greek debt restructuring spreadsheet

It appears as if the EU politicking behind the bailout bonanza didn't yield everything they had hoped. I still believe they are going about this the wrong way, but they are obviously not paying close attention to my opinions - or are they? CNBC reports Moody's: Greek Default Is Almost Certain. Here's Why. It's nothing you haven't heard on BoomBustBlog before, but here's the synopsis...

Ratings agency Moody's cut Greece's sovereign debt by three notches on Monday to Ca, just one notch above default, saying the new bailout set a negative precedent for creditors of other debt-burdened countries.

For some reason, the EU leaders don't see this as adding to potential contagion, but I, Moody's and Fitch appear to differ. Since when do we agree? Why should any formally profligate state tighten its belt properly and risk the requisite political backlash when these bailouts are all but guaranteed to protect the German and French banks?

Euro zone leaders agreed last week to offer Greece debt relief through a new rescue package of easier loan terms, with private creditors shouldering part of the burden via a debt exchange. The downgrade means Greece now has the lowest rating of any country in the world covered by Moody's, which, like Fitch last week, said it would offer a new rating after the debt swap was completed.

Reference Multiple Botched and Mismanaged Stress Test Have Created The Makings Of A Pan-European Bank Run for my take.

"Once the distressed exchange has been completed, Moody's will reassess Greece's rating to ensure that it reflects the risk associated with the country's new credit profile, including the potential for further debt restructurings," it said. Last Friday, Fitch Ratings said Greece would be declared in restricted default due to the steps taken in the new euro zone rescue package but that new ratings of a low speculative grade would likely be assigned once the bond exchange is completed. Moody's said the combination of the announced EU support program and debt exchange proposals by major financial institutions implied that private creditors would incur hefty losses on their Greek government debt holdings.

Now the ratings agencies are getting seious and spitting the ugly truth. You see, the EU is attempting to paper over the losses with financial engineering and alternative names, but the fact of the matter is a loss, is a loss, is a loss. As excerpted from the afore-linked article:

Although the EU refuses to publish the truth, I have done so freely for blog subscribers and have available a detailed list, currently in its 3rd rendition, that explicitly walks though what will probably happen as any combination of the PIIGS group defaults.

Our most recent subscriber document explores the banking side of Greek failure - File Icon European Bank's Greece exposure, but I have put a significant amount of info into the public domain as well. If one were to even come close to marking the EU banks books to reality, market prices, or anything in between, the Lehman situation would look tame in compariosn! As excerpted from the subscriber document: File Icon The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis

It said that while the overall package carried a number of benefits for Greece, including lower debt-servicing costs and reduced reliance on financial markets for years to come, the impact on its debt burden would be limited. The rating agency also warned that despite some debt reduction thanks to the new rescue package, the country still faced medium-term solvency challenges and significant implementation risks. 

This is EXACTLY what we said over a year ago, reference A Comparison of Our Greek Bond Restructuring Analysis to that of Argentina. The team was even able to ascertain which path the restructuring would take well in advance, as well as anticipatng the problem that Moody's is just now articulating. See What is the Most Likely Scenario in the Greek Debt Fiasco? Restructuring Via Extension of Maturity Dates.

"The announced EU program along with the Institute of International Finance's statement implies that the probability of a distressed exchange, and hence a default, on Greek government bonds is virtually 100 percent," Moody's said.

The IIF said that the bond-exchange deal would help reduce Greece's debt pile by 13.5 billion euros, and by offering a menu of new instruments it aims to attract 90 percent investor participation in the plan.

But Moody's noted that Greece would still have a mountain of debt to service after that"(Greece's) stock of debt will still be well in excess of 100 percent of GDP for many years and it will still face very significant implementation risks to fiscal and economic reform," it said.

Hmmm, like clockwork - as excerpted from What is the Most Likely Scenario in the Greek Debt Fiasco? Restructuring Via Extension of Maturity Dates dated Wednesday, 26 May 2010 02:07...

Greek Restructuring Scenarios

There are several precedents of sovereign debt restructuring through maturity extension without taking an explicit  haircut on the principal amount, and many analysts are predicting something of a similar order for Greece. This form of restructuring is usually followed as a preemptive step in order to avoid a country from technically defaulting on its debt obligation due to lack of funds available from the market. It primarily aims to ease the liquidity pressures by deferring the immediate funding requirements to later periods and by spreading the debt obligations over a longer period of time. It also helps in moderating the increase in interest expenditure due to refinancing if the rates are expected to remain high in the near-to medium term but decline over the long term.

However, the two major negative limitations of this form of restructuring if applied to Greek sovereign debt restructuring are –

  • It solves only the liquidity side of the problem which means that the refinancing of the huge debt (expected to reach 133% of GDP by the end of 2010) will be spread over a longer time period while the debt itself will continue to remain at such high levels. The sustainability of such high debt level, which is growing continuously owing to the snowball effect and the primary deficit, is and will continue to be highly questionable. Greek public finances are burdened by a very large interest expense which is approaching 7% of GDP. The government’s revenues are sagging and the drastic austerity measures need to first bridge the huge primary deficit (which was 8.6% of GDP in 2009), before generating funds to cover the interest expenditure and reduce debt.

Thus, even though the amount of funds required each year to refinance the maturing debt will be reduced by extending maturities, the solvency and sustainability issues surrounding Greece’s public finances, which were the primary reasons for it’s being ostracized from the market in the first place, will remain unanswered.

  • It will lead to decline in present value of cash flows for the creditors since the average coupon rate is lower than the cost of capital (reflected by the yields on the Greek bonds). The average coupon rate for bonds maturing between 2010 and 2020 is about 4.4% while the average benchmark yield for bonds with maturities from 1-10 years is nearly 7.5%. Also, as the maturity of the debt is extended, the risk increases and so does the cost of capital.

In order to assess the effectiveness of this form of restructuring for Greek sovereign debt, we have built three scenarios in which the maturities of the Greek debt is extended. These scenarios weren’t designed to be exact predictions of the future but to represent what may happen under a variety of highly likely scenarios (a pessimistic, base and optimistic case, so to say):

  • Restructuring 1 – Under this scenario, we assumed that the creditors with debt maturing between 2010 and 2020 will exchange their existing debt securities with new debt securities having same coupon rate but double the maturity.
  • Restructuring 2 – Under this scenario, we assumed that the creditors with debt maturing between 2010 and 2020 will exchange their existing debt securities with new debt securities having half the coupon rate but double the maturity.
  • Restructuring 3 – Under this scenario, the debt maturing between 2010 and 2020 will be rolled up into one bundle and exchanged against a single, self-amortizing 20-year bond with coupon equal to average coupon rate of the converted bonds.

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In all the three scenarios, we computed the total funding requirements and compared the same with funding requirements prior to restructuring. It is observed that restructuring will help in easing the immediate pressure of procuring funds to meet the huge funding requirements lined up in the next 5 years. However, it will also lead to substantial loss to creditors in the form of erosion of present value of cash flows. (Discount rate was the benchmark yields of Greek government bonds for similar maturity period).

Professional and Institutional level subscribers (click here to upgrade) may access the live spreadsheet behind the document by clicking here (scroll down after for full summary, spreadsheet and charts).greek debt restructuring spreadsheetgreek debt restructuring spreadsheetgreek debt restructuring spreadsheet

We will be running similar restructuring analysis for all of the PIIGS member that we have researched in thePan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis series.

Moody's added that while the rescue package for Greece benefited all euro zone countries by containing near-term contagion risks, the deal set a negative precedent. "The support package sets a precedent for future restructurings should the finances of another euro area sovereign become as problematic as those of Greece. The impact of Thursday's announcement for creditors of Ireland and Portugal is therefore likely to be credit-neutral," it said.

But economically, it is credit negative. Bondholders will be forced to realize significant losses on what was once held as "risk free debt" and "reserves". See the list of links below to ascertain the results of such, but first realize that those bondholders that will take said losses will not be able to collect on their CDS, of course sparking signficant litigation, and further losses.

Standard & Poor's and Fitch have downgraded Greece to CCC.

Derivatives body ISDA told Reuters on Friday that the IIF's plans for voluntary debt swaps and buybacks to help rescue Greece wouldn't trigger a "credit event" and payment of CDS contracts, limiting the fallout of any default rating. One condition for a credit event affecting CDS is that changes in the terms of debt must be binding on all holders, which ISDA said was not the case.

Then there's the obvious twists from other impetuses:

And in the End, What Does It All Mean?

LGD 100+: What's the Possibility of Certain European Banks Having a Loss Given Default Approaching 100%?

My next post on this topic will be a discussion of a technical trade set up using options (for pros/institutional subscribers) for the bank run candidate whose fundamental/forensic analysis write up I posted last week for subscribers, as well as an insiders (Asset/Liability manager department head) take on the situation for everyone. 

Professional and institutional subscribers will have access to our contributing trader’s trade setups and opinions within a week and a half. Institutional subscribers should feel free to reach out to me via Google Plus for video chat and discussion this and every Tuesday at 12 pm (please RSVP via email). If you need an invitation to Google+ and are a subscriber, simply drop me a mail and I will give you one. Feel free to follow me on:

Published in BoomBustBlog

We are in the process of updating the very revealing work we performed last year, identifying which banks were most likely to do the "Lehman Brothers" thing. I believe we were the only media source to predict the collapse of Lehman Brothers, CountryWide, WaMu, Bear Stearns, etc. months in advance - with each of these calls being precedent setting calls from both a profit and strategic preparation perspective. The thought process that went into the research and taking speculative positions behind said research against the crowd, resulted in an interesting experience -to say the least. Reference  the introductory paragraph from Is this the Breaking of the Bear? from January 27, 2008, two months before this banks collapse (I gave a similar diatribe for Lehman, several months before their collapse or even mere negative presence in the media as well):

Anybody who follows my blog knows that I am extremely bearish on the global macro environment, particularly risky and financial assets. As I see it, the Doctor(s) FrankenFinance are constantly percolating econo-alchemical brews such as that of the ongoing “Great Macro Experiment,” eliciting undulating waves of joy and elation from amateur speculators such as myself while simultaneously creating risk/reward traps that many a financial and real asset concern may never escape from. While discussing with my team how best to move forward to find a target of our “Macro Experiment” victim analysis in the financial sector, I was queried as to what to look for in creating the short list. Evaluating investment banks, like evaluating the monolines, is not necessarily a straightforward endeavor. No matter how you do it, someone is going to disagree. This is what makes what I do so appealing. All I have to answer to is performance. I just need a profitable result in order to be successful. No corporate politics or conflicts of interests to get in my way. In the end, absolute return is the ultimate criteria, and not whether it is accepted by the ivy league or academia, industry practitioners, sponsors, clients or whether or not XZY bank has been doing it differently for the last 25 years. Investing for your own account enforces a certain code of realism that, at times, may not be shared by others. So, I used that realism as my strength and my focal point to guide the creation of a short list, the ultimate target, and the valuation/risk analysis methodology. I simply said, in the REAL world where I would have to make some money from some REAL assets,throwing off REAL cash flows and REAL market transactions? Using this “Reggie REALity Engine” (so to speak) to power the analysis proved very enlightening. We found banks that counted spread guesstimates as assets. We found banks that could not afford to keep their best employees. We found too many banks that faced insolvency in the very near future. We found a lot. To keep this story short, let’s just say we used the engine to find that truth that nobody really wants to hear. That truth as marked to reality. This resulted in a short list of 2 firms. The first one is Bear Stearns, which we will delve into here. The second one is what I call, “The Riskiest Bank on the Street”, and the blog post and analysis will be out in a few days. Using a Sherlock Holmes style of forensic analysis, we have tried very hard not to leave anything out of our scope of analysis. In the case of Bear Stearns, it was not easy since very little info was available outside of the plain vanilla 10Q, 10K, etc. They also volunteered very little information. Much of this is investigative analysis and it would be much more detailed if we had access to the Bear Stearns inventory. We wrote to Bear Stearns’ investor relations department asking for more information on the company’s exposure to risky assets and their breakup. So far, no word back. No need to be concerned for my health, I’m not holding our breath…

Alas, as I stated earlier, it is that truth that no one wants to hear. So if you are one of those "no ones" that don't want to hear the truth, cover your ears, cause here we go...

Well, here we go again, but this time on a much, much larger level. In addition, the investment portion of the game has become much more complicated for now you don't just have to know what the disease is and who has it, but you have to be able to navigate the fact that our dear Fed Chairman has eliminated all inoculations against said disease (or put more aptly, poked holes in all of our condoms) by artificially suppressing volatility and rates and distorting normal price discovery through market mechanisms, see Did Bernanke Permanently Cripple the Butterfly That Is US Housing? The Answer Is More Obvious Than Many Want To Believe and as excerpted: 

... Do Black Swans Really Matter? Not As Much as the Circle of Life, The Circle Purposely Disrupted By Multiple Central Banks Worldwide!!!, Bernanke et. al. have snipped the chrysalis of the US markets and economy one too many times. He has interrupted the circle of life...

I have always been of the contention that the 2008 market crash was cut short by the global machinations of a cadre of central bankers intent on somehow rewriting the rules of economics, investment physics and global finance. They became the buyers of last resort, then consequently the buyers of only resort while at the same time flooding the world with liquidity and guarantees. These central bankers and the countries they allegedly strive to serve took on the debt and nigh worthless assets of the private sector who threw prudence through the window during the “Peak” phase of the circle of economic life, and engaged in rampant speculation. Click to enlarge to print quality…

 

The result of this “Great Global Macro Experiment” is a market crash that never completed. BoomBustBlog subscribers should reference File Icon The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis while non-subscribers should see Is Another Banking Crisis Inevitable? as well as The True Cause Of The 2008 Market Crash Looks Like Its About To Rear Its Ugly Head Again, With A Vengeance. All four corners of the globe are currently “hobbling along on one leg”, under the pretense of a “global recovery”.

This brings us back full circle to today, where (despite the protestations of many in the sell side such as "Buy the Euro Banks Goldman" and those in the mainstream media who proclaim that risks are beimgn overblown, Europe's banking system is sitting on the nuclear version of a veritable powder keg that could very well make the Bear Stearns/Lehman days look like a veritable bull market. I plan on delivering an update to our European bank exposure analysis for subscribers:

Take note that this update will include several American banks and the risks they face from writing nearly all of the richly priced CDS purchased by said European banks. This is an interesting and complicated story because all of those IMF/EU bailouts, besides adding more debt to already debt laden countries, have considerably subordinated the claims of the stakeholders involved. The following was written over a year ago, and has proven to be quite prescient:

The year 2013, with a IMF-proclaimed debt ratio of a tad under 150%, is the time when Greece will have to refinance the debt to pay the IMF. However, since the current debt raised by Greece is at fairly high rates, new debt will only be available at much higher rates (as markets should price-in the risk of high debt rollover) unless there is some saving grace of a drastic plunge in world wide interest rates and a concomitant plunge in the risk profile of Greece. At a 150% debt ratio, historically low artificially suppressed global interest rates that have nowhere to go but higher and prospective junk ratings from the US rating agencies, we don’ t see this happening. Thus, the cost of borrowing for in 2013 is likely to be much higher in the market than the nearly five percent for the existing debt. Greece will either be unable to fund itself in the markets at all, and will have to convince the Euro Members and the IMF to extend the three-year lending facility just announced (reference What We Know About the Pan European Bailout Thus Far) or, it will get the debt refinanced at very high rates. In both cases the total debt as a percentage of GDP will continue to rise, and this is not a sustainable scenario over the longer-term. In addition, if it accept the EU/IMF package and there is an event of default or restructuring, the IMF will force a haircut upon the private and public debtors beyond what would have normally been the case. This essentially devalues the debt upon the involvement of the IMF, a scenario that we believe many sovereign bondholders (particularly Greek, Spanish and Irish) may not have taken into consideration. This also leaves the possibility of a significant need for many banks to revalue their sovereign debt – particularly Greek sovereign debt – holdings.

As illustrated above, there is a higher probability for a Greek sovereign debt restructuring in 2013, which will definitely not hurt IMF (since it has a preferred right) but the Euro Members and other investors who will be holding the Greek debt.

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LGD: Loss Given Default... ~100%???

We're talking damn near complete wipeouts boys and girls. There are practicaly no entities holding this debt at par that are leveraged under 30x. The starting point in case of default for Greece is between roughly 48% to 52% of par. You've seen the math on BoomBustBlog many a time - Over A Year After Being Dismissed As Sensationalist For Questioning the ECB's Continued Solvency After Sovereign Debt Buying Binge, Guess What!
 

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Add forced subordination due to IMF and US imperialitic dictate, and discussion of recoveries may very well be moot. On that oh so cheery note, let's move on to the basis of the refresh of our European bank exposure note for subscribers, who have voted overwhelmingly to have us pursue this venue...
BoomBustBlog
I woild like to take this time to warn those who may have a waning interest in real estate due to the fundamentals defying act of REITs over the two years, that party is likely quite over if and once the Europeans blow up. The real long term risks still sitting on US, Asian and European bank balance sheet are still real asset based, and because it is so labor intensive to hide tons of bricks, dirt and mortar under pulp based ledger sheets using creative yet relatively meek accountants, these chickens are coming back home to roost to.
 

I will end this post with some graphs that show the bubblistic mentality of the German and French banks as they gorged on soon to be 2 for 1 sale sovereign debt at the height of the US induced credit and real asset bubble. You see, many outside of the Americas blame the US for instigating the last world wide crash (and admittedely rightfully so), but this time around the crash will be much bigger, and we all know whose fault it will be (hint: it doesn't rhyme with jaflerican). Remember, these supposedly risk free assets are being accumulated with somewhere between 30x to 72x leverage.

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In preparation for what will probably be a very, very valuable subscriber update, I will start off my next post on this topic with a public display of what we published this time last year regarding French and German banks. In passing, remember: 
  1. The US still has the right to singularly vote down a supermajority in the IMF, and it is the only single state to be able to do that.
  2. We see how well the EU has agreed on things in the past when time was of the essence.
  3. The EU voluntarily took subordinate positions to existing claimholders, that was the purpose of the bailout. The IMF has never inferred such.
  4. The Fed has opened up the swap lines in the past, and didn't do so for charitable reasons. Read my post on FICC risk and bank implosions on my blog. The Fed can't afford for Euro banks to start calling on those faux hedges. That's why the lines are open.
  5. Any haircut you get before adding on a trillion dollars of debt and the IMF standing in front of you for $120 billion is going to be less then the one you get afterwards

As always, may the BoomBust be wth you! Interested parties may feel free to follow me on twitter, email me directly, or register for/subscribe to BoomBustBlog.

Published in BoomBustBlog

I have decried the virtual collapse of the EU banking system beginning in 2009, and through 2010 and 2011. I have even delivered keynote speeches at EU banks on the very same topic...

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The points made in this video are, in my oh so not so humble opinion, incontrovertbe. As a matter of fact the farce, the political fame being played in the hold to maturity accounting arean is enough to spark both a bank run and a resulting banking collapse. I know my proclamations sounded rather bombastic when I first made them. They sounded sensationalist last year. Well, pray tell, how do they sound now?

UK banks abandon eurozone over Greek default fears

UK banks have pulled billions of pounds of funding from the eurozone as fears grow about the impact of a “Lehman-style” event connected to a Greek default.

 Senior sources have revealed that leading banks, including Barclays and Standard Chartered, have radically reduced the amount of unsecured lending they are prepared to make available to eurozone banks, raising the prospect of a new credit crunch for the European banking system.

Standard Chartered is understood to have withdrawn tens of billions of pounds from the eurozone inter-bank lending market in recent months and cut its overall exposure by two-thirds in the past few weeks as it has become increasingly worried about the finances of other European banks.

Barclays has also cut its exposure in recent months as senior managers have become increasingly concerned about developments among banks with large exposures to the troubled European countries Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal.

In its interim management statement, published in April, Barclays reported a wholesale exposure to Spain of £6.4bn, compared with £7.2bn last June, while its exposure to Italy has fallen by more than £100m.

One source said it was “inevitable” that British banks would look to minimise their potential losses in the event the eurozone crisis were to get worse. “Everyone wants to ensure that they are not badly affected by the crisis,” said one bank executive.

Moves by stronger banks to cut back their lending to weaker banks is reminiscent of the build-up to the financial crisis in 2008, when the refusal of banks to lend to one another led to a

seizing-up of the markets that eventually led to the collapse of several major banks and taxpayer bail-outs of many more.

 

Eurocalypse Cometh! Principal Haircuts, Serial Bailouts, ECB Insolvent! Disruptive Sound Of Dominoes In Background Going "Click, Clack"! BoomBustBloggers Instructed To Line Up Bearish Positions Again! 

If one were to even come close to marking the EU banks books to reality, market prices, or anything in between, the Lehman situation would look tame in compariosn!

As excerpted from the subscriber document: File Icon The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis

 

It Should Be Obvious To Many That The Risk Of Defaulting Sovereign Bonds Can Spark A European Banking Crisis

For Those Who Failed To Heed My Warnings On Portugal, Visualize The Contagion That Causes European Bank Failure!!!

Is Another Banking Crisis Inevitable? 

Bloomberg reports that Goldman Sachs Turns Bullish on Europe Banks as Debt Risk Eases.The report goes on to state:

The U.S. bank that makes the most revenue from trading advised investors to take an “overweight” position on banks, raising its previous “neutral” recommendation, according to a group of equity strategists led Peter Oppenheimer. Investors should pay for the trade by lowering holdings of consumer shares, he wrote.

“For financials the narrowing of sovereign spreads in peripheral eurozone, which our economists expect to continue, is a clear positive,” London-based Oppenheimer wrote in the report dated Feb. 3. “Banks are one of the least expensive sectors in the market and the trade-off between their growth prospects and earnings in the next few years looks especially attractive.”

Unfortunately, the risks of this particular trade were not articulated, and I feel that the risks are material. Far be it for me to disagree with the "U.S. bank that makes the most revenue from trading", but they have been wrong before - many times before. Reference Is It Now Common Knowledge That Goldman’s Investment Advice Sucks??? or Did Reggie Middleton, a Blogger at BoomBustBlog, Best Wall Streets Best of the Best? for more on this topic...

 

 

 

Banks NPAs to total loans

Source: IMF, Boombust research and analytics

 

Euro banks remain weak as compared to their US counterparts

 

Health of European banks is weaker when compared to US banks. European banks are highly leveraged compared to their US counterparts (11.1x versus 4.1x) and are undercapitalized with core capital ratio of 6.5x vs. 8.5x. Also, the profitability of European banks is lower with net interest margin of 1.2% compared with 3.3%. However, non-performing loans-to-total loans for European banks are slightly better off when compared to US with NPL/loans at 4.9% vs. 5.6%. Nonetheless, considering the backdrop of high exposure to sovereign debt in Euro peripheral countries, we could see substantial write-downs for Euro banks AFS and HTM portfolio, which would more than offsets the relative strength of loan portfolio.

 

EURO Stress Test Rebuffed, Again

 

The OECD working paper “The EU stress test and sovereign debt exposures” by Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Patrick Slovik rebuffs the EU stress test, as we have several times in the past. The argument in the white paper echoes BoomBustBlog view that accounting policies allows banks and financial institutions to mask their true economic health. An asset that has declined in value leads to economic loss irrespective of its classification as held-to-maturity or held-for-trading, but accounting policies allow banks to mark down only their trading portfolio to the current market value while leaving a large chunk of held-to-maturity at book value even if said asset loses 50% in value that would take years to recover, or the bank could be presented with the very distinct possibility that there may be no recovery of said value loss. The former event (of recovering back to book value) would mask the true economic picture at a given snap shot of time while the latter (no recovery) is more of time shifting distortion wherein current profits are inflated for future losses.

 

Coming back to the EU stress test, the paper contends that by focusing only on the trading book exposures, the EU stress test gave a rosy picture of banks true health.

 

•     Sovereign bond haircuts were applied only on the trading book holdings with implicit assumption that bonds held to maturity will receive 100 cents in the euro. This assumption severely understates the banks losses as 83% of banks investment portfolio is in banking books in form of held-to-maturity assets while only 17% of assets are held in trading portfolio. In case of sovereign default, the distinction between the banking book and the trading book simply disappears. By considering only a smaller component of banks investment books, EU stress tests have severely undermined the estimated write-downs on banks books and have given rosy picture about banks true health. The logic of said methodology is that with the EU/ECB/ EFSF SPV (basically, a giant new European CDO) backing, no sovereign state will be allowed to default.

 

•     Second, and more importantly, the market is not prepared to give a zero probability to debt restructurings beyond the period of the stress test and/or the period after which the role of the EFSF SPV comes to an end.

 

o   The assumption of no default over 2010-2012 appears reasonable given that the EFSF is made up of a €720bn lending facility (€220bn from the IMF; €60bn from the EU; and the SPV can build exposures for 3 years to the limit of €440bn for the 16 Euro area countries) which provides a guarantee of funding for any countries facing financing pressures, certainly for the next 3 years.

 

o   However, the concerns in the market beyond 2012 are: the longer-run fiscal sustainability problem; and the difficulty of achieving structural adjustments in labor and pension markets and ability to achieve a sustainable growth in a period of budget restraint. The fear is that this will not be resolved by the time the support packages run out, and hence the probability of restructuring may not be put at zero by portfolio managers. Angela Merkel has recently announced her willingness to spearhead several common nation reforms to put the EU block of nations on heterogeneous footing in regards to regulation, debt management etc. This will go a long way to solving the problem at hand, but will also put significant strain on several of the weaker nations, again exacerbating the probability for restructuring to bring said nations in line with their stronger counterparts.

 

Impact of bank’s banking books on haircuts

 

EU banking book sovereign exposures are about five times larger than trading book. The table below gives sovereign exposure of major European countries for both trading and banking book. The EU trading book has €335bn of exposure while banking book has €1.7t exposure towards sovereign defaults. EU stress test estimated total write-down’s of €26bn as it only considered banks trading portfolio. This equated to implied haircut of 7.9% on trading portfolio with losses equating to 2.4% of Tier 1 capital. However, if the same haircuts (7.9% weighted average haircut) are applied to banking book then the loss would amount to €153bn equating to 13.8% of Tier 1 capital.

 

 

We have also presented an alternative scenario since we believe that EU stress test had failed not only to include banks HTM books but also the loss estimates were highly optimistic, as has much of the economic and financial forecasting that has come from the EU. It is highly recommended that readers review Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! for a detailed view of a long pattern of unrealistically optimistic forecasting. Here's and example...

 

 

 

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Revisions-R-US!

 

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In an alternative scenario, we have assumed weighted average haircut of 10% (exposure, haircut assumptions and writedowns for individual countries are presented in detail in the tables below) and have applied writedowns on both banking and trading books with the results available in the subscription document File Icon The Inevitability of Another Bank Crisis? Individual and more explicit haircut calculations are available for the following nations for professional and institutional subscribers:

 

 

Interested readers can follow me on twitter and review our latest European opinion and analysis

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Published in BoomBustBlog

 Italy on the right track, IMF says: Wall Street Journal

  • Italy's economy continues to be based off of external demand, and that is important to maintain fiscal discipline (We may never hear Italy and fiscal discipline in the same sentence again)
  • IMF predicts that Italian unemployment rates will continue to rise, and that native banks will continue to see credit risk rise as loans are appearing to be less profitable.
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As for listening to theIMF in regards to Italy's prospects throught this crisis, let's look at how accurate they have been since the crisis began, courtesy of "Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!": For paid viewers and subscribers, reference our Italian Macro and Public Finance Research, which throws a much more realistic and unbiased light on things. 

Subscribers should also review as the truth about Greece rolls through the banking system: File Icon Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note

The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, to date (free to all)

  1. The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.
  2. What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect
  3. The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.
  4. The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries
  5. The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!
  6. The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???
  7. I Think It's Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall 
  8. Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!
  9. Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?
  10. "Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe", Prodi Says - I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! 
  11. Germany Finally Comes Out and Says, "We're Not Touching Greece" - Well, Sort of...
  12. The Greece and the Greek Banks Get the Word "First" Etched on the Side of Their Domino
  13. As I Warned Earlier, Latvian Government Collapses Exacerbating Financial Crisis
  14. Once You Catch a Few EU Countries "Stretching the Truth", Why Should You Trust the Rest?
  15. Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!
  16. Ovebanked, Underfunded, and Overly Optimistic: The New Face of Sovereign Europe
  17. Moody's Follows Suit Behind Our Analysis and Downgrades 4 Greek Banks
  18. The EU Has Rescued Greece From the Bond Vigilantes,,, April Fools!!!
  19. How BoomBustBlog Research Intersects with That of the IMF: Greece in the Spotlight
  20. Grecian News and its Relevance to My Analysis
  21. A Summary and Related Thoughts on the IMF's "Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis
  22. Greek Soap Opera Update: Back to the Bailout That Was Never Needed?

 Italy on the right track, IMF says: Wall Street Journal

  • Italy's economy continues to be based off of external demand, and that is important to maintain fiscal discipline (We may never hear Italy and fiscal discipline in the same sentence again)
  • IMF predicts that Italian unemployment rates will continue to rise, and that native banks will continue to see credit risk rise as loans are appearing to be less profitable.
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As for listening to theIMF in regards to Italy's prospects throught this crisis, let's look at how accurate they have been since the crisis began, courtesy of "Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!": For paid viewers and subscribers, reference our Italian Macro and Public Finance Research, which throws a much more realistic and unbiased light on things. 

Subscribers should also review as the truth about Greece rolls through the banking system: File Icon Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note

The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, to date (free to all)

  1. The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.
  2. What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect
  3. The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.
  4. The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries
  5. The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!
  6. The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???
  7. I Think It's Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall 
  8. Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!
  9. Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?
  10. "Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe", Prodi Says - I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! 
  11. Germany Finally Comes Out and Says, "We're Not Touching Greece" - Well, Sort of...
  12. The Greece and the Greek Banks Get the Word "First" Etched on the Side of Their Domino
  13. As I Warned Earlier, Latvian Government Collapses Exacerbating Financial Crisis
  14. Once You Catch a Few EU Countries "Stretching the Truth", Why Should You Trust the Rest?
  15. Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!
  16. Ovebanked, Underfunded, and Overly Optimistic: The New Face of Sovereign Europe
  17. Moody's Follows Suit Behind Our Analysis and Downgrades 4 Greek Banks
  18. The EU Has Rescued Greece From the Bond Vigilantes,,, April Fools!!!
  19. How BoomBustBlog Research Intersects with That of the IMF: Greece in the Spotlight
  20. Grecian News and its Relevance to My Analysis
  21. A Summary and Related Thoughts on the IMF's "Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis
  22. Greek Soap Opera Update: Back to the Bailout That Was Never Needed?

On March 26, EU endorsed the proposal of extending aid to Greece (in case it faces shortage of funds to meet the refinancing and new debt requirements) wherein each euro nation would provide loans to Greece at bend over market rates based on its stake in the European Central Bank. EU would provide more than half the loans and the IMF would provide the rest. The official estimates for the size of the planned assistance have not been disclosed since it would depend on Greece's actual need.  Erik Nielsen, Chief European Economist at GS, estimates Greece will need an 18-month package of as much as €25 billion, with the IMF providing about €10 billion of that. The French newspaper Le Figaro reports that German officials are estimating the total assistance of nearly €22 billion.

On March 26, EU endorsed the proposal of extending aid to Greece (in case it faces shortage of funds to meet the refinancing and new debt requirements) wherein each euro nation would provide loans to Greece at bend over market rates based on its stake in the European Central Bank. EU would provide more than half the loans and the IMF would provide the rest. The official estimates for the size of the planned assistance have not been disclosed since it would depend on Greece's actual need.  Erik Nielsen, Chief European Economist at GS, estimates Greece will need an 18-month package of as much as €25 billion, with the IMF providing about €10 billion of that. The French newspaper Le Figaro reports that German officials are estimating the total assistance of nearly €22 billion.

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