted in a lower net receipt to Goldman. This alone would have resulted in a hole of about $7.8bn for the bank.

Home grown credit risks look to come back home to roost. I am actually shocked the following development didn't get more traction in the mains stream media. The recent announcement by the Chinese finance ministry to nullify all guarantees for local governments for loans taken by their financing vehicles, and its plan to issue rules banning all future guarantees by local governments (see Bloomberg article), fuels (even further) our concerns about credit risks on such loans.

The primary concern is that most of these were non-recourse loans to provinces, municipalities and counties through shell companies, known as Urban Development Investment Corporations (UDIC). Some went to fund projects backed by assets, such as commercial real estate, others to projects with future cash flows such as subways and toll roads. Still others are social in nature and backed only by an implicit guarantee of the City/Provincial Investment Holding Corporation (CIHC).

 And the most concerning part of these loans primarily includes the estimated 3,000 billion Yuan ($450billion) of local infrastructure loans extended in 2009, which represents 30% of the record new bank lending last year.

• Most UDIC loans have sparse local equity and limited cash flow prospects for repayment. For 2009, local governments and CIHCs have been able to meet interest payment gaps with healthy land sales, which totaled 1,600 billion Yuan in 2009, as well as central government transfers.
• However, at the end of 2009, the UDIC liability is estimated at close to 6,000 billion Yuan or 14% of the outstanding loan base. And a 30% default rate could in effect wipe out the paid-in capital of top banks such as China Construction Bank and Bank of China.

According to Central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan, during the National People's Congress, "while ‘many' local financing vehicles have the ability to repay, two types cause concern. One uses land as collateral, while the other can't fully repay borrowing", which means that for such loans the local governments may become liable, leading to ‘fiscal risks' for the government.

Home grown credit risks look to come back home to roost. I am actually shocked the following development didn't get more traction in the mains stream media. The recent announcement by the Chinese finance ministry to nullify all guarantees for local governments for loans taken by their financing vehicles, and its plan to issue rules banning all future guarantees by local governments (see Bloomberg article), fuels (even further) our concerns about credit risks on such loans.

The primary concern is that most of these were non-recourse loans to provinces, municipalities and counties through shell companies, known as Urban Development Investment Corporations (UDIC). Some went to fund projects backed by assets, such as commercial real estate, others to projects with future cash flows such as subways and toll roads. Still others are social in nature and backed only by an implicit guarantee of the City/Provincial Investment Holding Corporation (CIHC).

 And the most concerning part of these loans primarily includes the estimated 3,000 billion Yuan ($450billion) of local infrastructure loans extended in 2009, which represents 30% of the record new bank lending last year.

• Most UDIC loans have sparse local equity and limited cash flow prospects for repayment. For 2009, local governments and CIHCs have been able to meet interest payment gaps with healthy land sales, which totaled 1,600 billion Yuan in 2009, as well as central government transfers.
• However, at the end of 2009, the UDIC liability is estimated at close to 6,000 billion Yuan or 14% of the outstanding loan base. And a 30% default rate could in effect wipe out the paid-in capital of top banks such as China Construction Bank and Bank of China.

According to Central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan, during the National People's Congress, "while ‘many' local financing vehicles have the ability to repay, two types cause concern. One uses land as collateral, while the other can't fully repay borrowing", which means that for such loans the local governments may become liable, leading to ‘fiscal risks' for the government.

Warranties of representation, and forced repurchase of loans

JP Morgan has increased its reserves with regards to repurchase of sold securities but the information surround these actions are very limited as the company does not separately report the repurchase reserves created to meet contingencies. However, the Company's income from mortgage servicing was severely impacted by increase in repurchase reserves. Mortgage production revenue was negative $192 million against negative $70 million in 3Q09 and positive $62 million in 4Q08.

Counterparties who are accruing losses from bad loans, (ex. monoline insurers such as Ambac and MBIA, see A Super Scary Halloween Tale of 104 Basis Points Pt I & II, by Reggie Middleton circa November 2007,) are stepping up their aggression in pushing loans that appear to breach certain warranties or smack of fraud. I expect this activity to pick up significantly, and those banks that made significant use of brokers and third parties to place mortgages will be at material risk - much more so than the primarily direct writers. I'll give you two guesses at which two banks are suspect. If you need a hint, take a look at who is increasing reserves for repurchases! JP Morgan and their not so profitable acquisition, WaMu!

http://boombustblog.com/images/stories/regional_banks/32bustedbanks/thumbnails/thumb_image020.png

As I said, losses should be ramping up on the mortgage sector. Notice the trend of housing prices after the onset of government bubble blowing: If Anybody Bothered to Take a Close Look at the Latest Housing Numbers...

PNC Bank and Wells Fargo are in very similar situations regarding acquiring stinky loan portfolios. I suggest subscribers review the latest forensic reports on each company to refresh as the companies report Q4 2009 earnings. Unlike JPM, these banks do not have the investment banking and trading fees of significance (albeit decreasing significance) to fall back on as a cushion to consumer and mortgage credit losses.

March 5 (Bloomberg) -- Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac may force lenders includingBank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Co. and Citigroup Inc. to buy back $21 billion of home loans this year as part of a crackdown on faulty mortgages.

That’s the estimate of Oppenheimer & Co. analyst Chris Kotowski, who says U.S. banks could suffer losses of $7 billion this year when those loans are returned and get marked down to their true value. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both controlled by the U.S. government, stuck the four biggest U.S. banks with losses of about $5 billion on buybacks in 2009, according to company filings made in the past two weeks.

The surge shows lenders are still paying the price for lax standards three years after mortgage markets collapsed under record defaults. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are looking for more faulty loans to return after suffering $202 billion of losses since 2007, and banks may have to go along, since the two U.S.- owned firms now buy at least 70 percent of new mortgages.

...

Freddie Mac forced lenders to buy back $4.1 billion of mortgages last year, almost triple the amount in 2008, according to a Feb. 26 filing. As of Dec. 31, Freddie Mac had another $4 billion outstanding loan-purchase demands that lenders hadn’t met, according to the filing. Fannie Mae didn’t disclose the amount of its loan-repurchase demands. Both firms were seized by the government in 2008 to stave off their collapse.

....

The government’s efforts might be counterproductive, since the Treasury and Federal Reserve are trying to help banks heal, FBR’s Miller said. The banks have to buy back the loans at par, and then take an impairment, because borrowers usually have stopped paying and the price of the underlying homehas plunged. JPMorgan said in a presentation last month that it loses about 50 cents on the dollar for every loan it has to buy back.

Striking a Balance

“It’s a fine line you’re walking, because the government’s trying to recapitalize the banks, not put them in bankruptcy, and then here’s Fannie and Freddie putting more pressure on the banks through these buybacks,” FBR’s Miller said. “If it becomes too big of an issue, the banks are going to complain to Congress, and they’re going to stop it.” [Of, course! Let the taxpayer eat the losses borne from our purposefully sloppy underwriting]

Bank of America recorded a $1.9 billion “warranties expense” for past and future buybacks of loans that weren’t properly written, seven times the 2008 amount, the bank said in a Feb. 26 filing. A spokesman for Charlotte, North Carolina- based Bank of America, Scott Silvestri, declined to comment.

JPMorgan, based in New York, recorded $1.6 billion of costs in 2009 from repurchases, including $500 million of losses on repurchased loans and $1 billion to increase reserves for future losses, according to a Feb. 24 filing.

“It’s become a very meaningful issue, and it will continue to be a meaningful issue for the next couple of years,” Charlie Scharf, JPMorgan’s head of retail banking, said at a Feb. 26 investor conference. He declined to say when the repurchase demands might peak.

...

“I can’t forecast the rates at which they’re going to continue,” she said. Her division lost $3.84 billion last year, as the bank overall posted a $6.28 billion profit. “The volume is increasing.”

Wells Fargo, ranked No. 1 among U.S. home lenders last year, bought back $1.3 billion of loans in 2009, triple the year-earlier amount, according to a Feb. 26 filing. The San Francisco-based bank recorded $927 million of costs last year associated with repurchases and estimated future losses.

...

Citigroup increased its repurchase reserve sixfold to $482 million, because of increased “trends in requests by investors for loan-documentation packages to be reviewed,” according to a Feb. 26 filing.

“The request for loan documentation packages is an early indicator of a potential claim,” New York-based Citigroup said.

...

Banks that sell mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have to provide “representations and warranties” assuring that the loans conformed to the agencies’ standards. With more loans going bad, the agencies are demanding that banks turn over loan files, so they can scour the records for missing documentation, inaccurate data and fraud.

...

The most common include inflated appraisals or falsely stated incomes in the loan applications, said Larry Platt, a Washington-based partner at law firm K&L Gates LLP who specializes in mortgage-purchase agreements. The government agencies hire their own reviewers who go back and compare the appraisals with prices from historical home sales, he said.

“They may do a drive-by for a visual inspection,” he said.

Wells Fargo said three-fourths of its repurchase requests came from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. While investors may demand repurchase at any time, most demands occur within three years of the loan date, Wells Fargo said.

The mortgage firms are looking at every loan more than 90 days past due and “asking us basically to give them all the documentation to show that it was properly underwritten,” JPMorgan’s Scharf said. “We then go through a process with them that takes a period of time, and literally it’s every loan, loan-by-loan, and have the discussion on whether or not we actually should buy the loan back.”

...

Mortgage repurchases may crimp bank earnings through 2011, Oppenheimer’s Kotowski said. That’s because the worst mortgages -- those underwritten in 2007 -- are just now coming under the heaviest scrutiny, he said.

...

“The worst of the stress is the 2007 vintages, though 2006 and 2005 weren’t a whole lot better and 2008 wasn’t much better,” Kotowski said.

Next week, the Mortgage Bankers Association is holding a workshop in the Dallas area that promises to help banks “survive the buyback deluge” and “build up your repertoire of lender defenses.” According to the MBA’s Web site, the workshop is sold out.

About a year and a half ago I warned that HSBC would be facing increasing and unanticipated (I was a contrarian on the China bubble) losses in Asia, as well as increasing losses on bad debt in the US. I believe I was one of the very few who threw this caution out there. I have included a free opinion along with the macro analysis to badk it up here: Part one of three of my opinion of HSBC and the macro factors affecting it . Subscribers can download the forensic reports: HSBC_Holdings_Report_04August2008 - retail 2008-09-16 06:38:38 87.28 Kb and HSBC_Holdings_Report_04August2008 - pro 2008-11-06 10:11:09 138.89 Kb. As a refresher, the 2nd quarter 2008 review is available here: HSBC 1H 08 results update. There is a discernable trend.

From Bloomberg:

March 1 (Bloomberg) -- HSBC Holdings Plc, Europe’s biggest bank, posted full-year net income that missed analyst estimates after impairments for bad loans rose and profit in Asia fell.

Johnathan Weill has an excellent article on
Bloomberg today illustrating just how BS the BS FASB accounting changes
regarding mark-to-market really were. For all of those who wondered why I
have stayed so bearish on the banks, stay tuned, but before we read
this oh so interesting story, let me provide you with a graphical
recollection of recent history via this chart sourced from Bloomberg:

So, Fitch finally get's around to downgrading the Greek banks. The sovereign debt short is probably a bit crowded right now, and may be due for a squeeze, but the fundamentals and the macro situation still stands. As a matter of fact, I really believe that most investors, speculators, pundits and regulators are actually looking at the wrong sets of risks - hence may truly be surprised when the choco-pudding hits the fan blades.

From Fitch:

Fitch Ratings-Barcelona/London-23 February 2010: Fitch Ratings has today downgraded the Long-term and Short-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of Greece's four largest banks, National Bank of Greece (NBG), Alpha Bank (Alpha), Efg Eurobank Ergasias (Eurobank) and Piraeus Bank (Piraeus) to 'BBB' from 'BBB+' and 'F3' from 'F2' respectively. The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs is Negative.

• Alpha Bank warned about in subscriber reports last week - Check!
• National Bank of Greece warned about in subscriber report last week - Check!
• Efg Eurobank Ergasias (Eurobank) warned about in subscriber report last week -Check!
• Piraeus Bank (Piraeus) warned about in subscriber report last week -Check!

All subscribers can download the Greek Bank Tear Sheet here:

Greek Banking Fundamental Tear Sheet

Pro subscribers can click below for the extended download

Banks exposed to high sovereign risks

There is only one bank in the analysis that was not downgraded, most likely for political issues. It is really only a matter of time, and when that one goes, so goes Greece...

At the same time, the agency has downgraded the banks' Individual Ratings to 'C' from 'B/C', whilst the ratings of the banks' senior, subordinated and hybrid capital instruments have all been downgraded by one notch. The Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors (SRF) of all four banks have been affirmed.

A full rating breakdown is provided at the end of this comment. Separately, Fitch has also affirmed Agricultural Bank of Greece's (ATEbank) Long-term IDR at 'BBB-', which is on its SRF, and Short-term IDR at 'F3'. The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Negative. ATEbank's IDRs, Support Rating and SRF are based on sovereign support as the bank is majority-owned by the Greek state (rated 'BBB+'/Negative Outlook).

The rating actions reflect Fitch's view that the banks' already weakening asset quality and profitability will come under further pressure due to anticipated considerable fiscal adjustments in Greece. In particular, Fitch believes the required fiscal tightening that needs to be made by the Greek government will have a significant effect on the real economy, affecting loan demand and putting additional pressure on asset quality. The latter could result in higher credit costs, ultimately weakening underlying profitability.

While the banks' operations in South Eastern Europe (SEE) and Turkey add revenue diversification, such revenues are derived from more volatile economies - some of which have themselves experienced recessionary pressures.

BoomBustBloggers are ahead of you Fitch :-)

The banks' profitability is also likely to be affected by higher funding costs derived from increased funding and liquidity pressures on Greek banks which mostly resulted from the ongoing market perception of elevated risk surrounding the Greek sovereign. The uncertainties surrounding the Greek public finances have to a large extent constrained Greek banks' access to wholesale markets and, to a lesser degree, interbank markets at reasonable prices. As a result, Greek banks continue to rely to some degree on European Central bank (ECB) funding. While unhindered access to ECB facilities provides short-term liquidity, Fitch would welcome a rebalancing of the banks' funding and liquidity profiles towards more traditional funding sources. However, on a positive note, Fitch highlights that Greek banks continue to be primarily funded by customer deposits (86% of gross loans on average for the five largest Greek banks at end-Q309), highlighting limited reliance on non-bank wholesale funding. Additionally, wholesale funding maturities for 2010 are manageable and funding needs for the year should be limited.

Excluding ATEbank, the other four banks' Long-term IDRs remain based on their individual financial strength, as expressed by Fitch's Individual Rating. This takes into account their well-established domestic banking franchises, which support revenue generation and good deposit bases, sound and in most cases recently strengthened capitalisation and also some degree of geographical diversification.

The Negative Outlook on all the banks' IDRs could be revised to Stable should Greek banks be successful in reducing ECB funding and be able to rebalance their funding and liquidity position without impairing their profitability, and if their underlying earnings capacity proves to be more resilient than currently anticipated to the expected prolonged recessionary environment in Greece and to a lesser extent in SEE.

The real question of the day is when will the rating agencies get serious and start downgrading Bank Greece. Bank Greece is an interesting entity, for it is the publicly traded Central Bank of Greece. Hey, why don't we float an offering of Bernanke Bank, the Federal Reserve - ticker BBFRB:-). Bank Greece's liabilities are backed directly by the Greek Government. I think it is fair to say that the Greek government's explicit backing doesn't necessarily mean that an entity is truly economically indemnified against loss. Who's backing the Greek government? As of the time of this writing, not one!

As we go over the responsibilities of Bank Greece, just keep in mind its financial condition in relation to the other banks, despite being backed by an entity that currently cannot pay its bills, has more debt than annual GDP and is facing civil unrest in trying to adjust its budget in attempt to resolve the issue, Bank Greece has the highest valuation multiple of 1.2x book, and has the highest adjusted leverage - by far - of the group at nearly 90x. Normally, the explicit backing of the Greek government should mean something, but again since it is obvious that the Greek government needs backing, this is sort of an increasingly empty promise - in appearance at least.

The next question is since the Bank of Greece is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) which is composed of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of all 27 European Union (EU) Member States, do they get backstopped somehow by forces from the EU? Inquiring minds want to know. I mean, it is quite feasible that the Greek banks can get in trouble once austerity measures take place and the civil unrest picks up. Even if unrest doesn't pick up, there is still a nearly guaranteed deepening of the recession. Then there is CEE exposure, which can help push banks over the edge. If the Greek Central Bank has to come to the aid of the banks, who will come to the Greek Central Banks aid? It is obvious that Greece doesn't have the budget for it.

The Bank of Greece, a short summary taken from their website...

The Bank of Greece

The Bank of Greece is the central bank of the country. It was established in 1927 by an Annex to the Geneva Protocol and started operations in May 1928. It was incorporated as a société anonyme. According to its Statute, its head office is in Athens. It has a nationwide network of 19 branches, 38 agencies and 7 outlets.

As from January 2001, the Bank of Greece is an integral part of the Eurosystem, which consists of theEuropean Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the European Union (EU) Member States participating in the euro area. This implies that the Bank of Greece contributes through its activities to the achievement of the objectives and the performance of the tasks of the Eurosystem, which defines and implements monetary policy in the euro area.

The Bank of Greece is responsible for implementing the Eurosystem’s monetary policy in Greece and safeguarding the stability of the Greek financial system. According to its Statute, its primary objective is to ensure the stability of the general price level. Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Bank supports the general economic policy of the government. In the performance of its tasks, the Bank enjoys institutional, personal and operational independence, and is accountable to the Greek Parliament.

...

Eurosystem-Related Tasks

Monetary policy

The Bank of Greece participates in the formulation of the single monetary policy in the euro area and implements it in Greece, in line with the guidelines and instructions of the European Central Bank (ECB). The Bank conducts monetary policy operations whereby it provides liquidity to domestic credit institutions (main and long-term refinancing operations). It also provides marginal lending and deposit facilities to credit institutions, in order to grant and absorb liquidity, respectively. Finally, it holds the minimum reserve accounts of domestic banks.

Financial stability

The Bank of Greece is responsible for monitoring financial stability, with a view to identifying vulnerabilities in Greece’s financial system, and assesses its resilience.

• It promotes arrangements for the maintenance of financial stability and effective management of financial crises, in cooperation with other competent authorities in Greece.
• It monitors banking risks, analyses developments affecting them and presents proposals for ensuring financial stability. It also monitors developments in insurance and investment firms, as well as in undertakings in collective investments not supervised by the Bank of Greece.

I think it is fair to say they are not doing a very good job of excelling at the financial stability task right now.

Statistics

Collecting statistical data from monetary financial institutions (MFIs) (i.e. banks and money market funds) is also a very important task of the Bank. The Bank of Greece collects data on bank rates, as well as data that make up monetary statistics (loans, deposits and other assets and liabilities of MFIs). These statistics are sent to the ECB and taken into account for the calculation of average interest rates in the euro area and the compilation of euro area monetary and credit aggregates. These aggregates are monitored in the context of the Eurosystem’s monetary analysis and their outcomes directly affect monetary policy decisions.

The statistics task appears to have succumbed to manipulation at worst, and quite liberal interpretation at best. From finding information that significantly increases the deficit over the weekend to private sector swaps with banks that mask debt obligations, I feel there is a reason to truly audit this bank and its past tasks and procedures as a condition of remaining an EMU member. Then again, that's just my opinion.

Treasurer and fiscal agent of the government

The Bank of Greece keeps current and time deposit accounts of the government and legal persons in public law in euro and foreign exchange, on the one hand for meeting domestic requirements and, on the other hand, for servicing the external debt. It also carries out payment and collection orders of the government and legal persons in public law in connection with foreign counterparties and provides intermediation services for their international financial activities.

Hmmm!!!

Statistics

The Bank of Greece also compiles and publishes the monetary and credit aggregates concerning the Greek economy and the average interest rates applied by domestic credit institutions to various categories of deposits and loans. In addition to collecting data for monetary statistics, the Bank of Greece also compiles the balance of payments and the financial accounts of the country and, generally, collects and publishes data concerning the Greek economy in the Bulletin of Conjunctural Indicators. Moreover, it conducts specialised statistical surveys on matters related to its tasks (e.g. household indebtedness surveys).

Collecting statistical data aims at both meeting the Bank’s own statistical information requirements and performing its obligations towards the ECB and other international organisations, as well as informing the public and researchers in Greece and abroad. Specifically, the data – in addition to monetary statistics – collected and compiled by the Bank of Greece concern the following four categories:

i. assets and liabilities of financial corporations and data on the mutual fund market

ii. Greece’s balance of payments and international investment position

iii. the country’s financial accounts, according to the methodology of the European System of Accounts 1995 and

iv. general data on the Greek economy.

Can we really trust these numbers?

See Will Greece Set Off the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? as well as:

This is the 2nd to last installment in my Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis series. After covering western and southern Europe, we are moving eastward. Before we go any further, be sure you have caught up on the previous portions:

1. Can China Control the "Side-Effects" of its Stimulus-Led Growth? Let's Look at the Facts - Explains the potential fallout of the excessive fiscal stimulus in China. While not European, it is quite likely to kick off the daisy chain effect.
2. The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.
3. What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect
4. The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.
5. The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries

Austria, Belgium and Sweden, while apparently healthy from a cursory perspective, have between one quarter to one half of their GDPs exposed to central and eastern European countries facing a full blown Depression!

Click to Enlarge...

cee_risk_map.png

These exposed countries are surrounded by much larger (GDP-wise and geo-politically) countries who have severe structural fiscal deficiencies and excessive debt as a proportion to their GDPs, not to mention being highly "OVERBANKED" (a term that I have coined).

So as to quiet those pundits who feel I am being sensationalist, let's take this step by step.

Depression (Wikipedia): In economics, a depression is a sustained, long-term downturn in economic activity in one or more economies. It is a more severe downturn than a recession, which is seen as part of a normal business cycle.

Considered a rare and extreme form of recession, a depression is characterized by its length, and by abnormal increases in unemployment, falls in the availability of credit, shrinking output and investment, numerous bankruptcies, reduced amounts of trade and commerce, as well as highly volatile relative currency value fluctuations, mostly devaluations. Price deflation, financial crisis and bank failures are also common elements of a depression.

There is no widely agreed definition for a depression, though some have been proposed. In the United States the National Bureau of Economic Research determines contractions and expansions in the business cycle, but does not declare depressions.^[1] Generally, periods labeled depressions are marked by a substantial and sustained shortfall of the ability to purchase goods relative to the amount that could be produced using current resources and technology (potential output).^[2] Another proposed definition of depression includes two general rules: 1) a decline in real GDP exceeding 10%, or 2) a recession lasting 2 or more years.[3][4]

Before we go on, let's graphically what a depression would look like in this modern day and age...

Now that the Fed has sent a clear signal that they are withdrawing some of the hyper-stimulus measures, combined with the fact that the monopolistic trading profits of the big banks are returning to mean, the trash on bank balance sheets should start coming to fore. Higher rates will compress net interest margins, and if you have been following my research the NIM of many banks were actually rather anemic despite zero interest rate policy. Now that banks are going to have to actually earn money by lending in lieu of a free lunch from the government, you should start seeing some very big hits to earnings - accounting and otherwise.