How many of those Greek, Portuguese, Irish and Spanish bondholders have factored the near guaranteed "additional" haircut (/scalping) they will receive having to stand behind the IMF in the event of a (probably guaranteed) default or restructuring? Do you think the investors of European banks (that includes central banks) that are holding/and currently still buying a boat load of these bonds have factored this into their valuations?

The IMF, like many other international institutions, asserts that it has a "preferred creditor status", and this has been a practiced convention in the past. Thus, IMF has de facto seniority rights over private creditors despite the fact that there is no legal or treaty-based foundation to support this claim and this seniority of rights for IMF will continue under the recent EU rescue plan announced as well as it has not been noted otherwise implicitly nor explicitly. This is the reason why Sarkozy said it is a said day when the EU has to accept a bailout from the IMF (aka, the US). The EU now, and truly, contains a significant parcel of debtor nations.

To add fuel to this global macro tabloidal fire, the Euro members’ loan will be pari passu with existing sovereign debt i.e. it will not be considered senior. Although there is no written, hard evidence to support this claim, it is our view that otherwise there will be no incentive for investors to hold the debt of troubled countries like Greece, which will ultimately defeat the whole purpose of the rescue package. Moreover, there are indications that support this idea. As per Dutch Finance Minister Jan Kees de Jager, “We are not talking about a special preference for the eurogroup loans, that’s not possible because then you would have the situation that already-existing rights of creditors at the moment would be harmed.” (reference http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-16/netherlands-excludes-senior-status-for-greek-aid-update1-.html). Of course, if more investors did their homework and ran the numbers, that same disincentive can be said to exist with the IMF's super senior preference given the event of a default and recoverable collateral after the IMF has fed at the trough.

The ramifications:

IMF’s preferred creditor status coupled with the expensive Euro members’ loans which are part of the rescue package can create a public debt snowball effect that could push the troubled countries towards insolvency when the IMF debt becomes repayable in three years time. This could be seen particularly in case of Greece (subscribers, please reference Greece Public Finances Projections). Even if all the spending cuts and revenue raising are achieved as planned for Greece, its debt will peak to 149.1% of the GDP in 2013. Please keep in mind that these numbers are based on what we perceived (as does simple math) to be pie in the sky optimism. I urge all readers to reference Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!.

Published in BoomBustBlog

 Italy on the right track, IMF says: Wall Street Journal

  • Italy's economy continues to be based off of external demand, and that is important to maintain fiscal discipline (We may never hear Italy and fiscal discipline in the same sentence again)
  • IMF predicts that Italian unemployment rates will continue to rise, and that native banks will continue to see credit risk rise as loans are appearing to be less profitable.
italian_real_gdp.png
optmisitic_italy.jpg
As for listening to theIMF in regards to Italy's prospects throught this crisis, let's look at how accurate they have been since the crisis began, courtesy of "Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!": For paid viewers and subscribers, reference our Italian Macro and Public Finance Research, which throws a much more realistic and unbiased light on things. 

Subscribers should also review as the truth about Greece rolls through the banking system: File Icon Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note

The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, to date (free to all)

  1. The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.
  2. What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect
  3. The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.
  4. The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries
  5. The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!
  6. The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???
  7. I Think It's Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall 
  8. Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!
  9. Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?
  10. "Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe", Prodi Says - I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! 
  11. Germany Finally Comes Out and Says, "We're Not Touching Greece" - Well, Sort of...
  12. The Greece and the Greek Banks Get the Word "First" Etched on the Side of Their Domino
  13. As I Warned Earlier, Latvian Government Collapses Exacerbating Financial Crisis
  14. Once You Catch a Few EU Countries "Stretching the Truth", Why Should You Trust the Rest?
  15. Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!
  16. Ovebanked, Underfunded, and Overly Optimistic: The New Face of Sovereign Europe
  17. Moody's Follows Suit Behind Our Analysis and Downgrades 4 Greek Banks
  18. The EU Has Rescued Greece From the Bond Vigilantes,,, April Fools!!!
  19. How BoomBustBlog Research Intersects with That of the IMF: Greece in the Spotlight
  20. Grecian News and its Relevance to My Analysis
  21. A Summary and Related Thoughts on the IMF's "Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis
  22. Greek Soap Opera Update: Back to the Bailout That Was Never Needed?

 Italy on the right track, IMF says: Wall Street Journal

  • Italy's economy continues to be based off of external demand, and that is important to maintain fiscal discipline (We may never hear Italy and fiscal discipline in the same sentence again)
  • IMF predicts that Italian unemployment rates will continue to rise, and that native banks will continue to see credit risk rise as loans are appearing to be less profitable.
italian_real_gdp.png
optmisitic_italy.jpg
As for listening to theIMF in regards to Italy's prospects throught this crisis, let's look at how accurate they have been since the crisis began, courtesy of "Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!": For paid viewers and subscribers, reference our Italian Macro and Public Finance Research, which throws a much more realistic and unbiased light on things. 

Subscribers should also review as the truth about Greece rolls through the banking system: File Icon Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note

The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, to date (free to all)

  1. The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.
  2. What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect
  3. The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.
  4. The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries
  5. The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!
  6. The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???
  7. I Think It's Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall 
  8. Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!
  9. Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?
  10. "Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe", Prodi Says - I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! 
  11. Germany Finally Comes Out and Says, "We're Not Touching Greece" - Well, Sort of...
  12. The Greece and the Greek Banks Get the Word "First" Etched on the Side of Their Domino
  13. As I Warned Earlier, Latvian Government Collapses Exacerbating Financial Crisis
  14. Once You Catch a Few EU Countries "Stretching the Truth", Why Should You Trust the Rest?
  15. Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!
  16. Ovebanked, Underfunded, and Overly Optimistic: The New Face of Sovereign Europe
  17. Moody's Follows Suit Behind Our Analysis and Downgrades 4 Greek Banks
  18. The EU Has Rescued Greece From the Bond Vigilantes,,, April Fools!!!
  19. How BoomBustBlog Research Intersects with That of the IMF: Greece in the Spotlight
  20. Grecian News and its Relevance to My Analysis
  21. A Summary and Related Thoughts on the IMF's "Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis
  22. Greek Soap Opera Update: Back to the Bailout That Was Never Needed?

The IMF has recently released a white paper labeled "Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis World". Here's a synopsis:

Introduction:

  • The fiscal state of the developed world is facing the question of solvency for the first time since WWII, and this time demographic trends are incredibly unfavorable.  See  Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! for explicit evidence.
  • Current fiscal models for the developed world see fiscal tightening starting in 2011 [in 8 months governments are going to start tightening liabilities? Possible, but I wouldn't hold my breath for this one]
  • The only G-7 economy with debt projected at <85% of GDP is Canada [True, but is that because it is temporally behind the curve? See Easter Weekend News Update:
    • Canadian Dollar Too Strong? Bloomberg.com:

    • Minority opposition in Canadian Parliament is growing over strengthening Loonie
    • Leaders fear fallout in exports from CAD nearly at parity with USD
    • CAD strength is directly tied to Chinese commodity demand (is the CAD bubblicious, too?)
  • Debts in emerging markets are beginning to look safer as they pare down stimulus packages plus old debt.

Potential Exit Strategies:

  • Inflating (debasing) one's own currency to pay off debt is too dangerous on a social level to be seriously considered, especially for emerging markets
  • Over the past three decades, the most successful method of managing debt and securing social safety has been to expand the primary balance surplus
Reference What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect

Click to enlarge... 

italy_-_ireland.png
  • Currently, the biggest step toward renewing primary surpluses in the developed world would be to phase out entitlement/pension funding or drastically modify payout schemes
 [But who really knows where all of the bodies are buried? Reference Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!

The French 

In 1997, the French government received an upfront payment of £4.7 billion ($7.1 billion) for assuming the pension liabilities for France Telecom workers in return. This quick cash injection helped bring down France's deficit, helping the country to meet the pre-condition to join the Euro zone. You may reference the pdfLaurent_Paul_and Christophe_Schalck_study for a background on the deal. I don't necessarily concur with their conclusions, but it does provide some info  france_telecomm_transaction.png

For the record and according to the doc referenced above, according to the State balance sheet for 2006, total pension liabilities of civil servants have been estimated at 941 billion €, i.e. 53% of annual GDP in France.  An attempt to reform all special schemes in 1995 collapsed because of severe strikes on the railways. Sounds awfully Hellenic in nature, doesn't it??? I, for one, believe that Greece is getting a bad rap, and not becaue it is being falsely accused but because it is just a lot sloppier at covering up its shenanigans than its European neighbors.

Now, back to France. A transaction similar to the France Telecomm deal took place in 2006 with La Poste which still employs 200,000 civil servants, but is now facing the same evolution as France Telecom in 1997. But an important difference with France Telecom is the obvious insufficiency of the lump sum paid by the postal company (2 billion €) compared to the amount of pension liabilities transferred (70 billion € at the end of 2006).
  • Almost 1/5 of public spending stabilization could come without affecting public investment, and simply cutting wage and transfer payments
  • The IMF recommends setting up government institutions to enforce budget restrictions (the ridiculousness of one government entity stopping a handful of spendthrift entities is mind boggling)

Global Adjustments:

  • Emerging markets that have opted to inflate away debt have seen interest rates skyrocket for years, while other who opted to adjust the primary balance deficit have seen interest rates fall
  • The average G-20 nation will need to adjust its balance sheet 8.8% by the end of the decade to reach public debt targets [RIIIGHT!!!! Like the Maastricht Treaty which, after 18 years has been respected by exactly 0.000000% of its members, all of whom are well below the 3% debt to GDP threshold by about an average of negative 300%!!!!]
  • Over the past 30 years, Greece has made a "large fiscal adjustment" once (1995), where they had more success generating new revenue, andbarely managed to cut expenditures. Greece's inability to make any sort of cuts to preserve fiscal responsibility is going to embarrass the cheerleaders looking to save Europe without lifting a finger. Spanish and Italian efforts have yielded similar results

Long Term Growth:

  • Over the previous 15 years, a clear inverse relationship has developed between debt ratios and real GDP growth
  • Evidence on whether adjustments should be upfront (shock therapy 1990's) or gradual is inconclusive according to IMF staff
  • One of the easier methods of reducing public expenditures is to tighten and reform pension policy (the days of mandatory retirements, backloaded payouts based on final five years average salary, etc, are numbered)
  • Countries with higher domestic debt ownership are more likely to honor debt and have higher debt tolerances among citizenry (i.e. Japanese JGB hoarding vs. USA tea parties)

Conclusion:

            The IMF has an incredible data set to work with yet somehow continues to see a picture far rosier than what meets the eye.  The impacts of measures to manage sovereign debt loads seemed to be futile in the medium-long term.  The situation we currently see is similar to the 1950's in data only.  The demographic makeup of the world today (particularly in Europe) is one that is aging, dependent on entitlement programs, and underfunded pensions that are seeing falling/no incoming revenue.  This is a clear contradiction to the call for managing or reducing entitlement and wage expenditures at the government level (globally), and is a sign that fears over a global sovereign default among advanced economies is a legitimate threat over the next decade.

Related Subscriber Content:

  1. Spain public finances projections_033010 (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  2. UK Public Finances March 2010 (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  3. Italy public finances projection (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  4. Greece Public Finances Projections (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  5. Banks exposed to Central and Eastern Europe (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  6. Greek Banking Fundamental Tear Sheet (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  7. Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  8. Spanish Banking Macro Discussion Note (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  9. China Macro Discussion 2-4-10 (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)

 The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, to date (free to all)

1.     The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.

2.     What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect

3.     The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.

4.     The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries

5.     The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!

6.     The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???

7.     I Think It's Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall 

8.     Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!

9.     Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?

10.   "Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe", Prodi Says - I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! 

11.   Germany Finally Comes Out and Says, "We're Not Touching Greece" - Well, Sort of...

12.   The Greece and the Greek Banks Get the Word "First" Etched on the Side of Their Domino

13.   As I Warned Earlier, Latvian Government Collapses Exacerbating Financial Crisis

14.   Once You Catch a Few EU Countries "Stretching the Truth", Why Should You Trust the Rest?

15.   Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!

16.   Ovebanked, Underfunded, and Overly Optimistic: The New Face of Sovereign Europe

17.   Moody's Follows Suit Behind Our Analysis and Downgrades 4 Greek Banks

 

 

The EU Has Rescued Greece From the Bond Vigilantes,,, April Fools!!!

How BoomBustBlog Research Intersects with That of the IMF: Greece in the Spotlight

Grecian News and its Relevance to My Analysis

The IMF has recently released a white paper labeled "Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis World". Here's a synopsis:

Introduction:

  • The fiscal state of the developed world is facing the question of solvency for the first time since WWII, and this time demographic trends are incredibly unfavorable.  See  Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! for explicit evidence.
  • Current fiscal models for the developed world see fiscal tightening starting in 2011 [in 8 months governments are going to start tightening liabilities? Possible, but I wouldn't hold my breath for this one]
  • The only G-7 economy with debt projected at <85% of GDP is Canada [True, but is that because it is temporally behind the curve? See Easter Weekend News Update:
    • Canadian Dollar Too Strong? Bloomberg.com:

    • Minority opposition in Canadian Parliament is growing over strengthening Loonie
    • Leaders fear fallout in exports from CAD nearly at parity with USD
    • CAD strength is directly tied to Chinese commodity demand (is the CAD bubblicious, too?)
  • Debts in emerging markets are beginning to look safer as they pare down stimulus packages plus old debt.

Potential Exit Strategies:

  • Inflating (debasing) one's own currency to pay off debt is too dangerous on a social level to be seriously considered, especially for emerging markets
  • Over the past three decades, the most successful method of managing debt and securing social safety has been to expand the primary balance surplus
Reference What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect

Click to enlarge... 

italy_-_ireland.png
  • Currently, the biggest step toward renewing primary surpluses in the developed world would be to phase out entitlement/pension funding or drastically modify payout schemes
 [But who really knows where all of the bodies are buried? Reference Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!

The French 

In 1997, the French government received an upfront payment of £4.7 billion ($7.1 billion) for assuming the pension liabilities for France Telecom workers in return. This quick cash injection helped bring down France's deficit, helping the country to meet the pre-condition to join the Euro zone. You may reference the pdfLaurent_Paul_and Christophe_Schalck_study for a background on the deal. I don't necessarily concur with their conclusions, but it does provide some info  france_telecomm_transaction.png

For the record and according to the doc referenced above, according to the State balance sheet for 2006, total pension liabilities of civil servants have been estimated at 941 billion €, i.e. 53% of annual GDP in France.  An attempt to reform all special schemes in 1995 collapsed because of severe strikes on the railways. Sounds awfully Hellenic in nature, doesn't it??? I, for one, believe that Greece is getting a bad rap, and not becaue it is being falsely accused but because it is just a lot sloppier at covering up its shenanigans than its European neighbors.

Now, back to France. A transaction similar to the France Telecomm deal took place in 2006 with La Poste which still employs 200,000 civil servants, but is now facing the same evolution as France Telecom in 1997. But an important difference with France Telecom is the obvious insufficiency of the lump sum paid by the postal company (2 billion €) compared to the amount of pension liabilities transferred (70 billion € at the end of 2006).
  • Almost 1/5 of public spending stabilization could come without affecting public investment, and simply cutting wage and transfer payments
  • The IMF recommends setting up government institutions to enforce budget restrictions (the ridiculousness of one government entity stopping a handful of spendthrift entities is mind boggling)

Global Adjustments:

  • Emerging markets that have opted to inflate away debt have seen interest rates skyrocket for years, while other who opted to adjust the primary balance deficit have seen interest rates fall
  • The average G-20 nation will need to adjust its balance sheet 8.8% by the end of the decade to reach public debt targets [RIIIGHT!!!! Like the Maastricht Treaty which, after 18 years has been respected by exactly 0.000000% of its members, all of whom are well below the 3% debt to GDP threshold by about an average of negative 300%!!!!]
  • Over the past 30 years, Greece has made a "large fiscal adjustment" once (1995), where they had more success generating new revenue, andbarely managed to cut expenditures. Greece's inability to make any sort of cuts to preserve fiscal responsibility is going to embarrass the cheerleaders looking to save Europe without lifting a finger. Spanish and Italian efforts have yielded similar results

Long Term Growth:

  • Over the previous 15 years, a clear inverse relationship has developed between debt ratios and real GDP growth
  • Evidence on whether adjustments should be upfront (shock therapy 1990's) or gradual is inconclusive according to IMF staff
  • One of the easier methods of reducing public expenditures is to tighten and reform pension policy (the days of mandatory retirements, backloaded payouts based on final five years average salary, etc, are numbered)
  • Countries with higher domestic debt ownership are more likely to honor debt and have higher debt tolerances among citizenry (i.e. Japanese JGB hoarding vs. USA tea parties)

Conclusion:

            The IMF has an incredible data set to work with yet somehow continues to see a picture far rosier than what meets the eye.  The impacts of measures to manage sovereign debt loads seemed to be futile in the medium-long term.  The situation we currently see is similar to the 1950's in data only.  The demographic makeup of the world today (particularly in Europe) is one that is aging, dependent on entitlement programs, and underfunded pensions that are seeing falling/no incoming revenue.  This is a clear contradiction to the call for managing or reducing entitlement and wage expenditures at the government level (globally), and is a sign that fears over a global sovereign default among advanced economies is a legitimate threat over the next decade.

Related Subscriber Content:

  1. Spain public finances projections_033010 (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  2. UK Public Finances March 2010 (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  3. Italy public finances projection (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  4. Greece Public Finances Projections (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)
  5. Banks exposed to Central and Eastern Europe (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  6. Greek Banking Fundamental Tear Sheet (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  7. Italian Banking Macro-Fundamental Discussion Note (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  8. Spanish Banking Macro Discussion Note (Commercial & Investment Banks)
  9. China Macro Discussion 2-4-10 (Global Macro, Trades & Strategy)

 The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis, to date (free to all)

1.     The Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis - introduces the crisis and identified it as a pan-European problem, not a localized one.

2.     What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? - illustrates the potential for the domino effect

3.     The Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis: If I Were to Short Any Country, What Country Would That Be.. - attempts to illustrate the highly interdependent weaknesses in Europe's sovereign nations can effect even the perceived "stronger" nations.

4.     The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis, Pt 4: The Spread to Western European Countries

5.     The Depression is Already Here for Some Members of Europe, and It Just Might Be Contagious!

6.     The Beginning of the Endgame is Coming???

7.     I Think It's Confirmed, Greece Will Be the First Domino to Fall 

8.     Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!

9.     Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?

10.   "Greek Crisis Is Over, Region Safe", Prodi Says - I say Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! 

11.   Germany Finally Comes Out and Says, "We're Not Touching Greece" - Well, Sort of...

12.   The Greece and the Greek Banks Get the Word "First" Etched on the Side of Their Domino

13.   As I Warned Earlier, Latvian Government Collapses Exacerbating Financial Crisis

14.   Once You Catch a Few EU Countries "Stretching the Truth", Why Should You Trust the Rest?

15.   Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse!

16.   Ovebanked, Underfunded, and Overly Optimistic: The New Face of Sovereign Europe

17.   Moody's Follows Suit Behind Our Analysis and Downgrades 4 Greek Banks

 

 

The EU Has Rescued Greece From the Bond Vigilantes,,, April Fools!!!

How BoomBustBlog Research Intersects with That of the IMF: Greece in the Spotlight

Grecian News and its Relevance to My Analysis

On March 26, EU endorsed the proposal of extending aid to Greece (in case it faces shortage of funds to meet the refinancing and new debt requirements) wherein each euro nation would provide loans to Greece at bend over market rates based on its stake in the European Central Bank. EU would provide more than half the loans and the IMF would provide the rest. The official estimates for the size of the planned assistance have not been disclosed since it would depend on Greece's actual need.  Erik Nielsen, Chief European Economist at GS, estimates Greece will need an 18-month package of as much as €25 billion, with the IMF providing about €10 billion of that. The French newspaper Le Figaro reports that German officials are estimating the total assistance of nearly €22 billion.

On March 26, EU endorsed the proposal of extending aid to Greece (in case it faces shortage of funds to meet the refinancing and new debt requirements) wherein each euro nation would provide loans to Greece at bend over market rates based on its stake in the European Central Bank. EU would provide more than half the loans and the IMF would provide the rest. The official estimates for the size of the planned assistance have not been disclosed since it would depend on Greece's actual need.  Erik Nielsen, Chief European Economist at GS, estimates Greece will need an 18-month package of as much as €25 billion, with the IMF providing about €10 billion of that. The French newspaper Le Figaro reports that German officials are estimating the total assistance of nearly €22 billion.