This is a corrected and extended update of my glance into the Macerich update. This post was delayed due to material data input errors which have been rectified. I've decided to offer a peak into the ongoing analysis of its property portfolio, which combined with its credit and cash flow situation brings to mind the concerns that I have had about GGP about a year before it collapsed (see "GGP and the type of investigative analysis you will not get from your brokerage house.").

In looking at the data that I am about to display, I want readers to think of MAC as an investment entity that you, yourself, would run as a real estate investor. Think of your ability to make money over time, and the viability of your entity if you would actually lose money. As a property investor, I view MAC's properties in terms of being underwater or being profitable on a capital appreciation and NOI basis. As of 11/09, many of MAC's properties are significantly underwater, the ramifications of which depend on the financing utilized, since the use of debt has literally wiped out all of the equity in some, has made others require an equity infusion to roll over the mortgage, and has simply destroyed shareholder capital in other cases.

Even those properties that are 100% equity financed represent a material loss to shareholders where they are underwater. As you will read below, this has occurred in many instances. Very few publicly disseminated REIT analyses seem to take into consideration the ramifications of REITs actually losing money on investments that don't have large loans against them. They should, though. A loss, is a loss, is a loss.  Leverage simply amplifies the loss. That being said, if I paid $30 million in cash for a property that is currently worth $20 million, I lost $10 million (less the real income derived from that property since acquisition) - no matter which way you look at it. At least with a cash purchase, I may have the option of riding it out to hope that the market returns. If I bought the property with a 70% LTV, $21 million loan), not only have I taken a 110%+ loss, but I would probably be forced to write the property off come time to refinance the loan. The leverage significantly reduces my flexibility. This is what happened to GGP.

The next question is, "Will the market come back to where it was when I made these high priced, high leverage purchases?". Reggie's assertion is, "No time in the near future!". Let's take a look at Richard Koo's chart on the Japanese asset bubble, after GDP started to ramp up...

This is a corrected and extended update of my glance into the Macerich update. This post was delayed due to material data input errors which have been rectified. I've decided to offer a peak into the ongoing analysis of its property portfolio, which combined with its credit and cash flow situation brings to mind the concerns that I have had about GGP about a year before it collapsed (see "GGP and the type of investigative analysis you will not get from your brokerage house.").

In looking at the data that I am about to display, I want readers to think of MAC as an investment entity that you, yourself, would run as a real estate investor. Think of your ability to make money over time, and the viability of your entity if you would actually lose money. As a property investor, I view MAC's properties in terms of being underwater or being profitable on a capital appreciation and NOI basis. As of 11/09, many of MAC's properties are significantly underwater, the ramifications of which depend on the financing utilized, since the use of debt has literally wiped out all of the equity in some, has made others require an equity infusion to roll over the mortgage, and has simply destroyed shareholder capital in other cases.

Even those properties that are 100% equity financed represent a material loss to shareholders where they are underwater. As you will read below, this has occurred in many instances. Very few publicly disseminated REIT analyses seem to take into consideration the ramifications of REITs actually losing money on investments that don't have large loans against them. They should, though. A loss, is a loss, is a loss.  Leverage simply amplifies the loss. That being said, if I paid $30 million in cash for a property that is currently worth $20 million, I lost $10 million (less the real income derived from that property since acquisition) - no matter which way you look at it. At least with a cash purchase, I may have the option of riding it out to hope that the market returns. If I bought the property with a 70% LTV, $21 million loan), not only have I taken a 110%+ loss, but I would probably be forced to write the property off come time to refinance the loan. The leverage significantly reduces my flexibility. This is what happened to GGP.

The next question is, "Will the market come back to where it was when I made these high priced, high leverage purchases?". Reggie's assertion is, "No time in the near future!". Let's take a look at Richard Koo's chart on the Japanese asset bubble, after GDP started to ramp up...

As predicted by Zerohedge (see Is Goldman Preparing To Upgrade The REIT Sector?) and probably preordained by their underwriting of REIT debt a couple of weeks ago (see Reggie Middleton Personally Contragulates Goldman, but Questions How Much More Can Be Pulled Off), Goldman Sachs has upgraded the US REIT sector, and put a buy recommendation on Taubman.

If I were you I would keep my eyes open for additional Goldman underwritings in the REIT space in order to help said entities out of their bad debt dilemma, which of course doesn't exist since Goldman just recommended that we buy these companies. That is, until said analysts/strategist leave the employ of their respective bank - then all of a sudden the truth comes out.

Don't believe me, see the off Broadway version of the "Pump 'em and Dump 'em" play - "Here's a Big Company Bailout by the Taxpayer That Even the Taxpayer's Missed!." Don't forget to notice the change of heart of the head REIT analyst right after he leaves Merrill Lynch.

Of course, Wall Street analysts have absolutely nothing to do with their investment banking, broking and trading brethren, Right????

The post on Macerich that I released for a few hours yesterday had a material data input error causing some of the unconsolidated numbers to be off. It is being corrected and I will re-post it once it is fully checked.

As predicted by Zerohedge (see Is Goldman Preparing To Upgrade The REIT Sector?) and probably preordained by their underwriting of REIT debt a couple of weeks ago (see Reggie Middleton Personally Contragulates Goldman, but Questions How Much More Can Be Pulled Off), Goldman Sachs has upgraded the US REIT sector, and put a buy recommendation on Taubman.

If I were you I would keep my eyes open for additional Goldman underwritings in the REIT space in order to help said entities out of their bad debt dilemma, which of course doesn't exist since Goldman just recommended that we buy these companies. That is, until said analysts/strategist leave the employ of their respective bank - then all of a sudden the truth comes out.

Don't believe me, see the off Broadway version of the "Pump 'em and Dump 'em" play - "Here's a Big Company Bailout by the Taxpayer That Even the Taxpayer's Missed!." Don't forget to notice the change of heart of the head REIT analyst right after he leaves Merrill Lynch.

Of course, Wall Street analysts have absolutely nothing to do with their investment banking, broking and trading brethren, Right????

The post on Macerich that I released for a few hours yesterday had a material data input error causing some of the unconsolidated numbers to be off. It is being corrected and I will re-post it once it is fully checked.

The TCO reports are now available. Here is an excerpt from the Professional level report:

The following table summarizes the valuation of each property through NOI-based and CFAT-based approaches. Individual property valuations will be discussed in detail separately, and released to professional subscribers.

Click to enlarge...

tco_ltvs.png                      
The two deep underwater properties - The Piers Shops at Caesars and Regency Square were written down to the fair value by recording impairment charge in 3Q09. While the former is being handed over to the lenders for auction proceedings, the latter still remains with the Company and the Company continues to service its debt obligations.  Additionally, there are 5 more properties with LTV of more than 80%, making them highly susceptible to reach the negative equity territory in case of further declines in rentals or increase in cap rates.

It is noteworthy that properties with high LTV include a) the new developments during 2005- 2008 phase and b) the existing properties against which additional debt was raised during 2005-2008. Among the properties with LTV of more than 80%, Northlake Mall was the new development in 2005, The Piers Shops was acquired in 2007, while additional debt was raised against International Plaza, The Mall at Short Hills, The Mall at Wellington Green and Waterside Shops during 2005-2008.

Additionally, there are four properties - MacArthur Center, The Mall at Partridge Creek, Stony Point and Westfarms - with LTVs in the "immediately at risk" zone.

So, I am sure many are wondering if these properties are destined to be written off, or what??? Well, let's look at the trend...

cap_rate_trend.png

Sharply rising cap rates combined with...

mall_vacancies.png

  Dramatically increasing mall vacancies.

Subscribers can download the full reports here:

TCO Report - Retail TCO Report - Retail 2009-11-27 11:41:15 355.95 Kb

TCO Report - Professional TCO Report - Professional 2009-11-27 11:42:05 663.14 Kb

I will probably be releasing the lenders to these properties in the upcoming week. Any banks that have economic interests in these properties, or others should feel free to reach out to me via phone or email to discuss my research.

The TCO reports are now available. Here is an excerpt from the Professional level report:

The following table summarizes the valuation of each property through NOI-based and CFAT-based approaches. Individual property valuations will be discussed in detail separately, and released to professional subscribers.

Click to enlarge...

tco_ltvs.png                      
The two deep underwater properties - The Piers Shops at Caesars and Regency Square were written down to the fair value by recording impairment charge in 3Q09. While the former is being handed over to the lenders for auction proceedings, the latter still remains with the Company and the Company continues to service its debt obligations.  Additionally, there are 5 more properties with LTV of more than 80%, making them highly susceptible to reach the negative equity territory in case of further declines in rentals or increase in cap rates.

It is noteworthy that properties with high LTV include a) the new developments during 2005- 2008 phase and b) the existing properties against which additional debt was raised during 2005-2008. Among the properties with LTV of more than 80%, Northlake Mall was the new development in 2005, The Piers Shops was acquired in 2007, while additional debt was raised against International Plaza, The Mall at Short Hills, The Mall at Wellington Green and Waterside Shops during 2005-2008.

Additionally, there are four properties - MacArthur Center, The Mall at Partridge Creek, Stony Point and Westfarms - with LTVs in the "immediately at risk" zone.

So, I am sure many are wondering if these properties are destined to be written off, or what??? Well, let's look at the trend...

cap_rate_trend.png

Sharply rising cap rates combined with...

mall_vacancies.png

  Dramatically increasing mall vacancies.

Subscribers can download the full reports here:

TCO Report - Retail TCO Report - Retail 2009-11-27 11:41:15 355.95 Kb

TCO Report - Professional TCO Report - Professional 2009-11-27 11:42:05 663.14 Kb

I will probably be releasing the lenders to these properties in the upcoming week. Any banks that have economic interests in these properties, or others should feel free to reach out to me via phone or email to discuss my research.

As I am going over the final draft of one of the upcoming REIT research reports and a rough draft of the following report (I will release it after Thanksgiving, probably Friday), it is now coming into focus exactly how far underwater this industry actually is. I latched onto one company that appeared to be weak on the surface, but after digging further, actually turned out to be solvent. It is actually one of the better run companies, and outside of the fact that about 20% of its portfolio is underwater, it does not have any lethal issues to contend with. So, "What's the catch?", you say. It is trading at a very significant PREMIUM to it its NAV (yes, and that's with 20% of its portfolio underwater) and is also trading at a PREMIUM to its cash flow after taxes valuation as well. Why is this? Bubble, bubble, bubble. This will probably not end well.

As I am going over the final draft of one of the upcoming REIT research reports and a rough draft of the following report (I will release it after Thanksgiving, probably Friday), it is now coming into focus exactly how far underwater this industry actually is. I latched onto one company that appeared to be weak on the surface, but after digging further, actually turned out to be solvent. It is actually one of the better run companies, and outside of the fact that about 20% of its portfolio is underwater, it does not have any lethal issues to contend with. So, "What's the catch?", you say. It is trading at a very significant PREMIUM to it its NAV (yes, and that's with 20% of its portfolio underwater) and is also trading at a PREMIUM to its cash flow after taxes valuation as well. Why is this? Bubble, bubble, bubble. This will probably not end well.

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