Wednesday, 23 April 2008 01:00

Ambac does it again

I apologize if I seem defensive or full of myself, but often when I
strike out with a contrarian opinion, I get a lot of negative feedback.
It often causes me to view things defensively. Case in point - Ambac.
When I first released my analysis on this company, quoting:

Ambac is Effectively Insolvent & Will See More than $8 Billion of Losses with Just a $2.26 Billion equity base

I came to this conclusion after a detailed
analysis of Ambac's portfolio (at least what Ambac has made public,
which was sufficient) covering exposure in the Structured Finance,
Sub-prime RMBS and the Consumer Finance business. Ambac's management
was forthcoming enough to publish a portion of their insured portfolio
which allowed me to review each structure.

I am short Ambac and MBIA (for whom I have also released research),
so be aware of my position as I present this opinion. I profit not
necessarily from whether ABK can continue as an ongoing concern (which
is in doubt and wouldn't hurt my shorts to say the least), nor from an
infusion of capital (whether it be debt or equity, either of which
would be a poor investment from my perspective) but from the
significant decline in value of the existing shares in which I have
taken a bearish position. To determine my short position, I calculated
relative nominal book valuations, actual economic book valuations and
produced standard financial forecasts. Of interest is the loss tail
analysis wherein I have estimated the present value of the future

Stating this company would suffer $8 billion of losses and was effectively insolvent was met with
derision, skepticism and other adjectives which I won't mention. Even the reader rating system showed a poor reception (I am aware that my writing style irks some, but hey - that's who I amTongue out). I recieved a lot of requests for substantiation of my assumptions, hence I released more info (remember, this is not a paid service and I am not an analyst - I am a private investor). I first took a bearish position on Ambac and MBIA in the $60 to $80 range. I published the research while they were in the mid $20 to $40 dollar range. Well, they are $5 and $11 respectively, and I expect them to fall further and eventually go out of business. It appears to me that Ambac is still effectively insolvent after their latest press release which shows a very big loss on operating earnings as well as the massive loss in net earnings which includes the mark to market controversial writedowns. If you read through the insurance section of the blog, you will see that I have written extensively on this top and these companies. Thier entire business model is moot. They are trying to underprice the market on risk, and no arbitrage trade works consistently forever since even if there was an inconsistency in pricing that these companies found, it would be compensated for over time by the market. Basically, there is no free lunch.

Interestingly enough, the Bear Stearns analysis recieved some derision in the other places it was published as well. I wonder... I believe that there are several other well known financial services companies that are effectively insolvent and will meet an ignominious end. Many of the negative comments I recieved stemmed from two major camps:

  1. The first was the "Our business is to complex and complicated for you, and outsider, to understand".
  2. The other camp was the "Look at all of these big, smart name brand investors who invested contrary to your opinion. You have no idea what you are talking about because we've never even heard of you"

Well, my responses to these were:

  1. If the business model is too complex for the average financial guy to understand, its probably too complex period. In addition, I did understand it - it was just a bad business model.
  2. I actually dedicated an entire post to the name brand thing. Big hedge funds, billionaire investors, and well known private equity funds have all contributed to my trading profits thanks to their buying into the companies that I have shorted, driving the price way above what it should be and allowing me to profitably short some more. See the post for those who are hooked on name brand investors.

I can go on, after all the folly of this company being rated AAA by 2 of the 3 major ratings agenies is a joke (see my cartoons), then their is the systemic CDS risk they pose to the rest of the financial system. These guys are going to cause a CDS domino effect that nobody is going to want to see. Even those short the CDS will not get paid when the other side of the deal can't pay up. How do we know who can pay up and who can't? We don't know because of the non-existent credit risk management that is in place. I urge you to revisit who's holding the $119 billion bag? Then there is the issue of nobody wanting to do business with these companies in the first place, forcing this "AAA" rated company into runoff. Honestly, read through this earnings announcement and consider that Moody's and S&P just reaffirmed its AAA status!

Well, let's see how Ambac has done this past quarter:

From Bloomberg:

Ambac Financial Group Inc., the bond insurer that
lost 93 percent of its stock market value in the past year, posted a wider loss
than analysts estimated after $3.1 billion in charges for subprime-mortgage

The first-quarter net loss was $1.66 billion,
or $11.69 a share, New York-based Ambac said today in a statement. The company's
operating loss of $6.93 a share was more than three times the $1.82 estimated by
six analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.

Ambac fell as much as 22 percent in early New York Stock Exchange trading as new business slumped 87 percent after
states and municipalities shunned its insurance and the market for mortgage
securities dried up. Ambac, the second-largest bond insurer, increased by more
than half its estimate of the claims it will need to pay on home-loan debt by $2

This ``could send a negative ripple effect through the market,'' said Wayne Schmidt, senior portfolio manager at AXA Investment
Management in Minneapolis, which has about $14 billion in assets under
management. ``It sends a message that we're not out of the woods yet.''

Ambac fell to as low as $4.70 in early trading after closing at $6.03
yesterday. Armonk, New York-based MBIA Inc., the world's largest bond insurer, was down about 10

``The housing market crisis continues to disrupt the global credit markets
and our credit derivatives and direct mortgage portfolios were severely impacted
once again,'' Ambac interim Chief Executive Officer Michael Callen said in the statement.

Published in BoomBustBlog

In my last AGO update in mid-March , I commented on how XL was one of the more likely bear candidates in the insurance space, that has gone relatively unnoticed. Well, it has just released the earnings performance that I expected, below the consensus estimates, of course. It should gap down at the market open tomorrow with a 57% drop in first-quarter net income after the insurance and reinsurance company was hit by lower returns from some of its hedge fund investments.

Underwriting income is down (this is the soft portion of the P&C business and premium cycle), investment income is down (hard investment climate), underwriting profit is down (taking losses) with a very high combined (loss plus expenses and loss adjustment expenses) ratio, realized losses were significant, and unrealized losses were historically massive as writedowns shook the corporate and structured credit product inventories.

RTT News:

XL Capital Ltd (XL) reported a decrease in its first quarter earnings, hurt primarily by decrease in income from investment affiliates and losses on investments. Both earnings per share and revenues for the quarter came in below the consensus.

For the quarter, earnings were $244.4 million, down from $562.5 million last year. Net income available to ordinary shareholders for the quarter was $211.9 million, or $1.20 per share, down from $549.7 million, or $3.06 per share, in the same quarter last year.

The company attributed the fall in earnings to a decrease in net income from investment affiliates of $107.1 million, net realized losses on investments of $102.3 million, compared to a gain of $9.3 million in the prior year quarter, a decrease in underwriting profit from Property and Casualty operations of $52.4 million, an increase in foreign exchange losses of $44.2 million, and a decrease in net income from financial operating affiliates of $39.6 million.

Net income, excluding net realized gains and losses, for the quarter was $276.9 million, or $1.57 per ordinary share, lower than $540.0 million, or $3.01 per ordinary share, in the prior year quarter. Analysts estimated earnings of $2.24 per share for the quarter.

Quarterly revenues were $2.2 billion, down from $2.5 billion in the same quarter last year, while analysts estimated revenues of $2.3 billion for the quarter.

Net premiums earned for the quarter from Property and Casualty operations fell 2.9% to $1.6 billion, while life operations grew 8.6% to $159.6 million.

Combined ratio for the quarter was 93.6%, compared to 90.2% last year.

XL Capital closed Tuesday's regular trading session at $30.04, down $0.39 or 1.28%. In the after hours trading, the company's shares are trading at $27.50, down $2.54 or 8.46%.

Published in BoomBustBlog
Saturday, 19 April 2008 01:00

It ain't over...

From Fitch's latest report :

As the U.S. housing crisis continued to deepen in 2007, Fitch’s global
structured finance rating actions took a decidedly negative turn, driven
overwhelmingly by the unprecedented credit deterioration in the U.S.
subprime mortgage sector. By year’s end, U.S. subprime-related
downgrades affected 3,529 tranches, or 77% of the year’s 4,570 global
structured finance downgrades. Total downgrades readily topped upgrades
of 1,790, the first year in recent history to see such a trend in structured
finance. However, the nonmortgage ABS and CMBS sectors reported
more upgrades than downgrades in 2007.

The subprime mortgage sector downturn also pushed up the global
structured finance default rate in 2007 to 1.19% from 0.37% in 2006. The
average annual global structured finance default rate over the 17-year
period ending in 2007 subsequently moved up to 0.77% from 0.68% in

In reviewing 2007 global structured finance rating
activity, it is important to note that credit quality
continued to deteriorate in the subprime mortgage
and CDO sectors in early 2008, resulting in
additional and significant negative rating migration.

• Fitch’s global structured finance rating activity
turned net negative in 2007, with downgrades at
least 2.5 times more frequent than upgrades and
a record 14% of structured finance tranches
experiencing negative rating actions over the
course of the year, compared with 6%
experiencing positive rating actions. This
produced an upgrade-to-downgrade ratio of 0.39
to one in 2007, a stark contrast to the 4.54 to one
ratio reported in 2006.
• Despite weak performance in the U.S. subprime
mortgage securitization and CDO sectors, 80%
of global structured finance ratings remained the
same in 2007. However, this is down from an
85% stability rate in 2006.

Published in BoomBustBlog

I just found this post I made in February. Quite prescient, in retrospect.

I know who's holding the $119 billion dollar bag!

Published in BoomBustBlog

Here we go. It is amazing that the investment banks have rallied, particularly considering that most of them rely heavily on MBIA and Ambac as counterparties. Here is nearly all of the MBIA holdings of Morgan Stanley (many billions of dollars worth), recently downgraded: icon Morgan Stanley_final_040408 (1.38 MB) . A comprehensive forensic deep dive, economic analysis and update of Morgan Stanely will be following shortly. Stay tuned...

  • Fitch Ratings cut MBIA Inc.'s insurance rating to AA from AAA: bond insurer short of $3.8bn capital to warrant the top ranking. Outlook negative.
  • BIS: Monoliners have written roughly $450bn of super-senior protection on CDOs in the form of CDS contracts. About $125bn of these reference ABS CDOs. Counterparties to these trades are large banks, securities firms or off-balance sheet vehicles like ABCP conduits/SIVs.
  • Fitch: As of July 2007: Industry gross insured portfolio = $2.5trillion; industry shareholder equity = $24.5bn (=leverage ratio of 100x)
  • The industry guarantees $1.2trillion municipal bonds and around $800-900bn in structured finance products. CDS portfolio is $463bn (net seller). $287bn (or 61%) of CDS written on corporate bonds; 14% on RMBS.S&P: Banks hedge about $125bn of CDOs with monoliners (senior, super-senior tranches)
  • FT Alphaville: Fitch downgrades SCA monoline bond guarantor rating from AAA to junk--> needs around $5bn to regain AAA rating. FGIC downgraded again also by S&P--> April 3: FGIC given 30 days by regulator to raise new capital to avoid worst-case scenario.
  • Tett: Some Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) member banks want to offer their AAA rating to municipal infrastructure projects. However, FHLB role is already being expanded for mortgage purchases and their capital is stretched already.
  • Fahey/Scott: Exposures to financial guarantors arise from:
    - CDS counterparty exposure associated with CDO, CMBS, RMBS, other ABS and corporate bond hedges;
    - Trading inventories of equity or debt of guarantors;
    - 'Wrapped' securities held in trading or investment portfolios;
    - Muni bonds wrapped in association with Tender Option Bonds (TOB) and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (VRDO) programs [i.e. off-balance sheet entitites with liquidity backstop lines]
    - Loss protection for conduits;
    - Potential support for money funds containing enhanced securities.
  • Davies: Additional risk: unwinding of negative basis trades: difference between higher bond yield and lower cost to insure (with monoliners) that same bond (usually due to oversupply of CDS)--> buying both gives positive and risk-free return usually above Treasuries.
  • Oppenheimer: Banks may write down $70bn if major monolines lose AAA
  • Egan Jones: Bond Insurers Need $200 Billion to Retain AAA
For anybody who is interested, I am making available info on several other institutions with downgraded MBIA insured inventory. This is no trivial occurrence, and in my opinion it was long overdue (for those of you who don't remember, reference my Super Scary Halloween Tale of 104 Basis Points). Below are the results of my proprietary research on broker/bank direct Ambac and MBIA counterparty exposure. This is the link to Fitch's analysis of the same (requires free registration).
icon CFC ABS Inventory (these guys were just downgraded themselves, hat tip to Paul)
Published in BoomBustBlog

Of all the major ratings agencies, only Fitch has demonstrated the balls (and the honesty) to do what we all knew should have been done a long time ago. Read on from

Fitch Ratings cut MBIA Inc.'s insurance unit to AA from AAA, saying the bond insurer no longer has enough capital to warrant the top ranking. MBIA, the world's largest financial guarantor, would need as much as $3.8 billion more in capital to deserve an AAA, New York-based Fitch said today in a report. The outlook is negative, Fitch said. Fitch issued the new, lower rating even though Armonk, New York-based MBIA asked the ratings company last month to stop assessing its credit worthiness. The two companies disagree over how much capital MBIA needs to absorb losses on the bonds it insures. Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's both affirmed their AAA ratings earlier this year. ``It will be difficult for MBIA to stabilize its credit trend until the company can more effectively limit the downside risk'' from collateralized debt obligations, Fitch said. The long-term rating of MBIA Inc. was cut to A from AA, Fitch said. ``We respectfully disagree with Fitch's conclusions,'' MBIA Chief Financial Officer Chuck Chaplin said today in a statement. ``MBIA has a balance sheet that is among the strongest in the industry with over $17 billion in claims-paying resources, and has a high quality insured portfolio.''

... The capital MBIA raised has yet to be contributed to its insurance company and could be diverted to meet obligations at the holding company, Fitch said in its report. MBIA's holding company engages in transactions that may require it to post collateral, creating a rising demand for cash, Fitch said.

MBIA's suspension of its structured finance business, which includes CDOs and asset-backed securities, may help to boost the company's rating back to AAA in the future, Fitch said today.

MBIA will have losses on CDOs backed by subprime mortgages of as much as $4.9 billion after taking into account that they will be paid over time, Fitch said.

The analysis assumes that subprime mortgages backing securities sold in 2006 will experience losses of 21 percent and those originated in 2007 will lose 26 percent, Fitch said. Subprime mortgages are given to borrowers with poor credit.

Published in BoomBustBlog

From More monoline trouble looms

Welcome back the spectre of the monoline downgrade.

And we have a new milestone. SCA became the first of the AAA-badged bond insurers to have its rating slashed to below investment grade. ACA, which succumbed to junk status some months ago, was never rated top notch to start with.

Fitch, of course, was the one doing the downgrading. It cut the financial-strength rating of SCA’s subsidiary XLCA from A to BB, citing an updated assessment of the company’s capital position as well as the “material erosion in SCA’s franchise value and competitive business position.”

The agency now expected losses on SCA’s subprime CDOs to fall between $3bn and $4bn, compared to the company’s resources to cover losses of $4.2bn at the turn of the year. The company, which suspended the writing of new business earlier this month, has said it won’t resume normal operations until it has regained a rating of at least AA, and preferably AAA.

But the signs are not good. Fitch reckons that the insurer would need to raise as much as $5.9bn to regain a triple-A badge.

SCA was swiftly joined in the downgrade camp by FGIC, cut to BBB by Fitch from AA. It is short of between $5.1bn and $5.3bn in capital, compared to levels required for an AAA rating. The insurer has ceased writing new business, as it fights to bring its capital levels back above the regulatory minimum under New York insurance law.

The return of monoline woes may be bad news for Merrill, which has previously taken a sizeable hit from the downgrade of ACA. A legal spat which kicked off between the bank and XLCA last week raises the prospect of further writedowns on exposure to CDOs, after CDS contracts were terminated by XLCA.

Here, courtesy of Bank of America, is a ready-reckoner to remind us of the various monoline woes (though not yet updated for Fitch’s latest on FGIC).

Published in BoomBustBlog
Saturday, 22 March 2008 01:00

Reggie Middleton on Assured Guaranty

This is the result of my research on Assured Guaranty (AGO). Since it is rather extensive, I will only post the industry and company highlights in HTML. The full version has valuation, mark to market losses, peer group comparisons, pro formas, etc. Technically this is still a draft/release candidate, but I will release it to the public domain (registered blog members) anyway. Beware, it is (as is everything else) a work in progress and subject to change. You can download it here:

icon Assured Guaranty_Consolidated (796.13 kB 2008-03-21 12:12:42) or continue on for the industry overview.


AGO remains vulnerable to continued bond market troubles

Assured Guaranty (AGO) has until now fared better than its peers in credit and capital markets owing to a significant cushion that it has in the form of a relatively higher share of superior grade investments in its insured portfolio. While stocks of other bond insurers, specifically Ambac, MBIA and Security Capital Assurance, have fallen sharply over the last few months, AGO has sailed successfully through the rough waters with its stock performance hardly bearing the brunt of the current turmoil in the bond insurance market. This has been primarily on the back of the favorable ratings AGO has till now enjoyed from various credit agencies. However, despite AGO's strong fundamentals the debacle in the credit market could seriously impact its financial position, causing rise in default losses and mark-to-market write-downs of its portfolio. The rating agencies, which have so far maintained triple-A ratings on AGO and have been under constant pressure to review all bond insurers' ratings, are likely to start considering a rating downgrade in view of projected losses from defaults. Any downgrade of AGO rating will seriously impact its advantageous position over other bond insurers and make it more competitive for the Company to insure new offerings.

I.1. Investment concerns

o Destabilizing US bond insurance industry. Having been hit hard by the unfolding debacle in subprime mortgage debt, the bond insurance industry is witnessing large-scale losses and rating downgrades. Large insurers like MBIA and Ambac which are striving to maintain their triple-A ratings are trading at 6.5% and 15.1%, respectively, to their last 12 month high. FSA and AGO are the only insurers which have managed to retain top ratings right through the debacle. While a large number of market participants are contemplating a further downgrade of ratings (including for AGO and FSA) in view of current gridlock in the credit markets, many of them are also projecting a rise in the global speculative-grade default rate which was at the lowest level at 0.7% in February 2008 in the last 12 years.

o Credit ratings likely to be a case for question. Credit agencies including S&P, Moody's and Fitch have maintained triple-A rating on AGO all this while, injecting a lot of confidence in the investors, but questions are being increasingly raised on the authenticity and justification of credit agencies' ratings in view of the subprime and credit market meltdowns. Ambac and MBIA commanded triple-A ratings until huge losses on their portfolio surfaced and their stocks lost over 80% of their value. Recently, while S&P reaffirmed an AAA rating for these two stocks, Fitch downgraded Ambac to AA and is considering downgrading MBIA. In addition, the fact that AGO also assigns internal rating to its portfolio raises a lot of doubts over possible revision amid a likely increase in default rates off worsening credit conditions.

o Increasingly challenging environment to retain triple-A ratings. Bond insurers including AGO are under constant pressure to maintain triple-A ratings to ensure that their ability to guaranty new issues does not deteriorate. With an estimated $250 billion of subprime mortgage write-downs still projected to be in the pipeline and bond insurers like Ambac and MBIA having already eroded a substantial portion of their capital, it is going to be extremely hard for them to retain the top ratings. Rating agencies are also under constant pressure to review their ratings amid rising concerns that the cushion the bond insurers have against possible (and rising) defaults is inconsistent with triple-A ratings. AGO, which has a relatively higher exposure to investment-grade securities, is likely to bear the brunt of losses and face a possible revision in its top-rating. While this may impact AGO's ability to insure new bond issues, it may also endanger the additional $750 mn financing arrangement from Wilbur Ross, which is contingent upon maintenance of triple-A rating by the Company.

o Stress on municipal bonds. Mounting fears of US recession led by weakening macro-economic fundamentals have raised concerns over a rise in defaults on municipal bonds. With conditions in the US residential and commercial sector continuing to worsen, municipal authorities face a difficult task of achieving their tax receipt targets which could in turn lead to increased budget deficits. California's deficit, for instance, had already ballooned to $16 bn in February 2008 from $14.5 bn in January 2008 off reduced tax collections caused by falling housing prices. Lowering employment levels (as evidenced by the biggest layoffs in five years of about 63,000 jobs in February 2008), fast declining capital expenditure and decelerating industrial output are adding to the woes.{mospagebreak}

o Escalating mark-to-market losses on CDO/CDS. Widening credit spreads in the fast deteriorating credit markets have resulted in large scale write-down in value of RMBS and other underlying securities. The US housing and mortgage sectors have hardly shown any positive response to Fed's aggressive rate cuts in the recent months to ease panic liquidity conditions stemming from uncertainty over the future of the US economy. The falling values of the underlying RMBS and CMBS are putting serious downward pressure on CDO/CDS that AGO underwrites impacting the Company's bottom-line. AGO reported mark-to-market losses of $221 mn and $411 mn in 3Q07 and 4Q07, respectively, resulting in negative earnings of $115 mn and $260 mn in these periods. AGO's mark-to-market write-downs are likely to be equally significant in 2008 and 2009 since the macro economic indicators have not demonstrated any recovery amid a growing probability of recession, which could result in further widening of credit spreads. As a result, we expect AGO to report $598 mn and $469 mn mark-to-market losses on CDS exposure in 2008 and 2009, respectively.

Published in BoomBustBlog

From the WSJ:

Stocks were unable to
hold onto Tuesday’s 400-plus point rally in the Dow industrials and
attendant rallies in other indexes, and steadily marched lower through
the afternoon, until news of a lawsuit filed by Merrill Lynch against a
unit of bond insurer Security Capital Assurance, alleging the company
is trying to avoid obligations of up to $3.1 billion under seven credit default swaps.
Merrill’s own CDS widened on the news, moving to 250 basis points from
210 basis points, according to Phoenix Partners Group, and the stock
market dove, with the Dow giving back a good lot of the previous day’s
massive rally.

I stated several
times in the comments that the CDS market may very well lead us into
the next serious leg down. Many of the guys who wrote these either
don't have the cash to pay up or are wrapped up in hedges using CDS
which will easily get @#$@ed up once one leg of the hedge falls.

Published in BoomBustBlog

My blog has been quite popular as of late,
most likely because it may appear to some that I have a crystal ball.
My last 5 or so warnings have resulted in 50 point or so price drops in
the shares of the companies in questions. Let me be both modest and
honest. I am not that smart and do not have a crystal ball. There is a
simple premise behind all of this that allows me to understand what is
going on, but this premise does not get any press play and is not
harped on by the analyst community. Many major players in our financial system are simply insolvent.
Plain and simple. The liquidity issues that you see are simply a result
of that insolvency, not a cause. When you lever up on assets at the top
of a bubble and that bubble pops, you become insolvent, delevered or
not. If forced to delever, the balance sheet insolvency now becomes an
income statement insolvency as the cash outflow outstrips the cash
inflows, but it all stems from the original balance sheet insolvency -
not the other way around.

Borrowing more money, no matter what the
terms, will not aide you in your dilemma. That is, of course, unless
you can borrow large amounts of that money quickly on non-recourse
terms. But that is not really borrowing money, it is someone giving you
money with the option to pay it back.
It is the equivalent of a straight bailout, isn't it? That is what just
happened last weekend, which leads me to the next paragraph...

I have been alleging that many investment banks, monoline insurers, home builders and commercial banks are effectively insolvent. Nouriel Roubinin wrote an accurate piece on the topic.
Between that and the the five or six major analytical pieces that I put
together, I believe a pattern emerges (please take note of the dates
the pieces were written and the share prices at the time of the post).
I believe the pattern is indisputable. You could have made a fortune on
the short side of these analyses, and you could have lost a fortune on
the long side, just ask the employess and shareholders of Bear Stearns,
Ambac, MBIA, Lennar, etc. My condolences go out to the rank and file
employees of all of these companies whose savings have been lost in the
share price devalution. Hopefully, there is a lesson to be learned

More on Insurers and Insurance

More on Commercial Real Estate

More on Residential Real Estate

More on Investment Banks

As you can see, the path was not impossible to determine as
practically all of these companies shared the same catalyst to their
downfall - excessive leverage at the top of an asset and credit cycle
bubble. Now, the Fed is attempting to lend directly to institutions
that it has no jursidiction over. If I am not mistaken, the Fed's
balance sheet is only good for $400 billion dollars or so. There are a
lot of potential "runs on the non-bank" coming down the pike, enought
to drain the coffers. This is an ingenious, albeit very risky endeavor.
Moral hazard abounds. I know the Fed believes that they have nixed the
moral hazard argument in the butt by wiping out the Bear Stearns
shareholders, but this is an imperfect argument. The shareholders have
to approve this $2 buyout deal, and $2 is low enough to risk a battle
with the Fed and their agents. This is a major flaw in the plan that I
see as coming back to bite the markets. If this happens when the next
shoe drops, I can see the Fed getting overwhelmed.

As an investor and analytical pundit, I will be looking for the next
shoe to drop, which I believe I have found. I will keep you posted.

Published in BoomBustBlog